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Assessment of potential bottlenecks along the materials supply chain for the future deployment of 
low-carbon energy and transport technologies in the EU. Wind power, photovoltaic and electric 
vehicles technologies, time frame: 2015-2030 
 
Abstract: 
 
The ambitious EU policy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in combination with a significant adoption of low-
carbon energy and transport technologies will lead to strong growth in the demand for certain raw materials. This 
report addresses the EU resilience in view of supply of the key materials required for the large deployment of 
selected low-carbon technologies, namely wind, photovoltaic and electric vehicles.  A comprehensive 
methodology based on various indicators is used to determine the EU’s resilience to supply bottlenecks along the 
complete supply chain – from raw materials to final components manufacturing. 
The results revealed that, in 2015, the EU had low resilience to supply bottlenecks for dysprosium, neodymium, 
praseodymium and graphite, medium resilience to supply of indium, silver, silicon, cobalt and lithium and high 
resilience to supply of carbon fibre composites. In the worst case scenario where no mitigation measures are 
adopted, the materials list with supply issues will grow until 2030. Indium, silver, cobalt and lithium will add up to 
the 2015 list.  
However, the probability of material supply shortages for these three low-carbon technologies might diminish by 
2030 as a result of mitigation measures considered in the present analysis, i.e. increasing the EU raw materials 
production, adoption of recycling and substitution. In such optimistic conditions, most of the materials 
investigated are rated as medium or high resilience. The exceptions are neodymium and praseodymium in 
electric vehicles, for which the EU resilience will remain low. 
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Executive summary 
Policy context 
The aim of this study is to give a quantitative indication of the EU’s resilience regarding 
the supply of materials relevant for the deployment of low-carbon energy and transport 
technologies. The report focuses on wind, photovoltaic and electric vehicles within the 
2030 time frame. The complete materials supply chain has been considered in this 
analysis – from raw materials to final components production.  
Methodology 
The analysis is based on a comprehensive methodology, which relies on sets of 
indicators aggregated in two dimensions: upstream and downstream.  
The upstream dimension is designed to give an indication of the EU’s resilience in terms 
of a secure, sustainable and adequate supply of raw materials. A set of eight indicators 
in this dimension are developed reflecting different supply aspects. These aspects range 
from the mineral resources availability, current and potential mining/refining suppliers, 
EU reliance on imports, macroeconomic, environmental and geopolitical factors to 
recycling and substitution. Particular attention has been given to estimate the current 
and future demand for materials required for these technologies in the EU and worldwide 
to assess the adequacy of the forthcoming materials supply.  
To complement the resilience evaluation, the downstream dimension – built on a set of 
three indicators – is designed to address the EU supply chain dependency on processed 
materials and components required to underpin the deployment of wind, photovoltaic 
and electric vehicles technologies in the Union. Aspects related to costs, markets and 
investment capability are also included. 
Key conclusions 
The main results of this study are presented in the chart below: 
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The analysis shows that in 2015 the EU had a low resilience to potential bottlenecks in 
the supply for several materials such as: the rare earths – neodymium (Nd), 
praseodymium (Pr) and dysprosium (Dy) – used in wind and electric vehicles 
technologies, as well as for graphite (C) required in rechargeable batteries in electric 
vehicles. Moderate supply issues are seen for indium (In), silver (Ag) and silicon (Si) in 
the photovoltaic technology as well as cobalt (Co) and lithium (Li) in electric vehicles. 
The resilience to supply bottlenecks for carbon fibre composites (CFC) used in wind 
turbine blades is evaluated as high. The demand for selenium (Se), copper (Cu), gallium 
(Ga), tellurium (Te) and cadmium (Cd) in photovoltaic technology is marginal compared 
to the global supply. Therefore, for these materials the estimated EU resilience is also 
high. 
The resilience will change by 2030 mainly due to increasing materials demand as a result 
of growing deployment rates of these technologies as well as potential adoption of 
different mitigation measures to improve material supply. Under a conservative scenario, 
defined here as a baseline scenario where no mitigation measures will be in place, the 
EU resilience to supply bottlenecks for a larger number of materials is assessed as low. 
This will include Nd, Pr and Dy for wind turbines and electric vehicles, In and Ag for 
photovoltaic, as well as Co, graphite and Li for electric vehicles. Some moderate supply 
issues are expected for Si in photovoltaic while no issues are envisaged for CFC in wind 
turbine as well as Se, Cd, Cu, Ga and Te in photovoltaic technology. 
The EU resilience to materials supply bottlenecks might improve considerably by 2030 if 
adequate measures to balance the expected growing material demand are taken. Such 
measures include an increase in the EU raw materials production, recycling or 
implementing substitution. In such optimistic conditions, the EU resilience to supply 
bottlenecks of rare earths in wind turbines is expected to evolve from low to medium. A 
similar transition, from low to medium resilience, could be also seen for In and Ag in 
photovoltaic technology. The most stringent situation in terms of material supply is 
expected for electric vehicles. For this technology, the EU resilience to materials supply 
bottlenecks remains low for Nd and Pr, medium for Dy, graphite and Co, while for Li it is 
still medium but approaching the low resilience threshold.  
Finally, the report identifies the mitigation measures that are best suited to ensure a 
secure supply along the value chain of materials in each of the investigated technologies. 
For the majority of the materials, it appears that substitution is the most effective 
measure to improve the EU resilience to supply bottlenecks, followed by recycling and 
increasing the EU’s production of raw materials. Engagement to promote such mitigation 
measures is likely to be essential for securing materials supply for the deployment of 
these three low-carbon technologies. 
Future work will look at potential material issues in other sectors such as efficient 
lighting, energy storage and smart grids. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Following the adoption in 2008 of the Raw Materials Initiative, which represents the EU’s 
strategy for securing reliable and unhindered access to raw materials, in 2013, the 
European Commission moved into the implementation phase of the RMI through the 
European Innovation Partnership (EIP) on raw materials. The context of the EU’s current 
raw materials policy covers the sustainable sourcing of raw materials from global 
markets, sustainable and environmentally friendly domestic material production, and 
resource efficiency and the supply of secondary raw materials. 
An overview of the challenges facing the EU related to raw materials is presented in the 
recently published Raw Materials Scoreboard [RMS, 2016]. Among general aspects on 
the raw materials policy context and the EIP's general objectives, the Scoreboard 
specifically highlights that materials are indispensable for the development and large-
scale deployment of low-carbon energy technologies in the EU. 
Low-carbon technologies play a fundamental role in Europe’s transition towards a clean, 
secure and competitive economy. They are essential for achieving both the EU’s climate 
and energy targets and its policy objectives, as shown in the Energy Union Framework 
Strategy [EC, 2015]. For instance, these technologies require significant amounts of 
steel, copper and aluminium as well as a vast array of speciality metals. In most cases, 
the annual demand for raw materials used in certain low-carbon technologies is 
projected to increase significantly by 2030 (Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1: Projected variation in the EU’s annual demand for raw materials in selected 
low-carbon technologies from 2012 to 2030 [RMS, 2016] 
Some of the raw materials needed for low-carbon technologies are also used in other 
European economic sectors, such as construction, transport, ICT, defence, etc. Based on 
economic importance and the level of risk to supply, some raw materials are evaluated 
as "critical" and as such are included in the 2014 EU critical raw materials list [EC, 
2014]. 
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While the EU criticality assessment addresses the whole European economy, in 2011 and 
2013, the JRC carried out and published specific studies on the identification of those 
materials which could become a bottleneck in the supply chain of various low-carbon 
energy technologies [JRC, 2011 and 2013]. The latest JRC analysis was based on a 
three-step bottom-up approach (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2: JRC approach applied in 2013 for assessing bottlenecks in material supply in 
low-carbon energy technologies [JRC, 2013] 
In this study, 32 materials were identified as being significant for the decarbonisation of 
the European energy system. When taking market and geopolitical factors into account, 
eight of them, namely Dy, Eu, Tb, Y, Pr, Nd, Ga and Te, were classified as "highly 
critical". The technologies of particular concern, due to their reliance on critical materials 
listed in the JRC report, were identified as follows: wind energy, electric vehicles, solar 
photovoltaic and fluorescent lighting [JRC, 2013]. 
Due to the continuous evolution in the materials supply/demand parameters, technology 
deployment scenarios, new players and policy context changes, a new investigation is 
necessary into material supply bottlenecks for low-carbon technologies. This assessment 
is also intended to reflect the latest market developments as well as recent projections 
about economic activity in energy and transport, as reflected for instance in the EU 
reference scenario [EC, 2016a] in view of achieving the EU’s climate and energy targets 
for 2030 and beyond. 
Various methods are used to evaluate the reliability of the materials supply and/or the 
effect of price volatility on a manufacturer or the economic sector. These methods are 
needed for monitoring the materials flow and helping decision-makers to prevent or 
mitigate the effects in case of shortages in supplies. Such assessments are often based 
on a different set of parameters or indicators. Given the materials supply issues, a 
specific methodology has been developed in this study to investigate which materials 
could become a bottleneck in the future high deployment rates forecast for low-carbon 
technologies in the EU. This methodology is built on previous research conducted by the 
JRC on material criticality and also takes into account inputs from stakeholders and other 
insights expressed in the scientific literature. This new approach is applied to materials 
used in three emerging low-carbon technologies – wind power, photovoltaic and electric 
vehicles. 
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1.2 Scope of the study 
This study aims to investigate whether the supply of certain materials along their supply 
chain may represent a barrier to the widespread deployment of low-carbon energy and 
transport technologies, thereby putting at risk the achievement of the EU's renewable 
and low-emission mobility goals. In particular, this study examines materials that can 
either hinder or slow down the forecasted deployment of three low-carbon technologies 
in the EU by 2030: wind power, photovoltaic and electric vehicles (Figure 3). 
The analysis is based on a 
methodology which takes into account 
various material issues, limitations 
and dependencies along the supply 
chain at both the upstream and 
downstream supply stages. Overall, 
15 different materials are 
investigated in this study. 
The results are expressed in terms of 
EU resilience to material supply 
shortages for low-carbon technologies. 
The methodology developed within 
this study allows for the assessment 
of each individual material in relation 
to its use in a particular technology. 
The impact of three main mitigation 
measures is assessed in relation to 
overcoming potential bottlenecks, 
namely recycling, substitution and EU 
raw materials production. Four 
different assessment scenarios are 
considered: baseline scenario, where 
no mitigation measures are in place 
and other three scenarios, which 
combine different mitigation 
measures. All these scenarios are 
explained in the next section. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Overview of materials 
required in the wind power, 
photovoltaic and electric vehicles 
technologies analysed in this study 
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2 Methodology 
Materials play a crucial role when it comes to deploying low-carbon technologies (LCT). 
Potential limitations and bottlenecks in the supply of materials along the entire value 
chain – from raw materials to the final product – may hinder the deployment of LCT. 
This is particularly relevant considering the latest EU scenarios which foresee an increase 
in the share of LCT. 
The high degree of resilience desired should be characterised by a sustainable and 
secure access to raw materials and components, a diversified supply, high recycling 
rates and substitution alternatives. All these aspects are elements of the proposed 
assessment methodology which aims to evaluate EU resilience in view of the adequate 
access to raw materials, processed materials and components required for a given LCT. 
The considered time horizon ranges from 2015 to 2030. 
In more detail, the methodology relies on sets of indicators aggregated in two 
dimensions: upstream (D1) and downstream (D2), as described below (Figure 4): 
 
 
Figure 4: JRC’s methodological approach for assessing EU resilience to material supply 
shortages along its supply chain 
The research and information analysed in this study were collected from a wide variety 
of sources, such as: public databases, industry/consultancy reports, articles, market 
trend analysis, etc. In some cases, an exhaustive analysis of future developments was 
difficult to carry out due to limited data. In such cases, appropriate assumptions were 
made, as explained in Annex B and Annex C. 
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2.1 Dimensions 
The upstream dimension (D1) is designed to give an indication of EU resilience in terms 
of a secure and sustainable supply of raw materials. D1 comprises eight indicators 
related to the geological availability of raw materials and their supply, macroeconomic 
and geopolitical factors, demand, import reliance, recycling and substitution: 
• D1.1 is a composite indicator which analyses the progression of EU demand based 
on the existing deployment scenarios for each LCT. If the demand is <1 % of the 
global supply it is considered that such a material does not pose issues for the 
deployment of the given LCT; 
 D1.2 analyses the EU’s investment power progression in relation to other leading 
countries: GDP is used as a proxy; 
 D1.3 is a composite indicator evaluating the concentration of supply weighted by 
the political stability of supplier countries; 
 D1.4 examines the adequacy of the reserves, as known today; 
 D1.5 evaluates the EU’s import reliance progression; 
 D1.6 estimates the present and future mine capacity utilisation ratio; 
 D1.7 considers future recycling trends; 
 D1.8 is devoted to the substitution potential. 
 
The downstream dimension (D2) comprises three indicators: 
 D2.1 goes beyond the raw materials issue and examines the likelihood of supply 
shortages that may occur downstream in the material supply chain; thus it covers 
EU dependence on the supply of processed materials/alloys/compounds as well as 
components and final products. Another aspect is whether the EU has the 
manufacturing capacity as well as the suitable infrastructure to supply the 
required processed materials, components or final products. 
 D2.2 indicates whether the EU has sufficient purchasing potential when compared 
to other competitor countries to respond to an eventual supply shortage along 
the supply chain or to incentivise and facilitate the penetration of a new 
technology. 
 D2.3 gives a simple economical measure of the contribution of an individual 
material to the final component/product cost. It is assumed here that if the 
material is a significant part of the total component cost, an escalation in the 
eventual material cost may hinder further technology deployment. 
More details for each individual indicator are given in section 2.2. 
The EU reference scenario and other official EU targets, as well as industry forecasts, 
latest trends and learning curves are used to establish the evolution in the indicators and 
to make the necessary projections until 2030. In cases where data is unavailable, a 
dedicated extrapolation analysis was performed. 
 
2.2 Indicators 
The indicators are graded on a scale ranging from 'zero' to 'one'. Zero represents 
minimum EU resilience and one represents maximum resilience: 
1 = max EU resilience 
0 = min EU resilience 
 15 
 
2.2.1 D1.1 Material demand 
D1.1. is a composite indicator consisting of three sub-indicators. The selected sub-
indicators represent different aspects of the material demand, bearing in mind that there 
is competition for the same material globally (worldwide) as well as within EU. They also 
consider that the same material is used for different end-uses/sectors. 
Details of each sub-indicator are given below: 
 
D1.1.1 Annual EU demand for a material in a specific technology as a fraction of 
its annual global (world) demand in all end-uses/sectors 
𝐷1.1.1 =  
𝐸𝑈 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦
𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑
 
D1.1.1 compares the EU’s material needs for the deployment of a given technology with 
the global demand for such material. If the EU demand represents a significant fraction, 
there is a high likelihood of a shortage in supply that may affect a given technology 
deployment in the EU. Conversely, it is assumed that if a technology requires only a very 
small fraction of the global demand, the likelihood of supply shortage is very low. A 
threshold value of 1 % is assumed for D1.1.1. If D1.1.1 < 1 %, the material will not 
represent a bottleneck in the deployment of this specific technology, and this is also 
used as a significance screening. 
D1.1.1 is a function of time and is calculated based on the expected average growth 
rates of the selected technology within the EU. Relevant documents, such as the EU 
scenarios, roadmaps, strategies, etc. are used to assess the projected demand. Data are 
also taken from relevant material/technology sources, as well as available commercial 
information. Scientific publications are used to identify the material intensity in the 
selected technology. 
 
D1.1.2 Annual EU demand for a material for a specific technology as a fraction 
of its annual EU demand in all end-uses/sectors 
𝐷1.1.2 =  
𝐸𝑈 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦
𝐸𝑈 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠
 
D1.1.2 represents the sectorial competition within the EU for the evaluated material. The 
technology being considered will compete with other sectors requiring the same 
material. While, in general, more conventional sectors register a steady increase of a few 
percentages per annum, the emerging technologies can even double each year (e.g. 
electric vehicle deployment rates have been higher than 100 % in recent years). Greater 
sectorial competition even within the EU implies a higher likelihood of supply difficulties. 
 
D1.1.3 Annual EU demand for a material in all end-uses/sectors as a fraction of 
the global material demand 
𝐷1.1.3 =  
𝐸𝑈 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠
𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑
 
D1.1.3 gives an approximation on how the EU is competing with the rest of the world for 
a particular material, bearing in mind all the main applications of this material. If the 
demand for a given material also increases significantly worldwide, this may put 
pressure on the continuity of its supply. 
The combination of the three sub-indicators is done by the weighted average. The 
weighting factors are chosen to give more emphasis on D1.1.1 which is considered to be 
the leading one in the formula below. These three sub-indicators and their weighted 
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average measure the likelihood of a shortage of supply in raw materials due to demand 
increase: 
𝐷1.1 = 1 − (60 % ∗ 𝐷1.1.1 + 10 % ∗ 𝐷1.1.2 + 30 % ∗ 𝐷1.1.3) 
D1.1 is, of course, time dependent and is consistently calculated in this way for each 
year between 2015 and 2030.  
Note: Since several deployment scenarios have been considered here for each 
technology, D1.1 indicator has been calculated for each deployment scenario. The final 
D1.1 is then taken as the arithmetic average of the D1.1 indicators obtained for each 
deployment scenario. 
 
2.2.2 D1.2 Investment potential 
D1.2 indicates the EU’s relative investment potential compared to other big world 
economies considered as possible EU competitors. It is assumed that a higher potential 
to invest may better facilitate possible expansion of the materials supply chain 
upstream. Besides financial means, environmental constraints are also considered. 
For instance, expanding or opening new mines and/or refining capacities requires 
significant investments, which are only possible when sufficient purchasing power is 
available, as well as suitable environmental conditions (leaving apart the availability of 
geological resources). Therefore, countries with higher investment potential and fewer 
environmental restrictions (providing that they also have resources) may be better 
placed when it comes to a secure supply of raw materials. 
Indicator D1.2 has more of a market and geopolitical relevance than specific material or 
technology pertinence; thus, it is assumed equal for all materials/technologies 
considered in this report. 
A country’s GDP gives a broadly accepted proxy of its economic and financial 
performance. Countries with fast-growing GDP have more potential to invest and attract 
more foreign investments. For this analysis, countries with GDP comparable to that of 
the EU are possible competitors of the EU in terms of investment potential, especially if 
they have a higher GDP Annual Growth Rate (AGR). The following countries have been 
identified as the EU’s potential competitors, i.e. having similar GDP and similar or higher 
GDP–AGR: USA, China, Japan, Brazil, India, Russia, Canada, Australia and South Korea. 
Countries’ GDPs are then weighted using the Environmental Performance Index (EPI) 
which ranks how well countries perform on high-priority environmental issues [EPI, 
2016]. The EPI is used as a proxy of the environmental constraints on expanding 
existing facilities and/or opening new mines in order to increase production of raw 
materials. The EPI values are higher for countries with higher environmental standards 
or, in other words, more environmental restrictions on opening new mines or extending 
existing ones. Therefore, (1-EPI) is used to give more weight to countries with fewer 
environmental constraints. 
Thus, the EU’s investment potential is presented as the ratio between EU GDP and the 
total GDP, being the summation of EU GDP and the non-EU GDP of the nine competitor 
countries selected for the analysis. All countries’ GDPs are weighted by their EPIs as 
follows: 
𝐷1.2 =
∑ (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐸𝑈𝑖 ∗ (1 − 𝐸𝑃𝐼𝐸𝑈𝑖))
28
𝑖=1
∑ (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝐸𝑈𝑗 ∗ (1 − 𝐸𝑃𝐼𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝐸𝑈𝑗))
9
𝑗=1 + ∑ (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐸𝑈𝑖 ∗ (1 − 𝐸𝑃𝐼𝐸𝑈𝑖))
28
𝑖=1
 
D1.2 is calculated for 2015 and 2030 using 2015 GDP data and 2030 projections from 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s database [OECD, 
2016b]. For the years 2020 and 2025, a linear data interpolation has been done. 
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The most recent EPI values for the EU and non-EU countries have been used for the 
entire period since no future EPI projections can be found.  
 
2.2.3 D1.3 Stability of supply 
D1.3 is a composite indicator measuring the stability of supply for both mining (D1.3 
mining) and refining (D1.3 refining) stages. 
The supply of specific material could be constrained if production is concentrated in a 
limited number of countries which lack political stability. Such circumstance may lead to 
disruptive events such as supply shortages or price escalation. The conventional 
approach to measuring the concentration of supply is based on the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index (HHI). HHI is the sum of the squares of the market shares of the supplier 
countries, and can range from close to zero to 10 000. One country supplier of a given 
raw material will result in the highest market concentration close to a monopoly, i.e. 
100 % share. Then HHI = (100^2) = 10 000. If hundreds of countries are competing as 
suppliers, their market share will be close to 0 %, resulting in an HHI close to zero. 
It is also important to take into account the reliability of each supply country. For this 
purpose, the World Governance Index (WGI), commonly accepted as a proxy of a 
country’s political stability, is used as a weighting factor [WGI, 2015]. The WGI is a 
cross-country indicator of governance and covers over 200 countries and territories, 
measuring six dimensions of governance: voice and accountability, political stability and 
absence of violence/terrorism, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law 
and control of corruption. The WGI values ranging originally from ‘-2.21’ to ‘+1.87’ are 
re-scaled from 0 to 1 to fit the present methodology. Thus, more stable countries have a 
higher WGI (closer to 1). 
In this analysis, for both the mining and refining stages, the current (2015) 
concentration of supply is weighted by (1-WGI) using the following equitation, which is a 
modified version of the conventional HHI: 
𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑊𝐺𝐼 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 (𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔)  = ∑(𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖
2 ∗ (1 − 𝑊𝐺𝐼𝑖))
𝑖
 
𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑊𝐺𝐼 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 (𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔)  = ∑(𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖
2 ∗ (1 − 𝑊𝐺𝐼𝑖))
𝑖
 
where 'i' is the number of suppliers. 
(1-WGI) is used as a weighting factor to give more weight to the more stable countries. 
By so doing, the concentration of supply can be mitigated (improved) if the major 
suppliers are politically stable countries. 
D1.3 mining and D1.3 refining are then assessed as follows: 
𝐷1.3 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 1–
𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑊𝐺𝐼 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 (𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔)
10000
 
𝐷1.3 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 1–
𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑊𝐺𝐼 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 (𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔)
10000
 
Different weights are used to sum the two components: 
𝐷1.3 = 70% ∗ 𝐷1.3𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 30% ∗ 𝐷1.3𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 
A larger weighting factor is applied to the mining stage to reflect the higher risk profile of 
the extraction phase. 
For each raw material under consideration, both present and future production scenarios 
until 2030 are assessed. The actual production shares are normally available for most 
raw materials, which are used to calculate HHI for 2015. 
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Future potential supply statistics in terms of mining and refining shares are however not 
available. For the mining stage, supply predictions until 2030 were made from 
information on the production capacities of operating mines and projects currently on 
the development stage. Capacity expansions of operating mines are also taken into 
consideration. For this purpose, an inventory of anticipated mine production capacities of 
mines in the preproduction stage and planned capacities of projects in 'reserves 
development', 'pre-feasibility' and 'feasibility' stages was compiled. However 
uncertainties exist in relation to the completeness of the used data sets as well as 
market conditions which are critical for the timing of the additional production capability. 
For example, very often projects have indication of planned production capacity without 
year of commencement. To make allowance for delays in the delivery of mine projects, 
fixed development timeframes were applied to the projects in the production pipeline: 
mines currently under construction are expected to 'be operational in 2018; projects 
under feasibility-stage (either started or completed) are expected to come on-stream in 
2020; supply from 'prefeasibility' and 'reserves development-stage' projects is expected 
to be available only beyond 2025.  
Unlike for the mining stage, there is less extensive and structured information available 
for the refining stage. Regarding the data on future refining capacities, the present 
refining capacities are used and, where possible, are complemented with new data. 
Since no WGI forecasting is available, the latest WGI values available for 2014 are used 
for the whole period from 2015 until 2030. 
D1.3 is time dependent and is calculated in this manner for each year between 2015 and 
2030. 
 
2.2.4 D1.4 Depletion of reserves 
D1.4 indicator gives a rough estimation of the future availability of the materials and 
aims to give an indication of the long-term sustainable access to a certain commodity. It 
is based on the ratio between reserves and consumption over time. 
The resources and reserves situation is often included in criticality studies with a long-
term focus. Reserves refer to those amounts of raw materials which have been 
confirmed and can be economically recovered with currently available technology. 
The static Reserves Depletion Index (RDI) is utilised to provide a conservative 
estimation. It gives the number of years of consumption using the known global reserves 
and forecasted global consumption. 
The reserves of each subsequent year are obtained by extracting the global production 
in the previous year, leading to the depletion in reserves. 
𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑛 =
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 (𝑛−1)– 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 (𝑛−1)
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑛
 
Here, the consumption is assumed to be equal to the forecasted global demand, 
calculated within D1.1 indicator, thus: 
𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑛 =
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 (𝑛−1)– 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 (𝑛−1)
𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑛
 
For the majority of raw materials, the RDI is greater than 15 years. This indicates 
adequate reserves and therefore no issues concerning future access over the considered 
time frame. D1.4 is then assumed to be equal to 1, giving the maximum contribution to 
the D1 resilience dimension. 
In the few cases, the RDI is less than 15 years. In such cases, D1.6 is progressively 
reduced down to the value of 0.7 to reflect a smaller contribution to the D1 resilience 
dimension. 
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In other words, RDI above 15 years is considered as a benchmark for an acceptable 
situation, while values below 15 years are considered as a potential supply issue. 
As mentioned before, the selected approach is conservative. In fact, the reserves and 
their static lifetime are by no means fixed amounts. It is common for mineral resources 
to be upgraded to ore reserves and subsequently mined. Moreover, additions to the 
reserve base are expected to be achieved and credited to exploration work involved in 
establishing new deposits. Historical analyses show that the static lifetime of reserves 
tends to be maintained over time. 
D1.4 is calculated in this way for each year between 2015 and 2030. 
 
2.2.5 D1.5 Import reliance 
Import reliance must be taken into account when assessing bottlenecks which can 
impede the deployment of a certain technology. A high degree of import reliance on raw 
materials from outside implies a high likelihood of supply shortages and/or price 
increase, specifically when combined with a high concentration of supply. 
In general, the import reliance is calculated as the ratio between the net import and net 
consumption: 
𝐼𝑅 =  
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
 
where 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 = 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡– 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡– 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 
Only the current EU imports and exports of different commodities are available in the 
Eurostat database, while no import/export data are available for the future. To deal with 
this, the following logic is considered to calculate the IR for a given commodity: raw 
materials not mined in the EU, not recycled in the EU and not substituted will have to be 
imported to satisfy EU demand. 
The EU net import is approximated as follows: 
𝐸𝑈 𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 = 𝐸𝑈𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑– 𝐸𝑈𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑈 − 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑈  
The EU net consumption is assumed to be equal to the EU demand. 
In this case, the general formulation of IR becomes: 
𝐼𝑅 =  
𝐸𝑈𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑– 𝐸𝑈𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑈 − 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑈
𝐸𝑈𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑
 
The methodology aims to measure EU resilience but higher import reliance leads to 
lower resilience (low D1.5 value). Conversely, marginal IR will lead to high resilience. 
Indicator D1.5 is then defined as follows: 
𝐷1.5 = 1– 𝐼𝑅 
Domestic EU production, recycling and substitution are different ways to reduce the 
import reliance and increase the resilience. D1.5 is also time dependent and is calculated 
in this way for each year between 2015 and 2030. 
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Note: The EU import reliance is calculated for each deployment scenario. The average 
value is taken consequently to estimate the import reliance for each assessment 
scenario. 
 
2.2.6 D1.6 Supply adequacy 
Increasing material demand is a common feature of growing economies and is not a 
limiting factor per se if the supply capacity can grow accordingly to cope in a timely way 
with the demand; this is referred to as supply adequacy. Sufficient capacity must be in 
place to satisfy a sudden increase in the demand. D1.6 indicator assesses the supply 
adequacy of raw materials on a global scale until 2030. 
One of the distinctive characteristics of the mining industry is the industry’s slow 
response time to changes in the rhythm of demand, normally referred to as supply 
inelasticity [Humphreys, 2012]. While the establishment of a new mine takes significant 
time, an existing mine provides certain elasticity to supply – companies very often enjoy 
spare capacities that are strategic assets to maximise profits as prices increase. Use of 
the mine capacity tends to fluctuate with business cycles, with companies adjusting 
production volumes in response to changing demand. The capacity utilisation rate, used 
in this analysis as a measure of supply adequacy, measures the proportion of potential 
output that is actually achieved. In response to market signals, a company with less 
than 100 % utilisation can theoretically increase production without incurring expensive 
overhead costs. 
In mining, however, production can be suppressed far below capacity unintentionally. 
Reasons for this include geological problems, such as faulting or unexpected ore-grade 
declines, mining issues such as pit-wall failures or rock bursts, and a long list of more 
random events like strikes, mechanical failures, accidents, power outages and weather 
events [Humphreys, 2012]. 
To perform the calculations, current demand and demand projections for a raw material 
over time (again considered to match production in a given year), are compared with 
existing and forecast capacities to give the capacity utilisation rate: 
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 =
𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑
𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦
 
The extent to which capacity utilisation would have to be pushed forward to cope with 
the demand levels forecast is then assessed and scored. 
In most cases, capacity utilisation rate is below 70 % which gives a sufficient margin to 
increase the production in a timely manner and avoiding a supply disruption event. In 
the present analysis, this is anticipated as an appropriate supply adequacy. 
Consequently, D1.6 is then assumed to be equal to 1, giving maximum contribution to 
the D1 resilience dimension. A higher rate of capacity utilisation indicates a reduced 
potential to respond to a sudden increase in demand. In these few cases, D1.6 is 
progressively reduced up to the value of 0.7 to reflect a lower contribution to the D1 
resilience dimension. 
D1.6 is time dependent and is calculated in this manner for 2015, 2020, 2025 and 2030. 
 
2.2.7 D1.7 Recycling 
Recycling is a way to reduce the demand for primary raw materials by generating the 
so-called secondary materials flows. Although recycling rates for some materials are 
very low today, a significant increase in secondary flows is expected in the next five to 
10 years, not least thanks to different policy initiatives taken at both the EU level and 
globally. This time horizon is the estimated time for the development, demonstration and 
market introduction of new recycling technologies. Improving the collection rates of end-
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of-life products is also a priority for the EU, which is expected to generate significant 
flows of secondary materials. 
D1.7 indicator represents the overall recycling rate for each material as explained 
herein. It accounts for the potential of the global future secondary materials supply as a 
means of mitigating the growing global demand for primary raw materials and thereby 
decreasing the pressure on their supply. In addition, such global secondary flows of 
materials also offer a diversification in supply which is a positive factor for the EU’s 
resilience, and in cases where recycling takes place outside the EU, too. 
Information on technological and additional economical aspects are necessary in order to 
estimate the potential recycling rates of materials until 2030, starting from today's 
negligible recycling rate. 
For example, the main obstacles for the mass recycling of many materials nowadays are 
economic factors rather than technological difficulties. If the price of the recycled 
material is several times higher than the price of the freshly mined material, the industry 
does not have any incentive to invest in recycling capacities and develop/improve 
recycling technologies. 
For simplicity and as a conservative approach, only the potential increase in recycling 
rates in the future is considered for materials that are already being recycled. For 
example, if the global end-of-life recycling rate of a given material is currently 30 % but 
has the potential to increase to 70 % over the next 10 years, only the additional 40 % is 
considered gradually (using an S-shape learning curve) as a means to increasing the 
future supply during this period. 
Depending on the available information on recycling of new (usually referred to as 
production) scrap and old (end-of-life) scrap, both are considered for the calculation of 
indicator D1.7. This is done for the different end-uses/sectors for the material being 
investigated, also taking into account the collection rate (CR) and recovery rate (RR). 
 
𝐷1.7(2030) = ∑ (
𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖 ∗ (𝐶𝑅 𝑛𝑒𝑤 𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑝 ∗ 𝑅𝑅 𝑛𝑒𝑤 𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑝 + 𝐶𝑅 𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑝 ∗ 𝑅𝑅 𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑝)𝑖
2
)
𝑖
 
where 'i' is the number of end-uses/sectors. 
As can be seen, the defined recycling rates from old and new scrap for the different end-
uses/sectors are summed up after weighting them by the relevant material shares in 
these end-uses/sectors. 
For materials for which collection and recovery rates from new and old scrap are not 
available, the most logical assumptions are made based simply on potential future 
shares of the materials in the different end-use/sector. Such assumptions have been 
validated by industry experts. 
The import reliance on certain materials can also be mitigated via recycling. Therefore, 
potential future recycling rates have also been taken into account in indicator D1.5. 
However, only quantities recycled within the EU are assumed to have the potential to 
reduce the EU import dependency on primary materials. If specific details are not 
available on future recycling facilities to be commissioned in the EU, information on 
global estimations is used assuming that the EU will follow the global evolution as 
regards developments in recycling. Recycling is already an essential part of the EU’s 
Circular Economy Package. To confirm the assumption and to get a more realistic picture 
on the future recycling rates for different materials within the EU, opinions of experts 
from companies operating in the recycling business, such as Umicore, have been taken 
into account. 
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2.2.8 D1.8 Substitution 
Substitution is a sustainable strategy to moderate the demand of some critical materials 
and thus reduce the pressure on their supply. Beyond reducing pressure on supply, it 
can be also an innovative way to create diversification and contribute to the D1 
resilience dimension. 
D1.8 represents the overall substitution rate for each material, as explained below. 
The materials substitution possibilities are analysed for their main end-uses/sectors by 
determining the material use and its share in these sectors. Further, the substitution 
potential until 2030 is defined for each end-use/sector based on the latest technological 
developments and R&D findings. Not only is the straightforward case of ‘material for 
material’ substitution considered, but alternative technologies may also be regarded de 
facto as a form of substitution and therefore considered in the analysis. The defined 
substitution rates for the different end-uses/sectors are summed up after weighting 
them by their relevant material shares in these end-uses/sectors. In this way, the 
overall material substitution rate for 2030 is defined. 
Once again for simplicity and as a conservative approach, the substitution rate for each 
material is assumed to be zero in 2015. It gradually reaches the calculated overall 2030 
substitution rate by following an S-shape curve. 
In addition, substitution is meant to reduce the EU import dependence on certain 
materials by moderating its demand for these materials. Thus, the substitution effect 
was also considered for indicator D1.5. 
Note: For materials which are extremely abundant in nature (e.g. silicon and carbon in 
this study) the indicators related to recycling and substitution are less pertinent and 
therefore should not be taken into account. For these materials, only the six other 
indicators are considered within the upstream dimension. 
 
2.2.9 D2.1 Supply chain dependency 
D2.1 is a composite indicator giving an indication of the EU dependency of the 
downstream supply for each material and for each step of the supply chain pertinent to a 
specific technology. The supply chain steps are identified for each technology excluding 
the mining and refining stages which have already been addressed in the upstream 
dimension. Thus, the supply chain steps investigated within this indicator range from 
materials processing to manufacturing of semi-finished/final products, such as special 
alloys, composites, etc. and components. 
The key supply chain steps are identified and where necessary clustered to reflect data 
availability. For each selected step, supply chain analysis is conducted resulting in the 
definition of two parameters: concentration of supply weighted by WGI, as parameter 'A' 
(see indicator D1.3) and EU supply share, as parameter 'B'. 
High dependency on different stages in the supply chain will increase the likelihood of 
potential supply chain bottlenecks and thus reduce EU resilience downstream. 
Conversely, low dependency along the supply chain indicates high EU resilience for the 
deployment of a specific technology. 
Since D2.1 indicates ‘dependency’, thus parameter 'A' representing the concentration of 
supply is calculated as the complement to 1 for each supply chain step (similarly to 
indicator D1.3): 
𝐴𝑖 = 1 −
𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑊𝐺𝐼 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 (𝑖)
10000
 
where 
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𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑊𝐺𝐼 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 (𝑖) = ∑ 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑗
2 ∗ (1 − 𝑊𝐺𝐼𝑗)
𝑗
 
where 'i' is the number of the identified steps and 'j' is the number of suppliers in each 
step. 
The EU countries' shares are grouped together and a WGI equal to 1 is assigned, 
indicating maximum security of supply. There are also a few unknown suppliers. In this 
case, WGI is assumed to be equal to 0.5. 
As for parameter 'B', a higher EU share for each supply chain step also indicates higher 
resilience; thus a direct relation is used: 
𝐵𝑖 = 𝐸𝑈 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖  
D2.1i for each step 'i' is then calculated as the arithmetic average of the two parameters 
– 'Ai' and 'Bi'. 
𝐷2.1𝑖 = 𝐴𝑖 ∗ 𝐵𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
Lastly, the overall D2.1 is the average of D2.1i determined for all identified steps. 
The calculation of D2.1 is done for every five-year interval between 2015 and 2030. 
Data on 2015 capacities are well established. When available, newly announced 
capacities are added to the existing capacity in 2015 to update the A and B parameters. 
 
2.2.10 D2.2 Purchasing potential 
In a similar way to D1.2, D2.2 measures the EU’s relative potential to purchase, using 
the countries’ GDP as a proxy. Since Dimension 2 is dedicated to downstream supply 
chain limitations, besides the countries’ investment potential, it is also important to 
consider the individual purchasing power of those citizens ready to pay higher price for a 
product (EVs in this case). Therefore, both the GDP at country level and the GDP per 
capita are taken into consideration when estimating the D2.2 indicator. 
While the first indicator within dimension 2 gives an indication of the EU dependency and 
limitations along the material/technology supply chain, the second indicator evaluates 
the EU’s potential capability to respond to supply shortages as well as increased prices. 
Growing competition may be expected in coming decades since the nine large economies 
selected here have already announced their plans to significantly increase the share of 
renewables and to deploy EVs extensively. This may restrict the supply to the EU and/or 
push up the prices of processed materials and components. 
Furthermore, the deployment rate of an emerging technology depends to a larger extent 
on the infrastructural developments and support: e.g. deployment of EVs is largely 
dependent on the availability of charging stations, suitable grid, and maintenance 
facilities, etc. Incentivising is another mechanism which contributes to achieving faster 
deployment rates. Adequate infrastructural support and incentives are dependent on a 
country’s ability to invest in emerging technologies until the technology becomes 
competitive. 
Moreover, factors such as environmental restrictions in different countries, as well as the 
support given by various governments to the deployment of green technologies, also 
play a significant role when evaluating how promptly and easily an emerging technology 
will be deployed. To account for this, countries' GDP and GDPs per capita are both 
weighted using the EPI related to the climate and energy indicator, which includes 
access to electricity, trends in CO2 emissions per KWh, and trends in carbon intensity. 
The EPI values are higher for those countries which comply better with the above 
parameters. More weight is thus given to those countries which will become stronger 
competitors. 
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The following formula is applied to calculate the D2.2 indicator: 
𝐷2.2 =
𝐶 + 𝐷
2
 
where 
𝐶 =
∑ (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐸𝑈𝑖 ∗ (1 − 𝐸𝑃𝐼𝐸𝑈𝑖))
28
𝑖=1
∑ (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝐸𝑈𝑗 ∗ (1 − 𝐸𝑃𝐼𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝐸𝑈𝑗))
9
𝑗=1 + ∑ (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐸𝑈𝑖 ∗ (1 − 𝐸𝑃𝐼𝐸𝑈𝑖))
28
𝑖=1
 
and 
𝐷 =  
 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎 𝐸𝑈𝑖 ∗ 𝐸𝑃𝐼𝐸𝑈𝑖
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎 𝐸𝑈𝑖 ∗ 𝐸𝑃𝐼𝐸𝑈𝑖
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ +  𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎 𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝐸𝑈𝑗 ∗ 𝐸𝑃𝐼𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝐸𝑈𝑗
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
 
D2.2 is calculated for 2015 and 2030 using 2015 GDP data and 2030 projections from 
the OECD database. Similarly, to calculate the GDP per capita, OECD data on countries’ 
populations for 2015 and projections for 2030 were utilised. For the years 2020 and 
2025, linear data interpolation is done. 
The most recent EPI values have been used for the entire period since no future EPI 
projections are found. 
 
2.2.11 D2.3 Material cost impact 
D2.3 is designed to give an indication of the impact on the individual material cost on 
the major component/product cost (for simplicity, this is referred to as component cost). 
Material prices are subjected to extreme variability. Depending on a manufacturer’s 
degree of reliance on a given material, this aspect may be significant. If the material 
cost is a significant part of the total component cost, an eventual escalation in the 
material cost may hinder the deployment of a specific technology. A recent example of 
such an impediment concerns the rare-earth elements crisis in 2010-2011 when the 
prices of these materials rapidly increased several fold. 
It is recognised that more accurate cost integration in the methodology would require 
the full material transformation costs associated with all the manufacturing steps needed 
to transform a raw material into a component. However, this is very difficult to do for 
several reasons: availability of data, varying transformation costs due to country 
differences (e.g. different labour, electricity costs, etc.), and different raw material costs 
depending to a larger extent on the volumes purchased. The relationship established 
between the technology manufacturer and raw materials supplier is another factor 
affecting the cost. 
Therefore, a simplified approach is taken to calculate D2.3, based on the following input 
parameters: 
(E) unitary cost of raw material (USD/tonne) 
(F) material intensity (amount of material used per unit of energy/power, tonne/kW(h)) 
(G) component cost (per unit of energy/power, USD/kW(h)) 
The material cost impact is calculated as follows: 
𝐷2.3 =
𝐺– 𝐸 ∗ 𝐹
𝐺
 
To determine the D2.3 evolution until 2030, the raw material costs, materials intensity 
as well as future component cost forecasts are taken from open sources and proprietary 
data. The same intensity of materials has been used consistently to calculate the 
material demand (D1.1 indicator). 
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2.3 Indicator aggregation and data visualisation 
As mentioned above, the indicators are aggregated in two dimensions. D1 is obtained as 
the arithmetic average of its eight constituent indicators. D2 is the weighted average 
(50 %:20 %:30 %) of its three constituent indicators. 
The EU resilience is shown for each material in each technology for a given year. The 
upstream (D1) and downstream (D2) dimensions represent the ‘X’ and ‘Y’ axis, 
respectively, of the so-called materials resilience chart (Figure 5). 
 
 
Figure 5: Material resilience chart 
Dimensions are expected to evolve with time. The assessment results for each material 
are represented for 2015, 2020, 2025 and 2030. The product of the two resilience 
dimensions (D1*D2) is finally used as a simple way to quantify by a single arbitrary 
number, called resilience score, the overall resilience. This is particularly useful to rank 
the resilience, allowing also for quantitative comparison of the evolution, for example in 
terms of % variation with time.  
Constant product curves are used to define the resilience areas to enable the ranking of 
materials up to 2030: 
• For materials positioned in the green area (D1*D2 ≥ 0.45), the expectation is 
that no supply issues will be encountered along the supply chain, which indicates 
high EU resilience. 
• Materials positioned between the green and the red lines – the middle yellow 
area (0.3 < D1*D2 < 0.45) have a moderate likelihood of supply shortages – 
anticipated as medium EU resilience. 
• Materials positioned below the red line (D1*D2 ≤ 0.3) represent a high likelihood 
of supply shortages – anticipated as low EU resilience. 
The thresholds values (0.3 and 0.45) separating the various zones in the resilience chart 
are selected according to a given logic, reflecting also up-to-date common knowledge 
and well based assumptions.  
The low resilience threshold curve (separating the low and medium resilience zones) is in 
fact chosen using the rare earths as a benchmark for 2015. Rare earths have been 
 26 
 
assessed as critical materials for the EU in different studies as well as in the previous 
JRC 2013 report. The low resilience threshold curve is then drawn in order to leave the 
rare earths in the low resilience zone for 2015; approximately 20% in terms of resilience 
score below the curve. 
The high resilience threshold curve (separating the medium- and high-resilience zones) 
has been set at 0.45, thus adding in terms of resilience a further margin of 50%. 
 
2.4 Assessment scenarios 
The EU resilience is assessed according to four different scenarios. Such scenarios allow 
for an individual analysis of the impact of the three mitigation measures under 
consideration – recycling, substitution and materials domestic production. 
The baseline scenario assumes that none of the considered mitigation measures 
will be in place in the considered time frame. The analysis based on such scenario – 
being a 'conservative scenario' – shows the evolution over time of EU resilience to 
material supply bottlenecks for each technology. 
Assessment scenario 1 (AS1), simply denoted further as scenario 1: takes into 
account any possible increase in EU raw materials domestic production and as such 
is less conservative than the baseline scenario. 
Assessment scenario 2 (AS2), simply denoted further as scenario 2: considers 
recycling and EU raw materials domestic production as possible mitigation 
measures. 
Assessment scenario 3 (AS3), simply denoted further as scenario 3: considers all 
three mitigation strategies, namely recycling, EU raw materials domestic production 
and substitution, and is thus the most optimistic scenario. 
Since the mitigation measures being considered only influence the upstream dimension, 
the above assessment scenarios are only applied to D1. 
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3 Determination of material supply bottlenecks in the wind 
power sector 
3.1 Market and wind technology background 
Wind energy is one of the most advanced and mature renewable energy technology 
which will play a significant role in meeting the Europe 2020 and 2030 climate and 
energy goals [JRC, 2015a]. The EU has long been the front runner in wind power 
generation. At the end of 2015, on average, wind power produced about 315 TWh of 
electricity, representing 11.4 % of the EU's total electricity production, through the 
cumulative installed capacity of 142 GW (of which 11 GW is offshore) [EWEA, 2016]. In 
terms of new installation capacity, in 2015, wind power registered the highest 
installation rate: 12.8 GW (9.8 GW onshore and 3 GW offshore), accounting for 44 % of 
all new installations in the EU [EWEA, 2016]. 
Implementation of EU and national specific policies and support schemes for renewable 
energy sources (RES) will drive an even broader penetration of wind energy in future 
power generation. Different scenarios describe the evolution of wind energy in the EU. 
According to the EU Reference Scenario 2016, wind power will supply 14.4% of total net 
electricity generation in 2020, increasing to 18 % in 2030 and 25 % by 2050 [EC, 
2016a]. This electricity will be generated by a total wind capacity in the EU of 207 GW in 
2020, 255 GW in 2030, and 367 GW in 2050 [EC, 2016a]. The EWEA’s new Central 
Scenario forecasts an installed wind capacity of 192 GW in 2020, increasing to 320 GW 
by 2030, of which 254 GW will be onshore and 66 GW offshore [EWEA, 2015a]. On a 
levelised basis, the current cost of onshore wind energy attained a lower price than that 
produced from coal and gas in several European countries [BNEF, 2016a]. This is the 
result of lower equipment costs and higher efficiency in new wind turbines. 
Today, a mix of wind turbine types is used to meet the various specific onshore and 
offshore site conditions. They are specifically designed to enhance their performance in 
terms of energy production, reliability, operation, maintenance, capital cost and 
transportation. Modern wind turbines integrate a series of highly optimised components 
to produce the lowest possible energy costs. The major components of standard upwind 
turbine architecture are shown in Figure 6. 
 
 
Figure 6: Major components in a modern wind turbine with a gearbox configuration 
Source: [MRS, 2011] 
The cost of wind turbines can be influenced by metal prices, in particular in the case of 
those turbines using generators containing rare-earth elements. Concerns that the 
supply of rare earths may not be sufficient to meet the growing demand for the global 
transition to a sustainable energy future have grown considerably since the rare earths 
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‘crunch’ in 2011 when near-monopolistic China imposed export restrictions. The rare 
earths, i.e. neodymium, praseodymium and dysprosium, are key ingredients in the most 
powerful magnet material, namely neodymium-iron-boron (NdFeB). This magnet is used 
to manufacture permanent magnet synchronous generators (PMSG), which are used in 
all major wind turbine configurations: low speed (direct drive), mid speed and high 
speed (Figure 7). 
 
 
Figure 7: Principal wind turbines types according to drive train configuration 
In 2015, the global market share of direct drive PMSG was estimated at 19 %, 1 % for 
mid-speed drive and 3 % for high-speed PMSG technologies (by capacity installed) [JRC, 
2016]. Different amounts of permanent magnets are required in PMSG configurations. 
About 2 tonnes of permanent magnets are used in 3 MW DD-PMSG turbine (low-speed 
design), or approximately 650 kg PM per MW of generator capacity [JRC, 2015a]. In 
contrast, a PMSG that is attached to a gear and rotates at mid speed may operate with a 
160 kg magnet per MW. This amount decreases up to 80 kg per MW in a high-speed 
PMSG configuration [JRC, 2012 and 2015]. The overall rare earth content in an NdFeB 
magnet is about a third of the magnet’s weight. 
The blade is another key component of a wind turbine. It allows loads to withstand the 
continuously varying wind speeds. These loading conditions, in combination with the low 
gravitational forces required, lead to a selection of materials that combine high strength-
to-weight with high stiffness and fatigue resistance. Glass-fibre composite layups are 
commonly used for blade fabrications, although carbon fibre might represent the next 
standard in wind turbine reinforcement. Today, it is estimated that about 17 % of total 
carbon fibre demand comes from the global wind power sector [CEMAC, 2016c]. Is is 
expected that the European wind power sector will account for the major share of total 
worldwide wind energy carbon fibre demand, i.e. about 65 % in 2020, due to its 
renewable energy targets and leadership in offshore wind sector [CEMAC, 2016c]. 
Wind energy is one of the most cost-effective technologies for climate-change mitigation 
and is a growing sector in the EU industrial base. Further penetration of wind technology 
in the EU and global markets is dependent on its techno-economic characteristics 
alongside regulatory frameworks and the effectiveness of energy policies. It will also be 
influenced by the stability of material supply and evolution of material prices. 
This study addresses three rare-earth elements, namely neodymium, praseodymium and 
dysprosium, required in wind generators as well as carbon fibre composite (CFC) 
required for the manufacture of blades. The analysis focuses on identifying which of 
these materials might become a bottleneck to the widespread adoption of wind energy in 
the EU by 2030. 
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3.2 Materials for wind turbine generators 
Three materials were investigated for wind turbine generators: Nd, Pr and Dy, required 
for the generator's permanent magnet. 
The calculated values of the indicators for both dimensions are shown in a form of polar 
charts for 2015, 2020, 2025 and 2030. 
Figure 8 and Figure 9 show the evolution of the upstream D1 indicators under the most 
conservative baseline (BL) and most optimistic scenario, respectively, for neodymium 
required in wind turbines for the period 2015-2030. 
The evolution of D2 indicators for neodymium in wind turbines is shown in Figure 10 for 
the period 2015-2030. 
Note: the D2 indicators are not affected by the assessment scenarios under 
consideration and therefore only one set of results is given for each material later in the 
report. 
The evolution of EU resilience for neodymium in all assessment scenarios is shown in 
Figure 11. Similarly, Figure 12, Figure 13, Figure 16 and Figure 17 show the evolution of 
the upstream D1 indicators under the most conservative baseline (BL) and most 
optimistic scenario, respectively, for praseodymium and dysprosium required in wind 
turbines for the period 2015-2030. The evolution of D2 indicators for praseodymium and 
dysprosium in wind turbines is shown in Figure 14 and Figure 18 for the period 2015–
2030. 
The evolution of EU resilience for praseodymium and dysprosium for all assessment 
scenarios is shown in Figure 15 and Figure 19. 
  
 30 
 
3.2.1 Neodymium 
  
  
Figure 8: Evolution of D1 indicators according to the conservative baseline (BL) scenario 
for neodymium in wind turbines, 2015-2030 
  
  
Figure 9: Evolution of D1 indicators according to the most optimistic assessment 
scenario 3 (AS3) for neodymium in wind turbines, 2015-2030 
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Figure 10: Evolution of D2 indicators for neodymium in wind turbines, 2015-2030 
  
  
Figure 11: Evolution of resilience for neodymium in all scenarios, 2015-2030 
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3.2.2 Praseodymium 
  
  
Figure 12: Evolution of D1 indicators according to conservative baseline (BL) scenario 
for praseodymium in wind turbines, 2015-2030 
 
  
  
Figure 13: Evolution of D1 indicators according to the most optimistic assessment 
scenario 3 (AS3) for praseodymium in wind turbines, 2015-2030 
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Figure 14: Evolution of D2 indicators for praseodymium in wind turbines, 2015-2030 
  
  
Figure 15: Evolution of resilience for praseodymium in all scenarios, 2015-2030 
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3.2.3 Dysprosium 
  
  
Figure 16: Evolution of D1 indicators according to the conservative baseline (BL) 
scenario for dysprosium in wind turbines, 2015-2030 
 
  
  
Figure 17: Evolution of D1 indicators according to the most optimistic assessment 
scenario 3 (AS3) for dysprosium in wind turbines, 2015-2030 
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Figure 18: Evolution of D2 indicators for dysprosium in wind turbines, 2015-2030 
  
  
Figure 19: Evolution of resilience for dysprosium in all scenarios, 2015-2030  
D2.1 Supply chain dependency
D2.2 Purchasing potentialD2.3 Material cost impact
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
Dy - 2015
 
D2=0.613
D2.1 Supply chain dependency
D2.2 Purchasing potentialD2.3 Material cost impact
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
Dy - 2020
 
D2=0.608
D2.1 Supply chain dependency
D2.2 Purchasing potentialD2.3 Material cost impact
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
Dy - 2025
 
D2=0.605
D2.1 Supply chain dependency
D2.2 Purchasing potentialD2.3 Material cost impact
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
Dy - 2030
 
D2=0.603
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
 Baseline
 Scenario 1
 Scenario 2
 Scenario 3
D
o
w
n
s
tr
e
a
m
 d
im
e
n
s
io
n
 (
D
2
)
Upstream dimension (D1)
Dy-2015
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
D
o
w
n
s
tr
e
a
m
 d
im
e
n
s
io
n
 (
D
2
)
 Baseline
 Scenario 1
 Scenario 2
 Scenario 3
Upstream dimension (D1)
Dy-2020
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
 Baseline
 Scenario 1
 Scenario 2
 Scenario 3
D
o
w
n
s
tr
e
a
m
 d
im
e
n
s
io
n
 (
D
2
)
Upstream dimension (D1)
Dy-2025
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
 Baseline
 Scenario 1
 Scenario 2
 Scenario 3
D
o
w
n
s
tr
e
a
m
 d
im
e
n
s
io
n
 (
D
2
)
Upstream dimension (D1)
Dy-2030
 36 
 
3.3 Materials for turbine blades 
Currently, both glass and carbon fibre composites are used for blade manufacture. 
However, the latest tendency is to progressively switch to carbon fibre composites (CFC) 
which produce stiffer and lighter blades. Although more expensive than glass-fibre 
composites, the CFC allow for less-robust turbine and tower components, thereby 
reducing the cost of the turbine. In particular, the CFC blades are an important 
advantage for the next generation of offshore turbines. 
CFC are already considered as an enabling technology by major EU turbine 
manufacturers such as Vestas (Denmark) and Gamesa (Spain). Therefore, only CFC 
have been assessed as the material which will be mostly applicable for blades until 2030. 
CFC are assessed for only one scenario, as it is assumed that recycling and substitution 
are not applicable. In fact, so far turbine blades are not included in the recycling flows of 
wind turbine components. The recycling of blades is not yet technologically or 
economically feasible due to several factors, including the low maturity of potential 
recycling companies, a lack of legislative measures to stimulate and support the growth 
of this industry, uncertainties related to required upfront investments to build necessary 
facilities, and the market for after-recycling products. 
However, in recent years, a number of solutions have been developed to recycle wind 
turbine blades. The potential uses for recycled blades range from heating and/or 
electricity production, use as a filling material, for cement production and pyrolysis 
[EWEA, 2015b]. One potential use can be the reuse of reworked blades which is judged 
economically viable but difficult to implement due to the different types of fibres, the 
purity of the materials and the small quantities.  
As for the substitution of CFC in blades, as mentioned above, glass-fibre composites can 
be regarded as substitute material, but this is not likely to be the trend for the next 
decades.  
For the time frame of this report, recycling and substitution of blades are not considered. 
The evolution of D1 and D2 indicators for CFC required in wind turbine blades is shown 
in Figure 20 and Figure 21, respectively, for the period 2015-2030. The evolution of EU 
resilience for CFC is shown in Figure 22. 
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3.3.1 Carbon fibre composite (CFC) 
  
  
Figure 20: Evolution of D1 indicators for carbon fibre composite (CFC) in wind turbines, 
2015-2030 
  
  
Figure 21: Evolution of D2 indicators for carbon fibre composite (CFC) in wind turbines 
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Figure 22: Evolution of resilience for carbon fibre composites from 2015 to 2030 
3.4 Wind technology resilience charts 
The resilience charts of all materials required in wind turbines in 2015, 2020, 2015 and 
2030 for baseline and scenario 3 are presented in Figure 23 and Figure 24 below. 
  
  
Figure 23: Resilience charts of materials required in wind turbines in 2015, 2020, 2025 
and 2030 for conservative baseline scenario 
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Figure 24: Resilience charts of materials used in wind turbines in 2015, 2020, 2025 and 
2030 for the most optimistic assessment scenario 3 
Note: Since mitigation measures are not considered, CFC is only assessed under the 
baseline scenario. Its resilience under scenarios 1 to 3 is assumed to match its resilience 
under the baseline scenario. 
As regards the wind energy sector, EU resilience to bottlenecks in the supply of 
neodymium, praseodymium and dysprosium used in turbine generators is currently low 
(2015 data). As for carbon fibre composite (CFC), used in turbine blades, there are no 
specific concerns about the supply of this material, which has been rated with a high 
resilience score (Figure 25). 
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Figure 25: Variation in EU resilience to supply bottlenecks of materials used in the wind 
power sector; thresholds 1 and 2 (at 0.3 and 0.45) represent the borders between low-
medium resilience, and medium-high resilience, respectively 
Neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium 
The EU resilience for these three materials remains low for all scenarios until 2020: 
slightly decreasing for Nd and Pr (between -0.3 % and -1.8 %) and Dy (between -3 % 
and -4.6 %), depending on the assessment scenario. 
During the 2020-2025 period, a substantial increase in resilience is observed for all 
materials: 
• For the baseline scenario: +5.5 %, +5.4 % and +12.2 % for Nd, Pr and Dy, 
respectively, thanks to improved diversification of supply; 
• For scenario 1: +6.3 % for Nd, +6.1 % for Pr and +14.2 % for Dy for the above-
mentioned materials, due to a potential increase in EU mine production, thereby 
reducing reliance on imports, plus a diversified supply; 
• For scenario 2: +15 % for Nd, +9.3 % for Pr and +17 % for Dy, thanks to 
additional recycling; 
• For scenario 3: +26 % for Nd, +26 % for Pr and +35 % for Dy is observed, 
based on a substitution potential of around 60 %. 
Nd, Pr and Dy cross the low resilience threshold curve in 2025, entering the medium-
resilience zone for scenario 3, when substitution is taken into account. 
In the last five-year period (2025-2030), the EU resilience increases further for all 
materials and all scenarios. A marginal increase of up to +1.3 % is achieved for all 
materials in the baseline scenario, as a result of new suppliers coming on to the market. 
A slight increase – between +1.1 % (Nd) and +3.1 % (Dy) – is observed for scenario 1 
because of the potential development of additional mine capacities in the EU. Further 
increases of +3.2 % (Nd), +8.7 % (Pr) and +10 % (Dy) are evident in scenario 2 when 
recycling is increased to up to 30 %. The greatest increments of +20 % (Nd), +20 % 
(Pr) and +22 % (Dy) could be achieved for scenario 3, which assumes that around 60 % 
of these materials will be replaced. 
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In 2030, all three materials cross the low resilience threshold curve, entering the 
medium-resilience zone for scenarios 2 and 3. Even if all the mitigation measures 
considered are in place, the resilience to supply bottlenecks of these three materials will 
not reach the high-resilience zone in 2030. 
To summarise, the resilience situation regarding the supply of Nd, Pr and Dy seems to 
improve until 2030, thanks to the potential diversification of supply sources and greater 
EU mine production. If a high degree of substitution and significant recycling rates are 
achieved, the EU resilience can be increased to the medium level. Substitution and 
recycling seem to be the most effective measures to enhance the EU resilience to supply 
of Nd, Pr and Dy. 
Carbon fibre composite (CFC) 
Although a slight decline of 2 % in the resilience to the supply of CFC is observed 
between 2015 and 2030, it remains in the high-resilience zone over the same period. No 
specific supply issues are expected for CFC used for manufacturing of blades within the 
time frame under consideration. 
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4 Determination of material supply bottlenecks in the solar 
PV sector 
4.1 Market and PV technology background 
This study addresses photovoltaic technology and its principal constituent materials. It 
does not cover concentrated solar power systems. 
A wide adoption of photovoltaic energy technology, which provides for the direct 
conversion of solar energy into electricity, represents a viable path to generating clean 
energy. For years, the high cost of photovoltaic power represented a significant shortfall 
in this technology. However, a combination of technology innovation, economies of scale 
and manufacturing experience led to an exponential decline in the cost of crystalline 
silicon PV modules from USD 72/W in 1976 to USD 0.6/W in 2015 (a learning rate of 
26.5 %) [BNEF, 2016b]. It is estimated that the competitiveness of photovoltaic 
technology will continue to improve due to falling costs and an increase in efficiency, 
driving a 60 % reduction in cost by 2040 [BNEF, 2016b]. 
Photovoltaic energy has gained significant relevance in power systems around the globe, 
increasing from about 1 GW of cumulative installed capacity in 2000, to 39 GW in 2010 
and 229 GW in 2015 [IEA, 2015; SPE, 2016]. The EU has been at the forefront of the PV 
market, accounting for more than 75 % of newly installed capacity in 2010. At the end 
of 2015, Europe still held the major global share with its 97 GW total capacity [SPE, 
2016]. In 2015, 50.6 GW solar PV were installed and commissioned worldwide, of which 
8.2 GW were in Europe [SPE, 2016]. After several years of decline, the solar PV sector in 
Europe registered a 15 % market growth in 2015. There are indications that the EU will 
return to a constant growth path as of 2017, driven by support schemes, cheaper solar 
panels and increased competitiveness. As a result, the EU reference scenario indicates a 
rise in the total PV capacity in Europe, reaching 137.5 GW in 2020, 183 GW in 2030 and 
299 GW in 2050 [EC, 2016a]. According to SolarPower Europe, the European PV power 
market could grow in the short term (2020) by over 75 % to 170.9 GW under a high 
scenario or by 33 % in a low scenario, resulting in 129.6 GW of cumulative solar power 
[SPE, 2016]. In terms of electricity generated, solar PV supplies 4 % of the electricity 
demand in the EU [SPE, 2016]. This share is expected to increase to 4.8 % in 2020, 7 % 
in 2030 and up to 11 % in 2050 [EC, 2016]. 
Commercial PV technologies include wafer-based crystalline silicon (c-Si) (either mono-
crystalline or multi-crystalline silicon) and thin-film (TF) using amorphous silicon (a-Si), 
copper-indium-gallium-diselenide-disulphide (CIGS) and cadmium-telluride [IRENA, 
2013]. The global production of solar PV accounted for 63.2 GWp in 2015, of which 
93.4 % was c-Si, the rest being TF (Figure 26) [ISE, 2016]. 
 
Figure 26: Global share of PV production by technology in 2015 [ISE, 2016] 
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In addition to the commercial technologies, a vast array of new PV technologies is 
currently being developed, e.g. multi-junction cells or hybrid devices at the nanoscale 
level. These new concepts show potential as regards significant increases in efficiency 
and/or reductions in cost through improvements in device architecture and material 
functionality. Due to the uncertainty around the market adoption of these new concepts, 
the present study will be limited to the current commercially available technologies, such 
as crystalline silicon (poly-/multi- and mono-crystalline Si) and thin-film technologies 
(i.e. a-Si, CIGS and CdTe). An overview of the commercial PV technologies, their 
performance and materials addressed in this study is presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Principal characteristics of commercial PV technologies addressed in this study. 
Data from [IRENA, 2013] and [ISE, 2016] 
PV 
technology 
Efficiency (%) Area/kW 
(m2/kW)(1) 
Lifetime 
(year) 
Main 
characteristics 
Materials 
analysed in 
this study 
Record 
cell lab 
Module 
Crystalline silicon 
Poly-c Si 20.8 12-18 8 25-30 - high maturity 
and efficiency 
- low cost 
- long lifetime 
Silicon and 
silver 
Mono-c Si 25.6 15-22 7 25-30 
Thin-film 
a-Si 14 7-12 15 25 - mature 
technology 
- low cost and low 
efficiency 
Silicon 
CIGS 20.5 8-14 10 25 - good electronic-
optical properties 
- challenging 
scale-up 
production 
Indium, 
copper, 
selenium and 
tellurium 
CdTe 21 10-15 10 25 - low-cost 
manufacturing 
- moderate 
efficiency 
Cadmium 
and tellurium 
Note: (1) a module efficiency of 10 % corresponds to about 100W/m2 
Manufacturers have struggled to improve the efficiency of PV modules while, at the same 
time, reducing costs and material use. The higher efficiency attained by photovoltaic 
cells in the laboratory indicates the potential to increase efficiency in future commercial 
technologies, too. In the past (2007-2008), the rapid growth of the PV industry led to an 
increase in the cost of purified silicon, and thus more expensive PV modules. Projected 
high growth rates in the PV industry and market dynamics forced manufacturers to 
explore the reduction of silicon and other materials in the production process. As a 
result, since 2006, the average use of silicon in solar cells has fallen by around 30 % to 
about 5.5 g/Wp for multi-crystalline and 4.8 g/Wp for mono-crystalline in 2014 [JRC, 
2014]. The target is to reach 3 g Si/Wp or less between 2030 and 2050 [IRENA, 2013]. 
Silicon metal and indium are critical raw materials for the EU economy [EC, 2014]. Other 
materials such as copper, gallium, cadmium, selenium, silver and tellurium have 
different criticality ratings according to the latest JRC study [JRC, 2013]. The potential 
supply constraints for these eight materials along their value chain are evaluated in the 
light of the large deployment scenarios for PV technology by 2030 in the EU. 
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4.2 Materials in crystalline silicon technology 
Two materials were investigated for c-Si PV technology: silicon (Si) and silver (Ag). 
The calculated values of the indicators for both dimensions are shown in a form of polar 
charts for 2015, 2020, 2025 and 2030. 
Figure 27 and Figure 28 show the evolution of the upstream D1 indicators under the 
most conservative baseline (BL) and most optimistic scenario, respectively, for silicon 
required in c-Si modules for the period 2015-2030. 
The evolution of D2 indicators for silicon in c-Si PV is shown in Figure 29 for the period 
2015-2030. 
The evolution of the EU resilience for silicon for all assessment scenarios is shown in 
Figure 30. 
Similarly, Figure 31 and Figure 32 show the evolution of the upstream D1 indicators 
under the most conservative baseline (BL) and most optimistic scenario, respectively, for 
silver required in c-Si modules for the period 2015-2030. 
The evolution of D2 indicators for silver in c-Si PV is shown in Figure 33 for the period 
2015-2030. 
The evolution of the EU’s resilience for silver in all the assessment scenarios is shown in 
Figure 34. 
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4.2.1 Silicon 
  
  
Figure 27: Evolution of D1 indicators according to the conservative baseline (BL) 
scenario for silicon in c-Si, 2015-2030 
  
  
Figure 28: Evolution of D1 indicators according to the most optimistic assessment 
scenario 3 (AS3) for silicon in c-Si, 2015-2030 
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Figure 29: Evolution of D2 indicators for silicon in c-Si, 2015-2030 
  
  
Figure 30: Evolution of resilience for silicon in c-Si for all scenarios, 2015-2030 
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4.2.2 Silver 
  
  
Figure 31: Evolution of D1 indicators according to the conservative baseline (BL) 
scenario for silver in c-Si, 2015-2030 
 
  
  
Figure 32: Evolution of D1 indicators according to the most optimistic assessment 
scenario 3 (AS3) for silver in c-Si, 2015-2030 
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Figure 33: Evolution of D2 indicators for silver in c-Si, 2015-2030 
  
  
Figure 34: Evolution of resilience for silver in c-Si for all scenarios, 2015-2030 
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4.3 Materials in thin-film amorphous silicon technology 
4.3.1 Silicon 
The amount of Si needed for amorphous Si thin-film PV is negligible when compared to 
polycrystalline and monocrystalline silicon PV. Only 33 tonnes of Si were required for 
amorphous Si thin-film due to the very low deployment rate versus 31 555 tonnes 
required for poly- and monocrystalline silicon PV together. Since amorphous Si thin-film 
PV is not expected to increase its share until 2030, no further evaluation has been done 
for this particular PV technology. 
 
4.4 Materials in thin-film CIGS technology 
Four materials were investigated for c-Si PV technology: indium (In), copper (Cu), 
gallium (Ga) and selenium (Se). 
According to the methodology, if the demand for a particular material is less than 1 % of 
the global supply in the considered time frame, this material is not deemed to be a 
potential bottleneck material and thus has not been evaluated further. From the four 
screened materials, only indium passed the significance screening – showing >1 % of 
the global supply of indium. Since the demand for the other three materials is <1 %, no 
further evaluation has been done. 
Copper, gallium and selenium are not seen as potential bottleneck materials for the 
deployment of CIGS PV technology in the EU until 2030. More details are given later in 
this section. 
It should be noted that only the indium content of the CIGS absorber layer has been 
estimated. Indium is also used as a transparent conductive oxide (TCO) coating but the 
amount is minor and therefore not considered in the estimation of demand for indium in 
solar thin-film cells. In addition, substitution alternatives for indium tin oxide (ITO) 
already exist for this application and their use in the next generation thin-film solar cell 
is foreseen. 
The calculated values of the indicators for both dimensions for indium are represented in 
the polar charts for 2015, 2020, 2025 and 2030. 
Figure 35 and Figure 36 show the evolution of the upstream D1 indicators under the 
most conservative baseline (BL) and the most optimistic scenario, respectively, for 
indium required in CIGS modules for the period 2015-2030. 
The evolution of D2 indicators for indium in CIGS PV is shown in Figure 37 for the period 
2015-2030. 
The evolution of EU resilience for indium for all assessment scenarios is shown in Figure 
38. 
  
 50 
 
4.4.1 Indium 
  
  
Figure 35: Evolution of D1 indicators according to the conservative baseline (BL) 
scenario for indium in CIGS, 2015-2030 
  
  
Figure 36: Evolution of D1 indicators according to the most optimistic assessment 
scenario 3 (AS3) for indium in CIGS, 2015-2030 
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Figure 37: Evolution of D2 indicators for indium in CIGS, 2015-2030 
  
  
Figure 38: Evolution of resilience for indium in CIGS for all scenarios, 2015-2030 
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4.4.2 Copper 
The EU demand for copper (Cu) in thin-film CIGS PV solar technology is calculated 
according to the procedure presented in Annex B. The amount of Cu required per 1MWp 
is multiplied by both the currently installed (2015) and expected MWp until 2030 (the 
average MWp by 2030 calculated from the different deployment scenarios). This resulted 
in 4.06 tonnes of Cu being required in the EU for this technology in 2015. Such an 
amount represents less than 1 % of the 2015 Cu global supply of 18 700 tonnes [USGS, 
2016]. Since the deployment rate of CIGS PV is expected to remain marginal until 2030 
and because of the material efficiency factor (less Cu required per MWp by 2030), Cu is 
not assessed further in the report. 
4.4.3 Gallium 
The EU demand for gallium (Ga) in thin-film CIGS PV solar technology is calculated 
according to the procedure presented in Annex B. The amount of Ga required per 1MWp 
is multiplied by both the currently installed (2015) and expected MWp until 2030. This 
resulted in 0.83 tonnes of Ga required in the EU for this technology in 2015. Such an 
amount represents less than 1 % of the 2015 Ga global supply of around 111 tonnes 
(USA not included) [By-products, 2015]. The deployment rate of CIGS PV is expected to 
remain marginal until 2030, as stated above. Moreover, Ga is not consistently used in all 
thin-film PV while less Ga will be required per WMp by 2030 because of the materials 
efficiency factor. 
4.4.4 Selenium 
EU demand for Se in thin-film CIGS PV solar technology is calculated according to the 
procedure presented in Annex B (section 6.3). The amount of Se required per 1MWp is 
multiplied by both the currently installed (2015) and expected MWp until 2030. This 
resulted in 6.67 tonnes of Se required in the EU for this technology in 2015. Such an 
amount represents less than 1 % of the 2015 Se global supply of 2340 tonnes (USA not 
included [USGS, 2016]. Since the deployment rate of CIGS PV is also expected to remain 
marginal until 2030 and because of the material efficiency factor (less Se required per 
MWp by 2030) Se is not assessed further in the report. 
 
4.5 Materials in thin-film CdTe technology 
Two materials were investigated for thin-film CdTe PV technology – cadmium (Cd) and 
tellurium (Te). Neither of them passed the significance screening: the demand for 
cadmium and tellurium for the EU is <1 % of the global supply of these two materials 
(see details below). 
4.5.1 Cadmium 
EU demand for Cd in thin-film CdTe PV solar technology is calculated according to the 
procedure presented in Annex B. The amount of Cd required per 1MWp is multiplied by 
both the currently installed (2015) and expected MWp until 2030. This resulted in 1.29 
tonnes of Cd required in the EU for this technology in 2015. Such an amount represents 
less than 1 % of the 2015 Cd global supply of 24 200 tonnes (USA not included) [USGS, 
2016]. Since the deployment rate of CdTe PV is also expected to remain marginal until 
2030 and due to the material efficiency factor, Cd is not assessed further in the report. 
4.5.2 Tellurium 
EU demand for Te in thin-film CdTe PV solar technology is calculated according to the 
procedure presented in Annex B. The amount of Te required per 1MWp is multiplied by 
both the currently installed (2015) and expected MWp until 2030. This resulted in 1.45 
tonnes of Te required in the EU for this technology in 2015. Such an amount represents 
less than 1 % of the current Te global supply of 169 tonnes [By-products, 2015]. As for 
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Cd, due to the low deployment rate of CdTe PV by 2030 and the material efficiency 
factor, Te is not assessed further in the report. 
 
4.6 PV technology resilience charts 
A full assessment is performed for three materials required for solar PV in the EU: Si, Ag 
and In. The resilience charts for PV technology in 2015, 2020, 2025 and 2030 under 
both the baseline and scenario 3 are presented below (Figure 39 and Figure 40). 
  
  
Figure 39: Resilience charts for materials required in PV technology in 2015, 2020, 2025 
and 2030 for the conservative baseline scenario 
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Figure 40: Resilience charts for materials required in PV technology in 2015, 2020, 2025 
and 2030 for the most optimistic assessment scenario 3 
As regards materials required for the photovoltaic energy sector, (2015) EU resilience to 
bottlenecks in the supply of silicon, silver and indium is currently assessed as medium 
(Figure 41). 
For the other materials screened here, namely Cu, Ga, Se, Te and Cd, no potential 
supply bottlenecks are expected for the time frame being considered. 
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Figure 41: Variation in EU resilience to supply bottlenecks of materials used in solar 
photovoltaic; threshold 1 fixed at 0.3 represents the border between low and medium 
resilience 
Silicon 
The EU resilience to bottlenecks in the supply of Si evolves in a similar way for all 
scenarios: 
 It deteriorates significantly until 2020 (-5.2 % decrease) due to the higher 
demand expected during this period; 
 During the period 2020-2025, the EU resilience decreases progressively in all 
scenarios by -2.4 %; 
 In the last five-year period (2025-2030) the resilience situation for Si degrades 
slightly (-1 %) in all four scenarios, although it remains in the medium zone. 
To summarise, the EU resilience for silicon is similar in all the assessment scenarios 
being considered and remains in the medium zone between 2015 and 2030. 
Silver 
In the baseline scenario, the situation for Ag deteriorates significantly until 2020 (-
13.7 %). In the other three scenarios, the decline is considerably smaller: only around 
5 % less due to new EU production of silver. The fact remains that the combined 
mitigation measures cannot compensate for the increased demand for Ag during this 
period. 
In the period between 2020 and 2025, the EU resilience further deteriorates in the 
baseline scenario (-8.5 %), scenario 1 (-7.1 %) and scenario 2 (-6.3 %), while a slight 
improvement is attained for scenario 3 (+0.3 %). The EU resilience to the supply of Ag 
in 2020 stays in the medium zone for all scenarios, with the exception of the baseline 
scenario where it is placed in the low resilience zone. The improvement in scenario 3 is 
mainly due to the effect of substitution. 
In the last five-year period (2025-2030) the situation for Ag further deteriorates in the 
baseline scenario (-2.2 %), scenario 1 (-2.6 %) and scenario 2 (-1.9 %), reaching the 
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low-resilience threshold. The situation improves for scenario 3 in which growth of around 
5 % can be achieved, mainly due to substitution, for which a potential of around 50 % is 
anticipated. Nevertheless, the situation for silver only recovers in this one situation, 
returning to the 2015 resilience level. 
To summarise, substitution is the mitigation measure with the highest potential in the 
2030 time frame, coupled with relevant silver production in the EU. However, Ag 
recycling will not yield an increase in tangible resilience. Nonetheless, these measures 
will be sufficient to maintain the current medium-resilience level. Potential improvements 
could also be realised downstream by enhancing EU production at different stages in the 
supply chain, in particular increasing solar cell production in the EU. 
Indium 
The EU resilience to bottlenecks in the supply of In deteriorates considerably until 2020 
(between -11 % and -13 %), reaching the low-resilience zone in all scenarios. 
In the period between 2020 and 2025, EU resilience falls progressively in both the 
baseline scenario (-3.5 %) and scenario 1 (-3.7 %). Almost no change is observed in 
scenario 2 and a slight improvement is noted for scenario 3 (+3.4 %), which is sufficient 
to return to the medium-resilience zone in 2025. 
In the last five-year period (2025-2030) the situation for In either further deteriorates in 
the baseline scenario (-2.6 %) and scenario 1 (-2.7 %) or remains unchanged (scenario 
2) thanks to some recycling efforts. In all three cases, the EU resilience remains low. 
The situation improves in scenario 3 because of the potential to increase global recycling 
(up to 20 %) and substitution rates. Even in this positive case, the EU resilience to 
bottlenecks in the supply of In does not return to its 2015 level. 
To summarise, the forecasted EU domestic production is not expected to influence its 
resilience to bottlenecks in the supply of In. Substitution and recycling have the highest 
potential by 2030. Their joint influence is effective in preventing this material from 
moving to the low-resilience zone. In all cases, resilience is expected to fall compared to 
its 2015 level. 
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5 Determination of material supply bottlenecks in the 
electric vehicles sector 
5.1 Market and EV technology background 
The European transport sector, which is essentially still running on oil products, is the 
main cause of air pollution as it is responsible for more than 30 % of the EU’s total 
energy consumption. At the global scale, transport accounts for about one-quarter of 
energy-related GHG emissions, more than half of which is related to road passenger 
transport [UNFCCC, 2015]. To ensure Europe will be able to respond to the increasing 
mobility needs of people and goods while, at the same time, safeguarding the transition 
to a low-carbon European economy, the Commission has recently set up a strategy to 
give guidance to EU Member States to prepare for future low-emission mobility [EC, 
2016b]. Electromobility in various transport modes coupled with a low-carbon power 
system are seen as the most promising sustainable solutions, which will contribute to 
reaching the climate objectives of the EU and other countries. According to the 
International Energy Agency (IEA), in order to meet the objective set by the Paris 
Agreement, e.g. limiting the global temperature increase to below 2 degrees Celsius, at 
least 20 % of all road transport vehicles globally will need to be electrically driven by 
2030, alongside the rail transport electrification (already under way) [UNFCCC, 2015]. 
To achieve this goal, the IEA’s model indicates that all electric drive vehicles, including 
passenger electric vehicles, two and three wheelers, light commercial vans, trucks, etc., 
must represent 35 % of global sales in 2030 [UNFCCC, 2015]. In this context, the global 
deployment target for the stock of passenger electric vehicles (EV) is set at 20 million EV 
by 2020, increasing to 100 million EV or even 150 million following a more ambitions 
pathway by 2030 [IEA, 2016]. At the end of 2015, the global EV stock was 1.26 million 
[IEA, 2016]. Achieving the global EV deployment targets for 2020 and 2030 implies 
substantial market growth, which should be sustained by massive investments, business 
solutions and policy support. To contribute to this goal, the EC proposed a set of targets 
to steer the R&I actions and guide coordination of EU and Member States funding. In the 
case of EV, areas concerned are materials research, nanotechnology, electrochemistry, 
manufacturing processes and manufacturing technologies [SET-Plan, 2016]. 
In 2015, seven countries around the globe reached over 1 % EV market share, six of 
them in Europe (the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, France and the United 
Kingdom). In the same year, the Netherlands and Norway registered the highest EV 
market share with about 10 % and 23 %, respectively [IEA, 2016]. In terms of annual 
sales, in 2015, the EU-28 accounted for approximately 150 000 EVs (around 30 % of the 
global market). About 60 % of total EV sales in the EU were plug-in electric vehicles 
(PHEV), the rest being battery electric vehicles (BEV) [EAFO, 2016]. In addition, about 
192 000 hybrid electric vehicles (HEV) were sold in the EU in 2015 [JATO, 2016]. 
To create an integrated electromobility ecosystem and the national roadmaps necessary 
to gather support from policy-makers, several countries have set up ambitious sales 
and/or stock targets for vehicle electrification. According to the European Roadmap for 
Electrification of Road Transport, over 5 million EVs will be on EU roads by 2020, 
increasing to 15 million by 2025 [ERERS, 2012]. To accomplish the emission reduction 
goals, McKinsey puts forward even more ambitious targets of 8-9 million EVs on the road 
by 2020 [McKinsey, 2014]. However, specific targets and timelines are subject to 
negotiation with the EU’s Member States. 
Because of overall concerns about the supply of certain materials, this study aims to 
assess whether the widespread deployment of electric vehicles in the EU could be 
hindered by the potentially insecure supply of materials along their supply chain. 
In particular, the report focuses on certain materials required in two key components in 
the electric powertrain: 
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 Rechargeable batteries, which allow on-board storage of electrical power from 
electricity grid and releasing it when requested. Among the options in terms of 
rechargeable batteries, lithium-ion batteries (LIB) are expected to dominate the 
market for EV in medium to long-term e.g. [Avicenne, 2015]. LIB can employ as 
cathode different chemistries such as LCO (lithium-cobalt-oxide), NMC (nickel-
manganese-cobalt), LMO (lithium, manganese, phosphate) or LFP (lithium-iron-
phosphate), with performances suited to different applications. According to 
Darton Commodities [Darton, 2016], until recently the cathode chemistry of 
choice for the majority of BEV and PHEV producers was a combination of NMC 
with a non-cobalt chemistry material, mainly LMO. The spreading trend is that an 
increasing number of automakers are choosing full NCM chemistry to achieve 
higher energy density and thus longer distances per charge. Natural graphite on 
is the reference anode material for LIB. In comparison to available alternatives 
(artificial graphite, mesocarbon microbeads, Si and Sn composites/alloys, and 
LTO – lithium-titanium-oxide), natural graphite received a 64 % share in 2014 
[Avicenne, 2015]. The following materials will be thus analysed: lithium, cobalt 
and graphite. 
 Electric traction motors are used for the propulsion of electric vehicles. The 
majority of traction motors use high-performance rare-earth magnets which 
contain neodymium, praseodymium and dysprosium. 
There is a large diversity of electric powertrain systems available on the automotive 
market (Figure 42). 
 
Figure 42: Electric powertrain concepts compared to conventional internal propulsion 
engine (ICE) system; representation adapted from [Fraunhofer, 2011] 
It is worth pointing out that not all vehicles which can be propelled by electric traction 
motors are part of the electric vehicles group. This applies to HEVs where the electric 
motor represents a secondary source of propulsion in parallel configuration with ICE 
drive. Since the HEV does not use electric power from the grid, it is not defined as an 
electric vehicle. 
Currently, BEV, PHEV and HEV types are the most common variants on the electric and 
hybrid vehicles market. These three vehicle types are characterised as follows: 
 BEVs run exclusively with one or more electric motors; they are powered by a 
rechargeable battery, thus using energy stored in the grid; 
 PHEVs include rechargeable batteries that can be plugged into an external electric 
power source for charging; they also have ICE to extend the range of vehicles; 
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 HEVs combine an internal combustion engine (ICE) and one or more electric 
motors. The full hybrid electric vehicle could be propelled solely by the electric 
motor under certain operating conditions. 
Depending on the car model and type of powertrain adopted, electric and hybrid vehicles 
may make use of lithium, cobalt and graphite in Li-ion batteries (with the exception of 
FCEVs which use a fuel cell instead of a battery) and neodymium, praseodymium and 
dysprosium for the NdFeB permanent magnet in electric traction motors. The present 
report refers to all six materials used in the electric and hybrid vehicles commercialised 
today or forecast to be adopted by 2030. The rare earths – neodymium, praseodymium 
and dysprosium – are evaluated as critical materials in an EC study [EC, 2014], and their 
supply issues in the EV sector are similar to those for wind turbines. Cobalt and graphite 
are also considered critical materials for the EU economy [EC, 2014]. Although lithium is 
not perceived as a critical material in terms of supply risk and economic performance, 
latest developments in the automotive sectors and increasing demand for rechargeable 
batteries call for a new assessment. 
 
5.2 Materials in rechargeable batteries: lithium-ion battery (LIB) 
Three materials have been investigated for LIB in hybrid and electric vehicles: lithium 
(Li), cobalt (Co) and graphite (C), which are the reference materials for LIB electrodes. 
The calculated values of the indicators for both dimensions are represented as polar 
charts for 2015, 2020, 2025 and 2030. 
Figure 43 and Figure 44 show the evolution of the upstream D1 indicators according to 
the most conservative baseline (BL) and the most optimistic scenario 3, respectively, for 
the lithium required in LIBs for the period 2015-2030. 
The evolution of D2 indicators for lithium in LIBs is shown in Figure 45 for the period 
2015- 2030. 
The evolution of EU resilience for lithium for all assessment scenarios is shown in Figure 
46. 
Similarly, Figure 47, Figure 48, Figure 51 and Figure 52 show the evolution of the 
upstream D1 indicators according to the most conservative baseline (BL) and the most 
optimistic scenario 3, respectively, for cobalt and graphite required in LIBs for the period 
2015-2030. 
The evolution of D2 indicators for cobalt and graphite in LIBs is shown in Figure 49 and 
Figure 53, respectively, for the period 2015-2030. 
The evolution of EU resilience for cobalt and graphite required in LIB for all assessment 
scenarios is shown in Figure 50 and Figure 54, respectively.  
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5.2.1 Lithium 
  
  
Figure 43: Evolution of D1 indicators according to the conservative baseline (BL) 
scenario for lithium in EVs, 2015-2030 
  
  
Figure 44: Evolution of D1 indicators according to the most optimistic assessment 
scenario 3 (AS3) for lithium in EVs, 2015-2030 
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Figure 45: Evolution of D2 indicators for lithium in EVs, 2015-2030 
  
  
Figure 46: Evolution of resilience for Li in EVs for all assessment scenarios, 2015-2030 
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5.2.2 Cobalt 
  
  
Figure 47: Evolution of D1 indicators according to the conservative baseline (BL) 
scenario for cobalt in EVs, 2015-2030 
  
  
Figure 48: Evolution of D1 indicators according to the most optimistic assessment 
scenario 3 (AS3) for cobalt in EVs, 2015-2030 
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Figure 49: Evolution of D2 indicators for cobalt in EVs, 2015-2030 
  
  
Figure 50: Evolution of resilience for cobalt in EVs for all scenarios, 2015-2030 
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5.2.3 Graphite 
  
  
Figure 51: Evolution of D1 indicators according to the conservative baseline (BL) 
scenario for graphite in EVs, 2015-2030 
  
  
Figure 52: Evolution of D1 indicators according to the most optimistic assessment 
scenario 3 (AS3) for graphite in EVs, 2015-2030 
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Figure 53: Evolution of D2 indicators for graphite in EVs, 2015-2030 
  
  
Figure 54: Evolution of resilience for graphite in EVs for all scenarios, 2015-2030 
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5.3 Materials in electric traction motors 
Three materials were investigated for electric traction motors in hybrid and electric 
vehicles: Nd, Pr and Dy, which are the materials required for a motor’s permanent 
magnets. 
The calculated values of the indicators for both dimensions are represented as polar 
charts for 2015, 2020, 2025 and 2030. 
Figure 55 and Figure 56 show the evolution of the upstream D1 indicators according to 
the most conservative baseline (BL) and the most optimistic scenario 3, respectively, for 
neodymium required in EV electric traction motors for the period 2015-2030. 
The evolution of D2 indicators for neodymium required in EV electric traction motors is 
shown in Figure 57 for the period 2015-2030. 
The evolution of EU resilience for neodymium in EV electric traction motors for all 
assessment scenarios is shown in Figure 58. 
Similarly, Figure 59, Figure 60, Figure 63 and Figure 64 show the evolution of the 
upstream D1 indicators according to the most conservative baseline (BL) and the most 
optimistic scenario 3, respectively, for praseodymium and dysprosium required in EV 
electric traction motors for the period 2015-2030. 
The evolution of D2 indicators for praseodymium and dysprosium in EV electric traction 
motors is shown respectively in Figure 61 and Figure 65 for the period 2015-2030. 
The evolution of EU resilience for praseodymium and dysprosium in EV electric traction 
motors for all assessment scenarios is shown in Figure 62 and Figure 66, respectively. 
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5.3.1 Neodymium 
  
  
Figure 55: Evolution of D1 indicators according to the conservative baseline (BL) 
scenario for neodymium in EVs, 2015-2030 
  
  
Figure 56: Evolution of D1 indicators according to the most optimistic assessment 
scenario 3 (AS3) for neodymium in EVs, 2015-2030 
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Figure 57: Evolution of D2 indicators for neodymium in EVs, 2015-2030 
  
  
Figure 58: Evolution of resilience for neodymium for all scenarios, 2015-2030 
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5.3.2 Praseodymium 
  
  
Figure 59: Evolution of D1 indicators according to the conservative baseline (BL) 
scenario for praseodymium in EVs, 2015-2030 
  
  
Figure 60: Evolution of D1 indicators according to the most optimistic assessment 
scenario 3 (AS3) for praseodymium in EVs, 2015-2030 
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Figure 61: Evolution of D2 indicators for praseodymium in EVs, 2015-2030 
  
  
Figure 62: Evolution of resilience for praseodymium in EVs for all scenarios, 2015-2030 
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5.3.3 Dysprosium 
  
  
Figure 63: Evolution of D1 indicators according to the conservative baseline (BL) 
scenario for dysprosium in EVs, 2015-2030 
  
  
Figure 64: Evolution of D1 indicators according to the most optimistic assessment 
scenario 3 (AS3) for dysprosium in EVs, 2015-2030 
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Figure 65: Evolution of D2 indicators for dysprosium in EVs, 2015-2030 
  
  
Figure 66: Evolution of resilience for dysprosium in EVs for all scenarios, 2015-2030 
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5.4 EV technology resilience charts 
The resilience charts for EV technology in 2015, 2020, 2025 and 2030 under the baseline 
and assessment scenario 3 are presented below (Figure 67 and Figure 68). 
  
  
Figure 67: Resilience charts for materials required in EV technology in 2015, 2020, 2015 
and 2030 for the conservative baseline scenario 
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Figure 68: Resilience charts for materials required in EV technology in 2015, 2020, 2025 
and 2030 for the most optimistic assessment scenario 3 
Two components pertinent to electric vehicles were assessed in the present study: 
batteries and electric traction motors. 
As regards the materials required for EV batteries, current EU resilience to supply 
bottlenecks is low for graphite (C) and medium for lithium (Li) and cobalt (Co). Over 
time, for these three materials the resilience remains very close to the border between 
the low- and medium-resilience zones (Figure 69). 
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Figure 69: Variation in EU resilience to supply bottlenecks of materials used in electric 
vehicles; threshold 1 fixed at 0.3 represents the border between low and medium 
resilience 
Lithium 
The situation for Li deteriorates until 2020 in all scenarios due to an increase in demand. 
Over these five years, EU resilience decreases by -3.3 % in the baseline scenario, -
2.8 % for scenario 1 and -2.3 % for the other two scenarios, thereby moving to the low-
resilience zone. In all scenarios, EU resilience remains in the low-resilience zone in 2020. 
In the period between 2020 and 2025, EU resilience falls progressively in the baseline 
scenario (-5 %) and scenario 1 (-2.7 %), while there is no significant change for 
scenarios 2 and 3 (<1 % drop). In other words, increasing EU Li production and 
recycling can mitigate the drop in resilience marginally, while no substitution effects are 
expected during this period. Increasing the EU domestic production could have a slightly 
larger effect on resilience (+2.3 %) than recycling (+2 %). 
In the last five-year period (2025-2030) the situation for Li further deteriorates in the 
baseline scenario (-6.2 %) and scenario 1 (-3.5 %) compared to the previous period. For 
scenarios 2 and 3, EU resilience recovers slightly by 1.1 % thanks to recycling. In these 
two cases, resilience reaches the threshold between the low and medium zones. 
However, Li does not recover to its initial (2015) resilience level in any of these 
scenarios. 
To summarise, Li recycling coupled with its production in the EU are the mitigation 
measures with highest potential in the 2030 time frame. However, these will not be 
sufficient to induce medium-resilience levels. Moreover, an alternative technology to Li-
ion batteries seems unlikely in the period under consideration. To secure the deployment 
of EVs in the EU, as regards the supply of batteries, the downstream dimension needs to 
be strengthened by increasing the production of processed materials, initiating cell-
manufacturing activities within EU as well as assuring long-term contracts with 
component suppliers outside the EU. 
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Cobalt 
Similarly to Li, the EU resilience deteriorates notably in 2020 in the baseline scenario 
and scenario 1. Over these five years, it drops by around 11 % in these two scenarios. 
The decrease is far smaller in the other two scenarios (-3.4 % and -2.8 %). In all the 
scenarios, however, the EU resilience drops from medium in 2015 to low in 2020. 
In the period between 2020 and 2025, the EU resilience further decreases in the 
baseline scenario and scenario 1 (~ -2 %). A noticeable increase in resilience is 
observed for scenario 2 (+7.7 %) and scenario 3 (+13 %), thanks primarily to recycling 
and to substitution measures, returning to the medium-resilience zone in these two 
scenarios, well above the 2015 level. 
Between 2025 and 2030, the situation for Co further deteriorates in the baseline 
scenario and scenario 1 (-2.4 %). This indicates that an increase in demand adversely 
affects resilience in the baseline scenario, and that new EU mine production cannot 
counter this effect (scenario 1). In scenario 2, the EU resilience does not change 
significantly (-0.2 %), while in scenario 3 a further large increase is achieved (+4.6 %) 
over the same period. In other words, recycling alone can cope with the higher demand 
but potential substitution measures have an even greater impact during this period. 
Overall, resilience to bottlenecks in the supply of Co increases in scenarios 2 and 3 
between 2015 and 2030. 
To summarise, both recycling and substitution can provide the most influential mitigation 
strategy in the 2030 time frame. These measures will increase the resilience to supply 
bottlenecks of Co, which would remain in the medium zone. Reinforcement of the 
downstream production is also an important step for cobalt. 
Graphite 
The EU resilience for graphite remains low for all scenarios until 2020, except for 
scenario 3 where it crosses the threshold into the medium-resilience zone. While it drops 
in the baseline scenario (<1 %), it improves by 3.8 %, 4.2 % and 11.7 % in the other 
three scenarios, respectively. 
In the period between 2020 and 2025, a slight fall is observed in the EU resilience in the 
baseline scenario (-1.6 %) and scenario 1 (-0.7 %). A small increase in resilience is 
observed for scenario 2 (+1.3 %) due to recycling efforts. A much larger increase is 
achieved for scenario 3 (+7.2 %) as a result of the addition of substitution. 
Between 2025 and 2030, the situation for graphite further deteriorates in the baseline 
scenario (-2.5 %) and scenario 1 (-0.6 %) compared to the previous period. In scenario 
2, it improves (+1.5 %), although not sufficiently to leave the low-resilience zone. In 
scenario 3, a further large increase is achieved (+5.1 %), yet not enough to reach the 
threshold with the high-resilience zone. 
To summarise, substitution is an effective mitigation strategy for graphite, while 
potential EU domestic production increase and recycling also play important roles. Yet 
the combination of all three measures is not sufficient to assure a high level of resilience 
by 2030. The independence and adequacy of the downstream supply are also crucial in 
the case of graphite. 
As regards the materials required for EV electric traction motors – neodymium (Nd), 
praseodymium (Pr) and dysprosium (Dy) – the current EU resilience (2015 data) is low 
in terms of their supply – a long way from the threshold between the low and medium 
zones. 
Neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium 
The EU resilience for these three materials remains low in all scenarios until 2020 with 
marginal increases (up to +2.6 % for Nd, +2.5 % for Pr and +4 % for Dy) mainly due to 
the enhanced diversification of supply. 
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During the 2020-2025 period, the EU resilience rises slightly, even in the baseline 
scenario: ~ +4 % for Nd and Pr and +6.6 % for Dy. A steady increase is also observed 
for Nd and Pr in scenario 1 (~ 4.5 %) and +8.2 % growth is reached for Dy. A larger 
increase is observed for scenario 2: +7.5 % for Nd and Pr and +11 % for Dy. As for 
scenario 3, a significant increase is achieved: +23 % for Nd and Pr and +27 % for Dy. 
Moreover, in 2025, the EU resilience for the three materials remains low in all scenarios. 
In the last five-year period (2025-2030), the EU resilience increases slightly (between 
0.8 and 1.2 % for all three materials) in the baseline scenario as a result of diversified 
supply and between 1.5 and 2.5 % in scenario 1 (resulting from potential increase in 
mine production in the EU). A large increase is observed for all materials for scenario 2 
(~ +8-9 %) and an even larger one, of around 20 %, is visible in scenario 3. In this 
favourable scenario, Nd and Pr move close to the border between low- and medium-
resilience zones, while Dy moves into the medium-resilience zone. 
To summarise, even though the resilience situation for the supply of Nd, Pr and Dy 
seems to improve until 2030, thanks to enhanced stability of supply and the expansion 
of EU mine capacity, potential increases in both the degree of substitution and in the 
recycling rate will be most effective in bringing the EU resilience to a near-medium level 
in 2030. 
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6 Conclusions 
This study addresses materials supply issues in meeting the EU’s increasing deployment 
rates of three important low-carbon technologies: wind energy, solar (photovoltaic) 
energy and electric vehicles. 
A specific methodology has been developed allowing for the assessment of the EU 
resilience to potential bottlenecks in the supply of materials along their value chain. In 
total, 15 materials have been screened. The results are expressed in terms of EU 
resilience to material supply bottlenecks. 
Currently (2015 data), as expected, the EU has low resilience to the supply of rare earth 
elements – neodymium, praseodymium and dysprosium – for the permanent magnets 
required for the wind and electric vehicle sectors. The analysis shows that the current 
resilience to supply constraints on graphite for lithium-ion batteries is also low, although 
to a lesser extent. The EU shows slightly better resilience, defined here as medium, for 
the silicon, silver and indium required for the photovoltaic sector, as well as lithium and 
cobalt for electric vehicle batteries. No supply issues are currently related to carbon fibre 
composite (CFC) for wind turbine blades. In view of low demand levels, several materials 
– namely copper, gallium, selenium, cadmium and tellurium – required for the 
photovoltaic sector do not face potential supply bottlenecks either today or until 2030. 
According to the proposed methodology, a full assessment of the EU resilience related to 
the supply of these materials has not been performed. 
The EU resilience to potential bottlenecks in the supply of materials is expected to 
change until 2030, driven by a number of factors. Besides the expected evolution of 
supply actors over time, with variable impacts on the stability of the supply of both raw 
and processed materials, these factors encompass developments in the recycling and 
substitution fields as well as advances in the EU mine production. The extent to which 
they can influence the EU resilience has been assessed in three different scenarios, as 
follows: 
• Assessment scenario 1 considers increasing EU mine production; 
• Assessment scenario 2 builds on scenario 1 and also takes into account 
secondary production (recycling); 
• Assessment scenario 3 adds substitution to scenario 2. 
The above scenarios are assessed against a conservative baseline scenario which does 
not include any of these three mitigation measures, namely increasing EU mine 
production, recycling and substitution. The role of these mitigation measures and their 
combination is assessed for each material in the present analysis. 
As regards the wind sector, the EU resilience remains low for neodymium, 
praseodymium and dysprosium until 2030 if there are no mitigation measures in place 
(baseline scenario). The potential to increase mine production in the EU, based on an 
assessment of current development-stage projects (scenario 1), has limited impact on 
the resilience of these rare earth elements. The analysis shows that recycling (scenario 
2), if developed as forecasted could have a more tangible effect on improving resilience, 
although this is not sufficient to reach the medium-resilience level in 2025. It is only 
thanks to substitution, applied in addition to an increase in mining production and 
recycling (scenario 3), that EU resilience can improve to medium level for the three rare 
earth elements in 2025. In 2030, increased recycling rates, as envisaged in scenario 2, 
might just be sufficient to raise EU resilience to the medium level. However, the supply 
situation for the three rare earth elements can only be substantially improved if 
substitution measures are applied, moving them closer to the high resilience zone in 
2030. 
No specific resilience issues are foreseen today or until 2030 for the Carbon Fibre 
Composites used for wind turbine blades. 
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With respect to the photovoltaic sector, the EU resilience to the supply of indium is 
deteriorating rapidly, and is already low in 2020 in all scenarios. It remains low in all 
scenarios until 2030, except for scenario 3 where, thanks to the potential for 
substitution, it increases to medium level. The EU resilience to the supply of silver could 
fall from 2025 onwards to a low level if mitigation measures are not taken. With 
mitigation measures in place, the resilience for silver is evaluated as medium in all 
scenarios. The EU resilience related to the supply of silicon, although progressively 
decreasing over time, remains medium in all scenarios. 
In the electric vehicle sector, the EU resilience to bottlenecks in the supply of 
neodymium, praseodymium and dysprosium remains low until 2030, despite improving 
slightly. The only exception is in scenario 3 when the EU resilience to the supply of 
dysprosium reaches the medium-resilience threshold, underlining yet again the 
importance of substitution. As regards the supply of graphite, the EU resilience is low in 
all scenarios, except for scenario 3 where it increases to medium in 2020. Already, in 
2020, the EU resilience to the supply of lithium deteriorates to low and falls even further 
until 2030 if no recycling measures are in place. Even if such measures are in place, the 
resilience will never return to the 2015 level, although it recovers slightly. Similarly to 
the case for lithium, the EU resilience to the supply of cobalt is already deteriorating to 
low in 2020 in all scenarios. If no recycling and substitution are in place, the situation 
continues to deteriorate until 2030. Recycling would contribute to returning the EU 
resilience to the medium level, even exceeding the 2015 level. Substitution further 
improves the situation in 2030, although not enough to reach a high level of resilience. 
Different mitigation measures are best suited to specific materials. For the majority of 
the materials investigated, it appears that substitution has been found to be the most 
effective measure for increasing resilience, followed by recycling and upscaling the EU’s 
production of raw materials. 
For the wind and electric vehicle sectors, the substitution of rare earths in permanent 
magnets and the substitution of graphite in batteries would seem to be the most efficient 
mitigation measures for raising EU resilience to the supply of these materials, followed 
by recycling and finally ramping-up the EU raw material production. A significant effort is 
already ongoing at both the EU level and globally on substitution of rare earths in 
permanent magnets, either via reducing their content or by using an alternative 
technology. Such alternative technologies are available for both wind generators and 
electric vehicle motors, in particular for battery electric vehicles, although they are not 
immune to technical and economic limitations. 
In the case of the lithium required for electric vehicle batteries, the EU resilience could 
be improved mainly by recycling as well as boosting EU primary lithium production, while 
substitution has no impact within the 2030 time frame. This indicates that recycling, if 
set up correctly, has the potential to create a continuous and secure secondary stream 
of lithium supply for the EU in the future. Policies and incentives need to be streamlined 
to jointly cope with a higher demand for lithium in the future and the growing pile of 
batteries considered as waste. In the longer term – beyond 2030 – substitution might 
also play a substantial role for lithium. 
In the case of cobalt, which is also required in batteries, if developed at the levels 
forecast, recycling and substitution would improve EU resilience to supply bottlenecks, 
while the extent to which cobalt production can be increased in EU is not likely to have 
an impact. 
As concerns the photovoltaic sector, increasing the EU production of silver and silicon is 
the mitigation measure with the greatest potential, whilst recycling indium mainly from 
new scrap appears to achieve the most relevant effects. In fact, the recycling of indium 
from end-of-life applications is expected to be limited because of the diffuse nature of its 
use. 
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The analysis has also shown inadequacies in the EU’s manufacturing capacity for 
processing materials and components in the wind energy, photovoltaic and electric 
vehicle sectors. The independence and adequacy of manufacturing capacities in all steps 
in the downstream supply chain would be highly beneficial to secure the smooth 
deployment of these technologies. This is particularly true for electric vehicles where the 
EU is very dependent on manufacturing capacities along the whole supply chain, and this 
supply is mainly concentrated in a few Asian countries. 
In the wind and photovoltaic sectors, the EU dependency on manufacturing capacities is 
slightly lower than for electric vehicles. However, improvements in downstream 
production would also be beneficial, in particular for rare earth elements – neodymium, 
praseodymium and dysprosium. This can be achieved by expanding existing EU 
production capacities and building new manufacturing capacities, along the complete 
materials supply chain. 
Finally, this analysis has highlighted the intrinsic difficulty to forecast the future EU 
resilience due to limited and not always coherent data, uncertainties related to the future 
technological development as well as actual deployment scenarios. This is particularly 
evident for the downstream stages of the supply chain.   
In addition, large uncertainties related to the implementation of the considered 
mitigation measures could have significant effect on the determination of the EU 
resilience.   
In spite of such limitations and uncertainties, the present report gives a clear 
quantitative indication of the EU resilience evolution in view of material supply 
bottlenecks which may hinder the deployment of low carbon technologies.  
In addition, it highlights the importance of the different mitigation measures as well as 
the necessity to strengthen the EU manufacturing potential along the complete value 
chain. 
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Annex A. Overview of indicators 
The following tables give the values of all indicators and an average of each of two 
dimensions relative to all materials investigated per technology. These values are also 
shown for the four different assessment scenarios, as described in chapter 2. 
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Table 2: Scores for indicators and dimensions for neodymium in wind turbines 
Indicator / 
Dimension 
Baseline scenario Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030 
D1.1 Material demand 0.931 0.767 0.831 0.842 0.931 0.767 0.831 0.842 0.931 0.767 0.831 0.842 0.931 0.767 0.831 0.842 
D1.2 Investment 
potential 0.190 0.180 0.170 0.160 0.190 0.180 0.170 0.160 0.190 0.180 0.170 0.160 0.190 0.180 0.170 0.160 
D1.3 Stability of 
supply 0.493 0.732 0.892 0.937 0.493 0.732 0.892 0.937 0.493 0.732 0.892 0.937 0.493 0.732 0.892 0.937 
D1.4 Reserve 
depletion 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
D1.5 Import reliance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.027 0.047 0.001 0.000 0.256 0.142 0.001 0.025 0.374 0.726 
D1.6 Supply 
adequacy 0.800 0.700 0.700 0.700 0.800 0.700 0.700 0.700 0.800 0.700 0.700 0.700 0.800 0.700 0.700 0.700 
D1.7 Recycling 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.007 0.073 0.292 0.001 0.007 0.073 0.292 
D1.8 Substitution 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.018 0.300 0.582 
D1 Upstream 
dimension 0.427 0.422 0.449 0.455 0.427 0.422 0.453 0.461 0.427 0.423 0.490 0.509 0.427 0.429 0.543 0.655 
D2.1 Supply chain 
dependency 0.490 0.490 0.490 0.490 
Idem baseline scenario Idem baseline scenario Idem baseline scenario 
D2.2 Purchasing 
potential 0.560 0.550 0.540 0.540 
D2.3 Material cost 
impact 1.000 0.990 0.980 0.960 
D2 Downstream 
dimension 0.613 0.608 0.603 0.599 
Idem baseline scenario Idem baseline scenario Idem baseline scenario 
 103 
 
Table 3: Scores for indicators and dimensions for praseodymium in wind turbines 
Indicator / 
Dimension 
Baseline scenario Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030 
D1.1 Material demand 0.930 0.755 0.823 0.834 0.930 0.755 0.823 0.834 0.930 0.755 0.823 0.834 0.930 0.755 0.823 0.834 
D1.2 Investment 
potential 0.190 0.180 0.170 0.160 0.190 0.180 0.170 0.160 0.190 0.180 0.170 0.160 0.190 0.180 0.170 0.160 
D1.3 Stability of 
supply 0.493 0.738 0.893 0.937 0.493 0.738 0.893 0.937 0.493 0.738 0.893 0.937 0.493 0.738 0.893 0.937 
D1.4 Reserve 
depletion 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
D1.5 Import reliance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.022 0.039 0.000 0.005 0.072 0.134 0.001 0.022 0.376 0.714 
D1.6 Supply 
adequacy 0.800 0.700 0.700 0.700 0.800 0.700 0.700 0.700 0.800 0.700 0.700 0.700 0.800 0.700 0.700 0.700 
D1.7 Recycling 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.007 0.073 0.292 0.001 0.007 0.073 0.292 
D1.8 Substitution 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.018 0.300 0.582 
D1 Upstream 
dimension 0.427 0.422 0.448 0.454 0.427 0.422 0.451 0.459 0.427 0.423 0.466 0.507 0.427 0.428 0.542 0.653 
D2.1 Supply chain 
dependency 0.490 0.490 0.490 0.490 
Idem baseline scenario Idem baseline scenario Idem baseline scenario 
D2.2 Purchasing 
potential 0.560 0.550 0.540 0.540 
D2.3 Material cost 
impact 1.000 1.000 0.990 0.990 
D2 Downstream 
dimension 0.613 0.610 0.605 0.605 
Idem baseline scenario Idem baseline scenario Idem baseline scenario 
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Table 4: Scores for indicators and dimensions for dysprosium in wind turbines 
Indicator / 
Dimension 
Baseline scenario Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030 
D1.1 Material demand 0.891 0.446 0.634 0.676 0.880 0.446 0.634 0.674 0.880 0.446 0.634 0.674 0.882 0.446 0.634 0.675 
D1.2 Investment 
potential 0.190 0.180 0.170 0.160 0.190 0.180 0.170 0.160 0.190 0.180 0.170 0.160 0.190 0.180 0.170 0.160 
D1.3 Stability of 
supply 0.493 0.823 0.946 0.965 0.493 0.823 0.946 0.965 0.493 0.823 0.946 0.965 0.493 0.823 0.946 0.965 
D1.4 Reserve 
depletion 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
D1.5 Import reliance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.065 0.142 0.000 0.005 0.115 0.237 0.001 0.022 0.415 0.818 
D1.6 Supply 
adequacy 0.700 0.700 0.800 0.800 0.700 0.700 0.800 0.800 0.700 0.700 0.800 0.800 0.700 0.700 0.800 0.800 
D1.7 Recycling 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.007 0.073 0.292 0.001 0.007 0.073 0.292 
D1.8 Substitution 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.018 0.300 0.582 
D1 Upstream 
dimension 0.409 0.394 0.444 0.450 0.408 0.394 0.452 0.468 0.408 0.395 0.467 0.516 0.408 0.400 0.542 0.662 
D2.1 Supply chain 
dependency 0.490 0.490 0.490 0.490 
Idem baseline scenario Idem baseline scenario Idem baseline scenario 
D2.2 Purchasing 
potential 0.560 0.550 0.540 0.540 
D2.3 Material cost 
impact 1.000 0.990 0.990 0.980 
D2 Downstream 
dimension 0.613 0.608 0.605 0.603 
Idem baseline scenario Idem baseline scenario Idem baseline scenario 
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Table 5: Scores for indicators and dimensions for carbon fibre composites in wind turbines 
Indicator / Dimension 
All scenarios 
2015 2020 2025 2030 
D1.1 Material demand 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
D1.2 Investment potential 0.190 0.180 0.170 0.160 
D1.3 Stability of supply 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
D1.4 Reserve depletion 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
D1.5 Import reliance 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
D1.6 Supply adequacy 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
D1.7 Recycling n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
D1.8 Substitution n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
D1 Upstream dimension 0.865 0.863 0.862 0.860 
D2.1 Supply chain dependency 0.585 0.585 0.585 0.585 
D2.2 Purchasing potential 0.560 0.550 0.540 0.540 
D2.3 Material cost impact 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 
D2 Downstream dimension 0.626 0.623 0.620 0.620 
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Table 6: Scores for indicators and dimensions for silicon in solar PV 
Indicator / 
Dimension 
Baseline scenario Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030 
D1.1 Material demand 0.974 0.973 0.970 0.967 0.974 0.973 0.970 0.967 0.974 0.973 0.970 0.965 0.974 0.973 0.970 0.965 
D1.2 Investment 
potential 0.190 0.180 0.170 0.160 0.190 0.180 0.170 0.160 0.190 0.180 0.170 0.160 0.190 0.180 0.170 0.160 
D1.3 Stability of 
supply 0.730 0.730 0.730 0.730 0.730 0.730 0.730 0.730 0.730 0.730 0.730 0.730 0.730 0.730 0.730 0.730 
D1.4 Reserve 
depletion 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
D1.5 Import reliance 0.217 0.178 0.143 0.116 0.217 0.178 0.143 0.116 0.217 0.178 0.143 0.119 0.217 0.178 0.143 0.119 
D1.6 Supply 
adequacy 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
D1.7 Recycling n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
D1.8 Substitution n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
D1 Upstream 
dimension 0.685 0.677 0.669 0.662 0.685 0.677 0.669 0.662 0.685 0.677 0.669 0.662 0.685 0.677 0.669 0.662 
D2.1 Supply chain 
dependency 0.480 0.450 0.450 0.450 
Idem baseline scenario Idem baseline scenario Idem baseline scenario 
D2.2 Purchasing 
potential 0.560 0.550 0.540 0.540 
D2.3 Material cost 
impact 0.920 0.890 0.870 0.870 
D2 Downstream 
dimension 0.592 0.568 0.561 0.561 
Idem baseline scenario Idem baseline scenario Idem baseline scenario 
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Table 7: Scores for indicators and dimensions for silver in solar PV 
Indicator / 
Dimension 
Baseline scenario Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030 
D1.1 Material demand 0.962 0.965 0.952 0.943 0.962 0.965 0.952 0.943 0.962 0.965 0.952 0.943 0.962 0.965 0.952 0.943 
D1.2 Investment 
potential 0.190 0.180 0.170 0.160 0.190 0.180 0.170 0.160 0.190 0.180 0.170 0.160 0.190 0.180 0.170 0.160 
D1.3 Stability of 
supply 0.922 0.930 0.930 0.935 0.922 0.930 0.930 0.935 0.922 0.930 0.930 0.935 0.922 0.930 0.930 0.935 
D1.4 Reserve 
depletion 1.000 0.900 0.700 0.700 1.000 0.900 0.700 0.700 1.000 0.900 0.700 0.700 1.000 0.900 0.700 0.700 
D1.5 Import reliance 0.882 0.578 0.474 0.401 0.882 0.979 0.909 0.811 0.882 0.981 0.919 0.835 0.882 0.984 1.000 1.000 
D1.6 Supply 
adequacy 0.700 0.700 0.700 0.700 0.700 0.700 0.700 0.700 0.700 0.700 0.700 0.700 0.700 0.700 0.700 0.700 
D1.7 Recycling 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.009 0.037 0.049 0.001 0.009 0.037 0.049 
D1.8 Substitution 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.015 0.250 0.485 
D1 Upstream 
dimension 0.582 0.531 0.491 0.480 0.582 0.582 0.545 0.531 0.582 0.583 0.551 0.540 0.582 0.585 0.592 0.621 
D2.1 Supply chain 
dependency 0.480 0.430 0.430 0.430 
Idem baseline scenario Idem baseline scenario Idem baseline scenario 
D2.2 Purchasing 
potential 0.560 0.550 0.540 0.540 
D2.3 Material cost 
impact 0.970 0.950 0.940 0.940 
D2 Downstream 
dimension 0.602 0.570 0.565 0.565 
Idem baseline scenario Idem baseline scenario Idem baseline scenario 
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Table 8: Scores for indicators and dimensions for indium in solar PV 
Indicator / 
Dimension 
Baseline scenario Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030 
D1.1 Material demand 0.941 0.940 0.935 0.933 0.941 0.940 0.935 0.933 0.941 0.940 0.935 0.933 0.941 0.940 0.935 0.933 
D1.2 Investment 
potential 0.190 0.180 0.170 0.160 0.190 0.180 0.170 0.160 0.190 0.180 0.170 0.160 0.190 0.180 0.170 0.160 
D1.3 Stability of 
supply 0.893 0.909 0.914 0.915 0.893 0.909 0.914 0.915 0.893 0.909 0.914 0.915 0.893 0.909 0.914 0.915 
D1.4 Reserve 
depletion 1.000 0.700 0.700 0.700 1.000 0.700 0.700 0.700 1.000 0.700 0.700 0.700 1.000 0.700 0.700 0.700 
D1.5 Import reliance 0.524 0.390 0.286 0.212 0.524 0.427 0.313 0.233 0.524 0.429 0.343 0.290 0.525 0.442 0.423 0.438 
D1.6 Supply 
adequacy 0.850 0.700 0.700 0.700 0.850 0.700 0.700 0.700 0.850 0.700 0.700 0.700 0.850 0.700 0.700 0.700 
D1.7 Recycling 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.017 0.129 0.195 0.001 0.017 0.129 0.195 
D1.8 Substitution 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.012 0.080 0.148 
D1 Upstream 
dimension 0.550 0.477 0.463 0.453 0.550 0.482 0.466 0.455 0.550 0.484 0.486 0.487 0.550 0.487 0.506 0.524 
D2.1 Supply chain 
dependency 0.483 0.480 0.480 0.480 
Idem baseline scenario Idem baseline scenario Idem baseline scenario 
D2.2 Purchasing 
potential 0.560 0.550 0.540 0.540 
D2.3 Material cost 
impact 0.990 0.990 0.990 0.980 
D2 Downstream 
dimension 0.608 0.603 0.600 0.598 
Idem baseline scenario Idem baseline scenario Idem baseline scenario 
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Table 9: Scores for indicators and dimensions for lithium in electric vehicles 
Indicator / 
Dimension 
Baseline scenario Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030 
D1.1 Material demand 0.903 0.814 0.789 0.776 0.903 0.814 0.789 0.776 0.903 0.814 0.789 0.776 0.903 0.814 0.789 0.776 
D1.2 Investment 
potential 0.190 0.181 0.170 0.161 0.190 0.181 0.170 0.161 0.190 0.181 0.170 0.161 0.192 0.181 0.170 0.161 
D1.3 Stability of 
supply 0.960 0.965 0.969 0.974 0.960 0.965 0.969 0.974 0.960 0.965 0.969 0.974 0.960 0.965 0.969 0.974 
D1.4 Reserve 
depletion 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
D1.5 Import reliance 0.038 0.021 0.012 0.008 0.038 0.039 0.123 0.216 0.041 0.053 0.180 0.366 0.041 0.053 0.180 0.366 
D1.6 Supply 
adequacy 1.000 1.000 0.900 0.700 1.000 1.000 0.900 0.700 1.000 1.000 0.900 0.700 1.000 1.000 0.900 0.700 
D1.7 Recycling 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.014 0.055 0.150 0.003 0.014 0.055 0.150 
D1.8 Substitution 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
D1 Upstream 
dimension 0.511 0.498 0.480 0.452 0.511 0.500 0.494 0.478 0.512 0.503 0.508 0.516 0.512 0.503 0.508 0.516 
D2.1 Supply chain 
dependency 0.460 0.460 0.450 0.450 
Idem baseline scenario Idem baseline scenario Idem baseline scenario 
D2.2 Purchasing 
potential 0.560 0.550 0.540 0.540 
D2.3 Material cost 
impact 0.993 0.988 0.983 0.972 
D2 Downstream 
dimension 0.596 0.593 0.583 0.581 
Idem baseline scenario Idem baseline scenario Idem baseline scenario 
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Table 10: Scores for indicators and dimensions for cobalt in electric vehicles 
Indicator / 
Dimension 
Baseline scenario Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030 
D1.1 Material demand 0.947 0.916 0.892 0.864 0.947 0.916 0.892 0.864 0.947 0.916 0.892 0.864 0.947 0.916 0.892 0.864 
D1.2 Investment 
potential 0.192 0.181 0.170 0.161 0.192 0.181 0.170 0.161 0.192 0.181 0.170 0.161 0.192 0.181 0.170 0.161 
D1.3 Stability of 
supply 0.831 0.818 0.846 0.850 0.831 0.818 0.846 0.850 0.831 0.818 0.846 0.850 0.831 0.818 0.846 0.850 
D1.4 Reserve 
depletion 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
D1.5 Import reliance 0.106 0.072 0.050 0.035 0.106 0.093 0.067 0.052 0.106 0.244 0.419 0.448 0.131 0.279 0.569 0.712 
D1.6 Supply 
adequacy 1.000 0.700 0.700 0.700 1.000 0.700 0.700 0.700 1.000 0.700 0.700 0.700 1.000 0.700 0.700 0.700 
D1.7 Recycling 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.151 0.352 0.396 0.019 0.151 0.352 0.396 
D1.8 Substitution 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.036 0.150 0.264 
D1 Upstream 
dimension 0.509 0.461 0.457 0.451 0.509 0.463 0.459 0.453 0.509 0.501 0.547 0.552 0.515 0.510 0.585 0.618 
D2.1 Supply chain 
dependency 0.460 0.455 0.450 0.450 
Idem baseline scenario Idem baseline scenario Idem baseline scenario 
D2.2 Purchasing 
potential 0.560 0.550 0.540 0.540 
D2.3 Material cost 
impact 0.979 0.954 0.938 0.908 
D2 Downstream 
dimension 0.594 0.583 0.575 0.569 
Idem baseline scenario Idem baseline scenario Idem baseline scenario 
 111 
 
Table 11: Scores for indicators and dimensions for graphite in electric vehicles 
Indicator / 
Dimension 
Baseline scenario Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030 
D1.1 Material demand 0.951 0.902 0.870 0.837 0.951 0.902 0.870 0.837 0.951 0.902 0.870 0.837 0.951 0.902 0.870 0.837 
D1.2 Investment 
potential 0.190 0.180 0.170 0.160 0.190 0.180 0.170 0.160 0.190 0.180 0.170 0.160 0.190 0.180 0.170 0.160 
D1.3 Stability of 
supply 0.710 0.788 0.809 0.820 0.710 0.788 0.809 0.820 0.710 0.788 0.809 0.820 0.710 0.788 0.809 0.820 
D1.4 Reserve 
depletion 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
D1.5 Import reliance 0.007 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.176 0.210 0.282 0.004 0.180 0.256 0.370 0.004 0.327 0.538 0.742 
D1.6 Supply 
adequacy 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.950 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.950 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.950 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.950 
D1.7 Recycling 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.008 0.050 0.092 0.001 0.008 0.050 0.092 
D1.8 Substitution 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.148 0.281 0.375 
D1 Upstream 
dimension 0.482 0.485 0.482 0.472 0.482 0.506 0.507 0.506 0.482 0.507 0.519 0.529 0.482 0.544 0.590 0.622 
D2.1 Supply chain 
dependency 0.390 0.387 0.383 0.383 
Idem baseline scenario Idem baseline scenario Idem baseline scenario 
D2.2 Purchasing 
potential 0.560 0.550 0.540 0.540 
D2.3 Material cost 
impact 0.992 0.986 0.982 0.973 
D2 Downstream 
dimension 0.561 0.556 0.550 0.548 
Idem baseline scenario Idem baseline scenario Idem baseline scenario 
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Table 12: Scores for indicators and dimensions for neodymium in electric vehicles 
Indicator / 
Dimension 
Baseline scenario Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030 
D1.1 Material demand 0.944 0.881 0.899 0.906 0.944 0.881 0.899 0.906 0.944 0.884 0.896 0.900 0.944 0.884 0.896 0.900 
D1.2 Investment 
potential 0.190 0.181 0.170 0.161 0.190 0.181 0.170 0.161 0.192 0.181 0.170 0.161 0.190 0.181 0.170 0.161 
D1.3 Stability of 
supply 0.490 0.732 0.892 0.937 0.490 0.732 0.892 0.937 0.493 0.732 0.892 0.937 0.490 0.732 0.892 0.937 
D1.4 Reserve 
depletion 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
D1.5 Import reliance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.025 0.052 0.000 0.005 0.074 0.139 0.005 0.022 0.374 0.722 
D1.6 Supply 
adequacy 0.800 0.700 0.700 0.700 0.800 0.700 0.700 0.700 0.800 0.700 0.700 0.700 0.800 0.700 0.700 0.700 
D1.7 Recycling 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.007 0.073 0.292 0.003 0.007 0.073 0.292 
D1.8 Substitution 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.018 0.300 0.582 
D1 Upstream 
dimension 0.428 0.437 0.458 0.463 0.428 0.437 0.461 0.469 0.429 0.439 0.476 0.516 0.429 0.443 0.551 0.662 
D2.1 Supply chain 
dependency 0.420 0.420 0.420 0.420 
Idem baseline scenario Idem baseline scenario Idem baseline scenario 
D2.2 Purchasing 
potential 0.560 0.550 0.540 0.540 
D2.3 Material cost 
impact 0.380 0.380 0.380 0.380 
D2 Downstream 
dimension 0.454 0.451 0.448 0.448 
Idem baseline scenario Idem baseline scenario Idem baseline scenario 
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Table 13: Scores for indicators and dimensions for praseodymium in electric vehicles 
Indicator / 
Dimension 
Baseline scenario Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030 
D1.1 Material demand 0.944 0.879 0.892 0.896 0.944 0.879 0.892 0.896 0.944 0.879 0.892 0.896 0.944 0.879 0.892 0.896 
D1.2 Investment 
potential 0.190 0.180 0.170 0.160 0.190 0.180 0.170 0.160 0.190 0.180 0.170 0.160 0.190 0.180 0.170 0.160 
D1.3 Stability of 
supply 0.493 0.738 0.893 0.937 0.493 0.738 0.893 0.937 0.493 0.738 0.893 0.937 0.490 0.738 0.893 0.937 
D1.4 Reserve 
depletion 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
D1.5 Import reliance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.021 0.036 0.000 0.005 0.071 0.132 0.005 0.022 0.371 0.714 
D1.6 Supply 
adequacy 0.800 0.700 0.700 0.700 0.800 0.700 0.700 0.700 0.800 0.700 0.700 0.700 0.800 0.700 0.700 0.700 
D1.7 Recycling 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.007 0.073 0.292 0.003 0.007 0.073 0.292 
D1.8 Substitution 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.018 0.300 0.582 
D1 Upstream 
dimension 0.428 0.437 0.457 0.462 0.428 0.437 0.460 0.466 0.428 0.439 0.475 0.515 0.429 0.443 0.550 0.660 
D2.1 Supply chain 
dependency 0.420 0.420 0.420 0.420 
Idem baseline scenario Idem baseline scenario Idem baseline scenario 
D2.2 Purchasing 
potential 0.560 0.550 0.540 0.540 
D2.3 Material cost 
impact 0.380 0.380 0.380 0.380 
D2 Downstream 
dimension 0.454 0.451 0.448 0.448 
Idem baseline scenario Idem baseline scenario Idem baseline scenario 
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Table 14: Scores for indicators and dimensions for dysprosium in electric vehicles 
Indicator / 
Dimension 
Baseline scenario Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030 
D1.1 Material demand 0.924 0.717 0.756 0.778 0.924 0.717 0.756 0.778 0.924 0.717 0.756 0.778 0.924 0.717 0.756 0.778 
D1.2 Investment 
potential 0.190 0.180 0.170 0.160 0.190 0.180 0.170 0.160 0.190 0.180 0.170 0.160 0.190 0.180 0.170 0.160 
D1.3 Stability of 
supply 0.493 0.823 0.946 0.965 0.493 0.823 0.946 0.965 0.490 0.823 0.946 0.965 0.490 0.823 0.946 0.965 
D1.4 Reserve 
depletion 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
D1.5 Import reliance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.052 0.114 0.002 0.005 0.102 0.209 0.004 0.022 0.402 0.792 
D1.6 Supply 
adequacy 0.700 0.700 0.800 0.800 0.700 0.700 0.800 0.800 0.700 0.700 0.800 0.800 0.700 0.700 0.800 0.800 
D1.7 Recycling 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.007 0.073 0.292 0.002 0.007 0.073 0.292 
D1.8 Substitution 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.018 0.300 0.582 
D1 Upstream 
dimension 0.413 0.428 0.459 0.463 0.413 0.428 0.466 0.477 0.413 0.429 0.481 0.526 0.414 0.433 0.556 0.671 
D2.1 Supply chain 
dependency 0.420 0.420 0.420 0.420 
Idem baseline scenario Idem baseline scenario Idem baseline scenario 
D2.2 Purchasing 
potential 0.560 0.550 0.540 0.540 
D2.3 Material cost 
impact 0.380 0.380 0.380 0.380 
D2 Downstream 
dimension 0.454 0.451 0.448 0.448 
Idem baseline scenario Idem baseline scenario Idem baseline scenario 
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Annex B. Supporting information for calculation of indicators 
Annex B presents the data, information and assumptions used to perform the calculation of the 
indicators. 
B.1 Wind power sector 
B.1.1 Deployment scenarios 
The wind power capacity installed and grid-connected in the EU during 2015 was 12.8 
GW, of which 9.8 GW was onshore and 3 GW offshore [EWEA, 2016a]. 
Four scenarios have been considered for the deployment of wind power in the EU until 
2030 to calculate the future material demand [EWEA, 2015; EC, 2016a]: 
1) EWEA low scenario 
2) EWEA central scenario 
3) EWEA high scenario 
4) EU reference scenario 
EWEA low scenario: EWEA’s low scenario only foresees 251 GW of wind power 
installations. 
EWEA central: EWEA’s new central scenario foresees 320 GW of wind power capacity to 
be installed in the EU in 2030. 
EWEA high scenario: The high scenario foresees 392 GW of wind power installed in 
2030. 
EU reference scenario: The 2016 EU reference scenario foresees 267 GW of wind 
power installed in 2030: 229 GW onshore and 38 GW offshore. 
 
B.1.2 Assumptions 
Penetration rate of the different turbine types 
The 2014 share for onshore DD-PMG turbines is 10 % of the total installed onshore 
capacity [JRC data, partially published in Serrano-González, 2016]. It is assumed that 
this share will increase to 29 % in 2020 and 44 % in 2030. 
The 2014 share for onshore MS/HS-PMG turbines is 18 % of the total installed onshore 
capacity [JRC data, partially published in Serrano-González, 2016]. It is assumed that 
this share will increase to 24 % in 2020 and 28 % in 2030. 
The 2014 share for offshore DD-PMG turbines is 21 % of the total installed offshore 
capacity [JRC data, partially published in Serrano-González, 2016]. It is assumed that 
this share will increase to 84 % in 2020 and 100 % in 2030. 
Average turbine capacity 
The average turbine capacity for onshore and offshore wind applications was used to 
derive the number of turbines required to be installed up to 2030 to fulfil the four 
deployment scenarios considered in the assessment. 
The average onshore turbine capacity is considered to be 3 MW in 2015; it is assumed 
that the average capacity will increase to 4 MW in 2020, 6 MW in 2025 and 10 MW in 
2030 (JRC expert opinion). 
The average offshore turbine capacity is considered to be 4.2 MW in 2015; it is assumed 
that the average capacity will increase to 8 MW in 2020, 11 MW in 2025 and 15 MW in 
2030 (JRC expert opinion). 
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Material efficiency 
The weight of the permanent magnet required per 1 MW power is considered to be 0.675 
tonnes/MW for DD-PMG turbine and 0.12 tonnes/MW for MS/HS-PMG turbine, 
respectively. The Nd content is calculated as 22.5 % of the permanent magnet weight, 
Dy content as 4.5 % and Pr content as 7.5 % [Zepf, 2013; Pavel, 2016]. 
Material cost impact 
Since the three materials – Nd, Pr and Dy – are always used in combination to produce a 
permanent magnet, a common material cost impact (D2.3 indicator) is anticipated and 
used consistently for all three materials.  
Determining the EU demand  
The EU demand for Nd, Dy and Pr for the deployment of wind power is calculated on a 
yearly basis up to 2030 as the sum of the demand of these three materials in the three 
types of turbines: DD-PMG onshore, MS/HS-PMG onshore and DD-PMG offshore. 
Blades 
It is assumed that no bottlenecks can occur in the upstream dimension for blades. As 
noted in the methodology, the recycling and substitution contributions are not taken into 
account for the assessment of very abundant materials (in this case carbon). Therefore, 
besides indicator D1.2 (the same for all materials) the rest of the indicators were 
assumed to be equal to 1, or maximum EU resilience. A full assessment for blades is 
performed along the downstream dimension. 
 
B.1.3 Indicator D1.1 Material demand 
Table 15: Data for calculating D1.1 material demand for neodymium 
Neodymium 2015 2020 2025 2030 
EU demand for wind (EWEA low scenario) 356 2610 3364 5610 
EU demand for wind (EWEA central scenario) 356 6063 5986 7427 
EU demand for wind (EWEA high scenario) 356 8798 10363 15638 
EU demand for wind (EC reference scenario) 356 2684 693 1156 
EU demand, all sectors (EWEA low scenario) 3502 8302 12701 20573 
EU demand, all sectors (EWEA central scenario) 3502 11754 15324 22390 
EU demand, all sectors (EWEA high scenario) 3502 14490 19700 30602 
EU demand, all sectors (EC reference scenario) 3502 8375 10031 16120 
Global demand, all sectors  20320 33024 53671 87226 
D1.1.1 EWEA 2030 low scenario 0.02 0.08 0.06 0.06 
D1.1.1 EWEA 2030 central scenario 0.02 0.18 0.11 0.09 
D1.1.1 EWEA 2030 high scenario 0.02 0.27 0.19 0.18 
D1.1.1 EC reference scenario 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.01 
D1.1.2 EWEA 2030 low scenario 0.10 0.31 0.26 0.27 
D1.1.2 EWEA 2030 central scenario 0.10 0.52 0.39 0.33 
D1.1.2 EWEA 2030 high scenario 0.10 0.61 0.53 0.51 
D1.1.2 EC reference Scenario 0.10 0.32 0.07 0.07 
D1.1.3 EWEA 2030 low scenario 0.17 0.25 0.24 0.24 
D1.1.3 EWEA 2030 central scenario 0.17 0.36 0.29 0.26 
D1.1.3 EWEA 2030 high scenario 0.17 0.44 0.37 0.35 
D1.1.3 EC reference scenario 0.17 0.25 0.19 0.18 
Note: Demand figures are given in tonnes. 
The global demand for Nd and its annual growth rate (10.2 %) until 2030 was estimated 
combining information from multiple sources: [Roskill, 2015a; Alonso, 2012; 
Gschneidner, 2012]. The EU demand for Nd was calculated based on information from 
[MSA, 2015]. 
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Table 16: Data for calculating D1.1 material demand for praseodymium 
Praseodymium 2015 2020 2025 2030 
EU demand for wind (EWEA low scenario) 119 870 1121 1870 
EU demand for wind (EWEA central scenario) 119 2021 1995 2476 
EU demand for wind (EWEA high scenario) 119 2933 3454 5213 
EU demand for wind (EC reference scenario) 119 895 231 385 
EU demand, all sectors (EWEA low scenario) 1095 2643 4020 6492 
EU demand, all sectors (EWEA central scenario) 1095 3794 4894 7098 
EU demand, all sectors (EWEA high scenario) 1095 4705 6353 9835 
EU demand, all sectors (EC reference scenario) 1095 2667 3130 5008 
Global demand, all sectors 6350 10266 16598 26835 
D1.1.1 EWEA 2030 low scenario 0.02 0.08 0.07 0.07 
D1.1.1 EWEA 2030 central scenario 0.02 0.20 0.12 0.09 
D1.1.1 EWEA 2030 high scenario 0.02 0.29 0.21 0.19 
D1.1.1 EC reference scenario 0.02 0.09 0.01 0.01 
D1.1.2 EWEA 2030 low scenario 0.11 0.33 0.28 0.29 
D1.1.2 EWEA 2030 central scenario 0.11 0.53 0.41 0.35 
D1.1.2 EWEA 2030 high scenario 0.11 0.62 0.54 0.53 
D1.1.2 EC reference scenario 0.11 0.34 0.07 0.08 
D1.1.3 EWEA 2030 low scenario 0.17 0.26 0.24 0.24 
D1.1.3 EWEA 2030 central scenario 0.17 0.37 0.29 0.26 
D1.1.3 EWEA 2030 high scenario 0.17 0.46 0.38 0.37 
D1.1.3 EC reference scenario 0.17 0.26 0.19 0.19 
Note: Demand figures are given in tonnes. 
The global demand for Pr and its annual growth rate (10.1 %) until 2030 was estimated 
combining information from multiple sources: [Roskill, 2015a; Alonso, 2012; 
Gschneidner, 2012]. The EU demand for Pr was calculated based on information from 
[MSA, 2015]. 
Table 17: Data for calculating D1.1 material demand for dysprosium 
Dysprosium 2015 2020 2025 2030 
EU demand for wind (EWEA low scenario) 71 522 673 1122 
EU demand for wind (EWEA central scenario) 71 1213 1197 1485 
EU demand for wind (EWEA high scenario) 71 1760 2073 3128 
EU demand for wind (EC Reference Scenario) 71 537 139 231 
EU demand, all sectors (EWEA low scenario) 225 989 1413 2236 
EU demand, all sectors (EWEA central scenario) 225 1679 1937 2600 
EU demand, all sectors (EWEA high scenario) 225 2226 2812 4242 
EU demand, all sectors (EC Reference Scenario) 225 1003 879 1346 
Global demand, all sectors 1270 2140 3606 6076 
D1.1.1 EWEA 2030 low scenario 0.06 0.24 0.19 0.18 
D1.1.1 EWEA 2030 central scenario 0.06 0.57 0.33 0.24 
D1.1.1 EWEA 2030 high scenario 0.06 0.82 0.57 0.51 
D1.1.1 EC reference scenario 0.06 0.25 0.04 0.04 
D1.1.2 EWEA 2030 low scenario 0.32 0.53 0.48 0.50 
D1.1.2 EWEA 2030 central scenario 0.32 0.72 0.62 0.57 
D1.1.2 EWEA 2030 high scenario 0.32 0.79 0.74 0.74 
D1.1.2 EC reference scenario 0.32 0.53 0.16 0.17 
D1.1.3 EWEA 2030 low scenario 0.18 0.46 0.39 0.37 
D1.1.3 EWEA 2030 central scenario 0.18 0.78 0.54 0.43 
D1.1.3 EWEA 2030 high scenario 0.18 1.04 0.78 0.70 
D1.1.3 EC reference scenario 0.18 0.47 0.24 0.22 
Note: Demand figures are given in tonnes. 
The global demand for Dy and its annual growth rate (11 %) until 2030 was estimated 
combining information from multiple sources: [Alonso, 2012; Gschneidner, 2012; 
Hoenderdaal, 2013; Venkatesan, 2014; Roskill, 2015a]. The EU demand for Dy was 
calculated based on information from [MSA, 2015]. 
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B.1.4 Indicator D1.2 Investment potential 
Table 18: Data for calculating D1.2 investment potential for non-EU countries 
Non-EU countries GDP 2015 
(bn USD) 
GDP 2030 
(bn USD) 
EPI 
Australia 911 1503 63 
Brazil 2174 3222 56 
Canada 1386 1880 75 
China 13325 26307 75 
India 4751 11162 67 
Japan 4153 4878 59 
Russia 2557 4001 84 
South Korea 1687 2571 62 
USA 15423 22482 81 
Total 46371 78008 - 
 
Table 19: Data for calculating D1.2 investment potential for EU countries 
EU countries GDP 2015 
(bn USD) 
GDP 2030 
(bn USD) 
EPI 
Austria 318 433 79 
Belgium 376 521 81 
Czech Republic 257 422 91 
Denmark 187 247 89 
Estonia 26.6 41.7 77 
Finland 170 245 90 
France 2012 2909 80 
Germany 2984 3462 78 
Greece 228 379 70 
Hungary 177 234 91 
Ireland 171 234 91 
Italy 1601 2163 79 
Luxembourg 37.5 53.7 74 
Netherlands 620 899 75 
Poland 762 1040 89 
Portugal 224 299 91 
Slovak Republic 121 184 91 
Slovenia 50.5 70.9 82 
Spain 1236 1644 82 
Sweden 358 532 93 
UK 2228 3332 85 
Rest(1) 363(2) 368(3) 86 
Total 14508 19713 - 
Note: (1) Rest includes: Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and Romania. (2) [World Bank, 2016]. 
The average EPI for these countries was used to scale their GDP total. (3) The 2030 GDP projection for the rest 
of the countries was obtained using the average GDP-CAGR for the EU-28 for the period 2015 - 2030. 
GDP in 2015 and GDP projections in 2030 are taken from the OECD database [OECD, 
2016a, OECD, 2016b, World Bank, 2016]. EPI (Environmental Performance Index) refers 
to the climate & energy indicator, retrieved from [EPI, 2016]. 
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B.1.5 Indicator D1.3 Stability of supply 
Table 20: Country production share, HHI and WGI for mining neodymium 
Country 2015 2020 2025 2030 WGI 
scaled share HHI share HHI share HHI share HHI 
Australia 1.51  9.96  11.50  9.79  0.94 
Brazil 0.20  0.00  1.22  2.83  0.53 
Burundi 0.00  0.00  0.41  0.96  0.30 
Canada 0.00  1.36  9.25  16.81  0.95 
China 95.13  68.83  42.09  30.65  0.44 
Germany 0.00  0.00  0.13  0.09  0.93 
Greenland 0.00  5.19  11.02  8.71  0.89 
Kenya 0.00  0.00  1.12  2.58  0.40 
Kyrgyzstan 0.00  0.11  0.23  0.16  0.35 
Madagascar 0.00  0.00  0.49  1.13  0.35 
Malawi 0.00  0.00  0.49  1.14  0.44 
Mozambique 0.00  0.00  0.17  0.28  0.41 
Namibia 0.00  0.00  0.02  0.04  0.61 
Russia 1.27  0.85  3.57  7.43  0.38 
South Africa 0.00  0.81  3.27  3.85  0.60 
Sweden 0.00  0.00  0.49  1.14  0.97 
Tanzania 0.00  4.07  8.25  5.94  0.43 
USA 1.72  7.75  5.63  6.03  0.84 
Vietnam 0.16  1.08  0.64  0.45  0.43 
Total 100 9057 100 4944 100 4944 100 1555  
Note: Production shares in 2015 are calculated based on 2015 data available from [MSA, 2016]. For 
consistency purposes, production allocated to Malaysia in that study was added up to Australia production. The 
production centre in Malaysia is known to be a processing plant of rare earths mined in Mount Weld, Australia. 
Production projections in 2020, 2025 and 2030 were obtained according to the procedures in Annex C. The WGI 
values were derived from [WGI, 2015]. 
 
Table 21: Country production share, HHI and WGI for mining praseodymium 
Country 2015 2020 2025 2030 WGI 
scaled share HHI share HHI share HHI share HHI 
Australia 1.51  9.59  11.18  9.52  0.94 
Brazil 0.20  0.00  1.37  3.19  0.53 
Burundi 0.00  0.00  0.42  0.97  0.30 
Canada 0.00  1.25  8.79  16.17  0.95 
China 95.14  67.94  41.88  30.64  0.44 
Germany 0.00  0.00  0.16  0.11  0.93 
Greenland 0.00  5.14  11.03  8.83  0.89 
Kenya 0.00  0.00  1.10  2.57  0.40 
Kyrgyzstan 0.00  0.17  0.35  0.24  0.35 
Madagascar 0.00  0.00  0.51  1.19  0.35 
Malawi 0.00  0.00  0.52  1.22  0.44 
Mozambique 0.00  0.00  0.17  0.27  0.41 
Namibia 0.00  0.00  0.02  0.03  0.61 
Russia 1.27  0.83  3.52  7.40  0.38 
South Africa 0.00  0.77  3.14  3.71  0.60 
Sweden 0.00  0.00  0.43  0.99  0.97 
Tanzania 0.00  4.04  8.32  6.12  0.43 
USA 1.72  8.95  6.29  6.25  0.84 
Vietnam 0.16  1.32  0.80  0.56  0.43 
Total 100 9057 100 4835 100 2214 100 1536  
Note: Production shares in 2015 are calculated based on 2015 data available from [MSA, 2016]. For 
consistency purposes, production allocated to Malaysia in that study was added up to Australia production. The 
production centre in Malaysia is known to be a processing plant of rare earths mined in Mount Weld, Australia. 
Production projections in 2020, 2025 and 2030 were obtained according to the procedures in Annex C. The WGI 
values were derived from [WGI, 2015]. 
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Table 22: Country production share, HHI and WGI for mining dysprosium 
Country 2015 2020 2025 2030 WGI 
scaled share HHI share HHI share HHI share HHI 
Australia 1.55  16.49  5.71  4.49  0.94 
Brazil 0.20  0.00  1.44  2.89  0.53 
Burundi 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.30 
Canada 0.00  7.83  17.90  17.68  0.95 
China 95.10  55.57  27.60  16.80  0.44 
Germany 0.00  0.00  0.02  0.01  0.93 
Greenland 0.00  11.87  19.61  11.87  0.89 
Kenya 0.00  0.00  0.88  1.76  0.40 
Kyrgyzstan 0.00  1.18  1.95  1.17  0.35 
Madagascar 0.00  0.00  0.89  1.78  0.35 
Malawi 0.00  0.00  0.16  0.32  0.44 
Mozambique 0.00  0.00  0.12  0.16  0.41 
Namibia 0.00  0.00  0.77  1.07  0.61 
Russia 1.27  0.74  2.10  3.69  0.38 
South Africa 0.00  0.64  1.84  1.58  0.60 
Sweden 0.00  0.00  1.97  3.94  0.97 
Tanzania 0.00  0.60  0.99  0.60  0.43 
USA 1.72  4.99  16.00  30.14  0.84 
Vietnam 0.16  0.09  0.05  0.03  0.43 
Total 100 9051 100 3589 100 1776 100 1713  
Note: Production shares in 2015 are calculated based on 2015 data available from [MSA, 2016]. For 
consistency purposes, production allocated to Malaysia in that study was added up to Australia production. The 
production centre in Malaysia is known to be a processing plant of rare earths mined in Mount Weld, Australia. 
Production projections in 2020, 2025 and 2030 were obtained according to the procedures in Annex C. The WGI 
values were derived from [WGI, 2015]. 
 
B.1.6 Indicator D1.4 Reserves depletion 
Table 23: Data for calculating D1.4 reserves depletion for neodymium  
Neodymium 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Reserves REO (mio. tonnes) 130 129.9 129.7 129.3 
Reserves Nd oxide (thousand tonnes) 20800 20780 20748 20696 
Global demand (tonnes) 20320 32904 53283 86281 
RDI (years) 1024 632 389 240 
REO reserves are taken from [USGS, 2016]. Reserves for neodymium oxides were 
calculated as 16 % of the REO reserves [Gschneidner, 2012]. 
 
Table 24: Data for calculating D1.4 reserves depletion for praseodymium 
Praseodymium 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Reserves REO (mio. tonnes) 130 129.9 129.7 129.3 
Reserves Pr oxide (thousand tonnes) 6500 6498 6495 6490 
Global demand (tonnes) 6350 10266 16598 26835 
RDI (years) 1024 633 391 242 
Reserves for praseodymium oxides were calculated as 5 % of the REO reserves 
[Gschneidner, 2012].  
 
Table 25: Data for calculating D1.4 reserves depletion for dysprosium 
Dysprosium 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Reserves REO (mio. tonnes) 130 129.9 129.7 129.3 
Reserves Dy oxide (thousand tonnes) 1300 1300 1300 1300 
Global demand (tonnes) 1270 2140 3606 6076 
RDI (years) 1024 607 360 214 
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Reserves for dysprosium oxides were calculated as 1 % of the REO reserves 
[Gschneidner, 2012]. 
 
B.1.7 Indicator D1.5 Import reliance 
Table 26: Import reliance on neodymium for various scenarios (%) 
Baseline 2015 2020 2025 2030 
EWEA low scenario 100 100 100 100 
EWEA central scenario 100 100 100 100 
EWEA high scenario 100 100 100 100 
EC reference scenario 100 100 100 100 
Scenario 1     
EWEA low scenario 100 100 97 95 
EWEA central scenario 100 100 98 96 
EWEA high scenario 100 100 98 97 
EC reference scenario 100 100 97 94 
Scenario 2     
EWEA low scenario 100 100 92 86 
EWEA central scenario 100 100 93 86 
EWEA high scenario 100 100 93 87 
EC reference scenario 100 100 92 84 
Scenario 3     
EWEA low scenario 100 98 62 27 
EWEA central scenario 100 98 63 28 
EWEA high scenario 100 98 63 29 
EC reference scenario 100 98 62 26 
Data used in the calculations of IR are given in Table 15 (EU demand) and Table 27 (EU 
production, recycling and substitution rates). See the table's notes for information on the 
data sources. 
 
Table 27: EU production, recycling and substitution of neodymium 
Neodymium 2015 2020 2025 2030 
EU production (tonnes) 0 0 349 994 
EU recycling rate (%) 0 0 5 10 
EU substitution rate (%) 0 2 30 58 
EU production in 2015 is based on data available from [MSA, 2015]. Projections in 2020, 
2025 and 2030 refer to mine capacities, obtained according to the procedures and 
references in Annex C. Recycling and substitution rates are based on the assumptions 
presented under Table 33 and Table 34. 
 
 
Table 28: Import reliance on praseodymium for various scenarios (%) 
Baseline 2015 2020 2025 2030 
EWEA low scenario 100 100 100 100 
EWEA central scenario 100 100 100 100 
EWEA high scenario 100 100 100 100 
EC reference scenario 100 100 100 100 
Scenario 1     
EWEA low scenario 100 100 98 96 
EWEA central scenario 100 100 98 96 
EWEA high scenario 100 100 98 97 
EC reference scenario 100 100 97 95 
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Scenario 2 2015 2020 2025 2030 
EWEA low scenario 100 100 93 86 
EWEA central scenario 100 100 93 87 
EWEA high scenario 100 100 93 88 
EC reference scenario 100 100 92 85 
Scenario 3     
EWEA low scenario 100 98 63 28 
EWEA central scenario 100 98 63 29 
EWEA High scenario 100 98 63 30 
EC reference scenario 100 98 62 27 
Data used in the calculations of IR are given in Table 16 (EU demand) and Table 29 (EU 
production, recycling and substitution rates). See the table's notes for information on the 
data sources. 
 
Table 29: EU production, recycling and substitution of praseodymium 
Praseodymium 2015 2020 2025 2030 
EU production (tonnes) 0 0 96 261 
EU recycling (%) 0 0 5 10 
EU substitution (%) 0 2 30 58 
Note: See Table 27 for information on the data sources. 
 
Table 30: Import reliance on dysprosium for various scenarios (%) 
Baseline 2015 2020 2025 2030 
EWEA 2030 low scenario 100 100 100 100 
EWEA 2030 central scenario 100 100 100 100 
EWEA 2030 high scenario 100 100 100 100 
EC reference scenario 100 100 100 100 
Scenario 1     
EWEA low scenario 100 100 93 86 
EWEA central scenario 100 100 95 88 
EWEA high scenario 100 100 97 93 
EC reference scenario 100 100 89 77 
Scenario 2     
EWEA low scenario 100 100 88 77 
EWEA central scenario 100 100 90 78 
EWEA high scenario 100 100 92 83 
EC reference scenario 100 100 84 67 
Scenario 3     
EWEA low scenario 100 98 58 18 
EWEA central scenario 100 98 60 20 
EWEA high scenario 100 98 62 25 
EC reference scenario 100 98 54 9 
Data used in the calculations of IR are given in Table 17 (EU demand) and Table 31 (EU 
production, recycling and substitution rates). See the table's notes for information on the 
data sources. 
 
Table 31: EU production, recycling and substitution of dysprosium  
Dysprosium 2015 2020 2025 2030 
EU production (tonnes) 0 0 95 312 
EU recycling rate (%) 0 0.5 5 10 
EU substitution rate (%) 0 2 30 58 
Note: See Table 27 for information on the data sources. 
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B.1.8 Indicator D1.6 Supply adequacy 
Table 32: Nd, Pr, and Dy global demand and mining capacity 
 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Nd: Global demand all sectors (tonnes) 20320 33024 53671 87226 
Nd: Global mine capacities (tonnes) 26464 33487 55931 80558 
Nd: Capacities utilisation (%) 77 99 96 108 
Pr: Global demand all sectors (tonnes) 6350 10266 16598 26835 
Pr: Global mine capacities (tonnes) 7845 9982 16515 23604 
Pr: Capacities utilisation (%) 81 103 101 114 
Dy: Global demand all sectors (tonnes) 1270 2140 3606 6076 
Dy: Global mine capacities (tonnes) 1365 2340 4739 7894 
Dy: Capacities utilisation (%) 93 91 76 77 
See Table 15, Table 16 and Table 17 for information on global demand data sources for 
Nd, Pr and Dy, respectively. Mine capacities in 2015, 2020, 2025 and 2030 were obtained 
following the procedures described in Annex C. 
 
B.1.9 Indicator D1.7 Recycling 
Table 33: Nd, Pr, Dy global recycling rates (%) 
Materials 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Nd 0 <1 7 30 
Pr 0 <1 7 30 
Dy 0 <1 7 30 
It is very difficult to judge the future increase in the recycling rate of rare earths. The 
diffused nature of rare earths in end-use applications poses a significant challenge for 
their recycling. Currently, recycled Nd comes mostly from computer hard-disc drives 
(HDDs), even though HDDs do not represent the largest application of Nd. Within the 
NdFeB magnets for HDDs, the potential for closing the loop is significant: up to 57 % in 
2017 is predicted as an achievable rate [Sprecher, 2014]. However, compared to the 
NdFeB production capacity, the recovery potential from HDDs is relatively small – in the 
range 1-3 %. 
Nd recycling from magnets and other applications is forecast to achieve 40 % in the next 
20 years [Dai, 2016]. 
The outcome of recycling of 500gr PM has been published, demonstrating the reuse of 
the entire alloy at relatively low energy and cost [Fraunhofer, 2015]. 
Several projects dedicated to permanent magnet recycling are either approved or under 
way in China [Roskill, 2015a]. 
For the current analysis, a gradual increase in the global recycling rate of up to 30 % is 
assumed as a more conservative approach. 
At the EU level, a recycling rate of Nd, Pr and Dy of only 10 % is considered by 2030. 
There is currently no recycling of these three rare earths in the EU. The main future 
sources of these materials able to assure a sufficient material flow to justify opening new 
recycling facilities in the EU would be wind turbine generators and electric vehicle 
motors. However, up to 2030, most of the wind turbines will still be in operation 
(assuming a 30 years lifetime). As for the EV sector, vehicles sold before 2020 will 
become available for recycling by 2030 (assuming an average lifetime of 10 years), 
providing enough material for recycling: several million EV, resulting from the 
calculations. 
It should be noted that the same recycling rates at global and EU level are also assumed 
for Nd, Pr and Dy in the EV sector. 
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B.1.10 Indicator D1.8 Substitution 
Table 34: Nd, Pr, Dy global substitution rates (%) 
Materials 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Nd 0 2 30 58 
Pr 0 2 30 58 
Dy 0 2 30 58 
Although rare earth substitution in PM is difficult to achieve, turbine generators and 
electric motors currently exist which do not use rare earths and are now produced 
commercially. Indeed, most of the wind turbines installed in the EU do not use PM 
generators and thus do not require rare earths. The same applies for electric motors; 
several EV models are currently using induction motors. Therefore, substituting a rare 
earth by using another technology is possible although it adversely affects the efficiency 
(in particular for a wind turbine). The development of new rare-earth-free electric motors 
is also being researched today. 
PM is the major applications for Nd, Pr and Dy. Substitution solutions exist and new 
solutions might be commercialised within five to 10 years. This allows a relatively high 
substitution rate (around 60%) to be assumed for Nd, Pr and Dy. The same rates are 
assumed for rare earths in permanent magnets in both wind turbines and EV motors. 
However, future trends contemplate smaller, more compact products with greater 
efficiency, which is why the full replacement of the rare earths cannot be assumed within 
the 2030 time frame. 
It should be noted that the same substitution rates are also assumed at both the global 
and EU level for Nd, Pr and Dy in the EV sector. 
 
B.1.11 Indicator D2.1 Supply chain dependency 
To perform the supply chain analysis, the main companies and their production/assembly 
capacity were identified for each step, as well as the location of their production sites. In 
addition, the production and assembly capacity were allocated to the production sites and 
aggregated at country level. This allowed for the derivation of the production/assembly 
capacity shares for each step of the supply chain. The data used for this assessment 
mainly stems from [FTI, 2015] and where relevant - additional references have been 
used. 
Permanent magnets step: China leads the market with almost 55 % of the global 
market, followed by Japan (approx. 30 %) and Europe (approx. 15 %). 
[FTI, 2015] source gives the capacity production of the major permanent magnet 
producers. It is assumed that the production takes place in the home country of the said 
companies. No capacity data could be retrieved for European manufacturers. Thus, the 
figures quoted there refer to the production level in 2014 [IndexBox, 2016]. 
Permanent magnet generators step: China leads the market with over 45 % of the 
global market, followed by Europe (approx. 30 %) and India (approx. 14 %). 
Most of the capacities are retrieved from [FTI, 2015]. However, capacities are not always 
disaggregated among the various types of generators (e.g. DFIG, PMG, EESC, etc.). In 
such cases, it was assumed that 20 % – the approximate market share of PMG-based 
turbines in 2014 – of the overall capacity related to PMGs. 
Additional references where found for Gamesa’s assembly capacity [Gamesa, 2015] and 
Siemens [WindPowerMonthly, 2011], while the capacity of ABB is not taken into account 
in Table 35. ABB seems to be leading the wind turbine generators sector, although the 
locations of ABB’s 17 factories could not be identified. 
 125 
 
Further assembly capacity has been identified, but could not be quantified, in Brazil, 
Czech Republic, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea and Portugal. 
Disclaimer: FTI indicates an assembly capacity of > 14 000 MW/y for permanent magnet 
based generators. Applying the above-mentioned method gave a total figure of more 
than double (35 000MW/y). 
 
Table 35: Country production share, HHI and WGI for relevant steps in the supply chain 
(Nd, Pr, Dy) 
Country 2015 2020 2025 2030 WGI 
scaled share HHI share HHI share HHI share HHI 
 
Step 1: Magnet alloys/powder 
 
China 83  83  83  83  0.44 
Japan 10  10  10  10  0.89 
USA 3  3  3  3  0.84 
EU 1  1  1  1  1.00 
Other 3  3  3  3  0.50 
Total 100 7064 100 7064 100 7064 100 7064  
 
Step 2: Permanent magnets (PM) 
 
China 54  54  54  54  0.44 
Japan 30  30  30  30  0.89 
EU 15  15  15  15  1.00 
Total 100 4102 100 4102 100 4102 100 4102  
 
Step 3: PM generators 
 
China 46  46  46  46  044 
EU 27  27  27  27  1.00 
India 14  14  14  14  0.47 
Mexico 9  9  9  9  0.49 
Serbia 3  3  3  3  0.56 
USA 1  1  1  1  0.84 
Total 100 3111 100 3111 100 3111 100 3111  
 
Step 4: Wind turbine assembly 
 
EU 30  30  30  30  1.00 
Brazil 5  5  5  5  0.53 
China 42  42  42  42  0.44 
India 13  13  13  13  0.47 
USA 10  10  10  10  0.84 
Total 100 2947 100 2947 100 2947 100 2947  
The data are used to assess D2.1 indicator for Nd, Pr and Dy. 
Wind turbine assembly step: China leads the market with over 40 % of the global 
market, followed by Europe (approx. 30 %), India and the USA (over 10 % each). 
[FTI, 2015] provides the global turbine manufacturing capacity announced at the end of 
2014 at the continental level. By using a textual description, this data could be further 
disaggregated by the origin of the OEMs (e.g. capacity per continental manufacturers per 
continent, such as European OEMs production in Europe, in America, in Asia, etc.). It 
should be noted though that only the main 15 OEMs are covered. The capacities have 
been complemented at country level based on a list of factories for most of the 
manufacturers [Acciona, 2016; ENERCON, 2016; SENVION, 2014; SENVION, 2016; 
SUZLON, 2016; Wobben, 2016]. References indicating assembly capacities have also 
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been taken into consideration. When no capacity could be found, facilities located in the 
same region were assumed to have the same capacity. 
Under the assumption that the assembly of a turbine requires the same effort, 
independent of its rated power, the capacities in MW have been converted into number of 
turbines. To this end, the rated power of the turbines produced in the facility has been 
used. 3MW has been assumed in cases where such information was not available. 
Blades 
Both the supply of and demand for CFCs are concentrated in Europe, the USA and Asia 
[CEMAC, 2016c]. Blades are produced in many countries around the globe, which is 
probably due to transport limitations. China leads the market with approximately 47 % of 
the global market, followed by Europe (approx. 25 %) and the USA (approx. 10 %). 
Similarly to the shares in turbine assembly, most of the capacities are retrieved from 
[FTI, 2015] and re-arranged at country level, based on the location of the production 
facilities. Additional references may provide capacities in terms of units/blades. Under the 
assumption that the manufacture of a blade requires the same effort, independent of its 
rated power, the capacities in MW have been converted into capacity in the number of 
blades. To this end, the rated power of the turbines produced in the facility has been 
used. 3MW for three blades has been assumed where this information was not available. 
 
Table 36: Country production share, HHI and WGI for relevant steps in the supply chain 
(CFC) 
Country 2015 2020 2025 2030 WGI 
scaled share HHI share HHI share HHI share HHI 
 
Step 1: Carbon fibre manufacturing 
 
Europe 27.7  27.5  27.5  27.5  1.00 
USA 26.2  25.3  25.3  25.3  0.89 
Asia (Japan and 
China) 
44.7  42.0  42.0  42.0  0.67 
Other countries 1.4  5.2  5.2  5.2  0.50 
Total 100 3455 100 3188 100 3188 100 3188  
 
Step 2: Blades manufacturing 
 
Australia 0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.94 
Brazil 7.7  7.7  7.7  7.7  0.53 
Canada 1.5  1.5  1.5  1.5  0.95 
China 46.9  46.9  46.9  46.9  0.44 
Europe 24.1  24.1  24.1  24.1  1.00 
India 6.0  6.0  6.0  6.0  0.47 
Mexico 1.1  1.1  1.1  1.1  0.49 
South Korea 0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.73 
Turkey 2.2  2.2  2.2  2.2  0.52 
USA 9.9  9.9  9.9  9.9  0.89 
Total 100 2988 100 2988 100 2988 100 2988  
 
Step 3: Wind turbine assembly 
 
Europe 30.4  30.4  30.4  30.4  1 
Brazil 5.0  5.0  5.0  5.0  0.53 
China 41.7  41.7  41.7  41.7  0.44 
India 12.5  12.5  12.5  12.5  0.47 
USA 10.4  10.4  10.4  10.4  0.89 
Total 100 2947 100 2947 100 2947 100 2947  
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Table 37: Parameters for calculating D2.1 supply chain dependency for the wind energy 
sector (Nd, Pr, Dy) 
 2015 2020 2025 2030 
A step 1 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 
B step 1 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
D2.1 step 1 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 
A step 2 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 
B step 2 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 
D2.1 step 2 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 
A step 3 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 
B step 3 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 
D2.1 step 3 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 
A step 4 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 
B step 4 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 
D2.1 step 4 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 
D2.1 (Nd, Pr, Dy) 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 
 
Table 38: Parameters for calculating D2.1 supply chain dependency for the wind energy 
sector (CFC) 
 2015 2020 2025 2030 
A step 1 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 
B step 1 0.28 0.25 0.25 0.25 
D2.1 step 1 0.60 0.59 0.59 0.59 
A step 2 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 
B step 2 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 
D2.1 step 2 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 
A step 3 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 
B step 3 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 
D2.1 step 3 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 
D2.1 (CFC) 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 
 
B.1.12 Indicator D2.2 Purchasing potential 
GDP per capita was obtained dividing the GDP by the population, using current data and 
forecasts from OECD [OECD, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c]. EPI (Environmental Performance 
Index) refers to the climate & energy indicator, retrieved from [EPI, 2016]. 
 
Table 39: Data for calculating D2.2 purchasing potential for non-EU countries 
Non-EU countries GDP per 
capita 2015 
(USD) 
GDP per 
capita 2030 
(USD) 
EPI 
Australia 38075 49946 63 
Brazil 10827 14890 56 
Canada 38395 45047 75 
China 9508 18102 75 
India 3705 7561 67 
Japan 32809 41834 59 
Russia 17488 27063 84 
South Korea 33332 49293 62 
USA 47994 62717 81 
Average 12918 20038 - 
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Table 40: Data for calculating D2.2 purchasing potential for EU countries 
EU countries GDP per 
capita 2015 
(USD) 
GDP per 
capita 2030 
(USD) 
EPI 
Austria 37303 48225 79 
Belgium 33127 42329 81 
Czech Republic 24427 40693 91 
Denmark 33341 42209 89 
Estonia 20324 34486 77 
Finland 31100 41996 90 
France 31130 42379 80 
Germany 36753 43616 78 
Greece 20083 33503 70 
Hungary 18110 25451 91 
Ireland 37468 46041 91 
Italy 25982 34067 79 
Luxembourg 74993 94295 74 
Netherlands 36531 51123 75 
Poland 20068 28263 89 
Portugal 21585 30246 91 
Slovak Republic 22453 34686 91 
Slovenia 24442 33979 82 
Spain 26639 36232 82 
Sweden 36595 49389 93 
UK 34535 47097 85 
Rest (1) 9252 9884 86 
Average 28495 38058 - 
Note: (1) Rest includes: Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and Romania. The average EPI for 
these countries was used to scale their GDP per capita total. 
 
B.1.13 Indicator D2.3 Material cost impact 
Table 41: Parameters for calculating D2.3 material cost impact for wind power (Nd) 
Neodymium 2015 2020 2025 2030 
E (thousand USD/tonne) 71.2 108 148 148 
F (tonne/MW) 0.03 0.11 0.22 0.35 
G (thousand USD/MW) 1400 1400 1400 1400 
D2.3 (Nd) 1 0.99 0.98 0.96 
E (USD/tonne) is the Nd oxide price [Statista, 2016a]; since no price forecast is given for 
2030, the same price is considered as for 2025. 
F (tonne/MW) is the average Nd material intensity in wind: it is calculated by dividing the 
total demand for Nd by the total installed wind power – onshore and offshore – in 2015, 
2020, 2025 and 2030 (indicator D1.1). Of course, the F values are similar for each 
deployment scenario. 
G (USD/MW) is the turbine cost per MW [IRENA, 2012]. 
 
Table 42: Parameters for calculating D2.3 material cost impact for wind power (Pr) 
Praseodymium 2015 2020 2025 2030 
E (thousand USD/tonne) 121 123 119 119 
F (tonne/MW) 0.01 0.04 0.07 0.12 
G (thousand USD/MW) 1400 1400 1400 1400 
D2.3 (Pr) 1 1 0.99 0.99 
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E (USD/tonne) is the Pr oxide price [Statista, 2016b]; since no price forecast is given for 
2030, the same price is considered as for 2025. 
F (tonne/MW) is the average Pr material intensity in wind: it is calculated by dividing the 
total demand for Pr by the total installed wind power – onshore and offshore – in 2015, 
2020, 2025 and 2030 (indicator D1.1). Of course, the F values are similar for each 
deployment scenario. 
G (USD/MW) is turbine cost per MW [IRENA, 2012]. 
 
Table 43: Parameters for calculating D2.3 material cost impact for wind power (Dy) 
Dysprosium 2015 2020 2025 2030 
E (thousand USD/tonne) 456 454 378 378 
F (tonne/MW) 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.07 
G (thousand USD/MW) 1400 1400 1400 1400 
D2.3 (Dy) 1 0.99 0.99 0.98 
E (USD/tonne) is the Dy oxide price [Statista, 2016c]; since no price forecast is given for 
2030, the same price is considered as for 2025. 
F (tonne/MW) is the average Dy material intensity in wind: it is calculated by dividing the 
total demand for Dy by the total installed wind power – onshore and offshore – in 2015, 
2020, 2025 and 2030 (indicator D1.1). Of course, the F values are similar for each 
deployment scenario. 
G (USD/MW) is turbine cost per MW [IRENA, 2012]. 
 
Calculating D2.3 materials cost impact for wind power (CFC) 
D2.3 indicator for blades is calculated using data and information from [IRENA, 2012] 
and [CEMAC, 2016c]. A cost breakdown for wind turbine, based on typical onshore wind 
turbine is given in [IRENA, 2012]. The blades are representing about 22.2 % of the total 
turbine cost. The turbine cost is estimated to be on average 1400 USD/kW (grid 
connection, foundation, planning and miscellaneous excluded). The final cost of the 
blades would be then around 311 USD/kW.  The materials represent around 75 % of the 
blades cost [CEMAC, 2016c] or around 233 USD/kW. The indicator D2.3 for blades is 
then calculated based on the numbers above: D2.3 = 0.83. The same D2.3 for blades is 
assumed until 2030. 
 
B.2 Solar PV power 
B.2.1 Deployment scenarios 
During 2014, the solar PV power installed capacity in the EU was around 6.6 GW. This 
value has been used as a starting point for calculating material demand.  
Four scenarios have been considered for the deployment of PV power in the EU until 
2030 to calculate the future demand for materials: 
1) Solar power Europe 2030: low scenario [SolarPower Europe, 2015] 
2) Solar power Europe 2030: high scenario [SolarPower Europe, 2015] 
3) IEA PV Technology Roadmap: hi-ren scenario [IEA, 2014] 
4) EU reference scenario [EC, 2016ª] 
Between 2000 and 2014, the installed solar capacity in the EU-28 was 86.6 GW 
[SolarPower Europe, 2015]. 
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Based on the above scenarios, the cumulative installed PV capacity in the EU by 2030 is 
calculated as follows: 
Table 44: Cumulative installed PV capacity in the EU based on four different scenarios 
Scenario 2020 2030 
Solar power Europe 2030: low scenario capacity 110 284 
Solar power Europe 2030: high scenario capacity 137 556 
IEA PV Technology Roadmap: hi-ren scenario capacity 117 192 
EU reference scenario capacity 119 165 
Note: Capacity is given in GW. 
 
B.2.2 Assumptions 
Market shares for different PV technologies 
The following market shares for the PV technologies being considered were assumed for 
EU demand calculations in 2015 (JRC experts' estimation): 
Table 45: Market shares for different PV technologies in EU solar power 
PV technology Market share 
Polycrystalline silicon PV 73 % 
Monocrystalline silicon PV 23 % 
Amorphous silicon thin-film PV 0.5 % 
CIGS thin-film PV 3 % 
CdTe thin-film PV 0.5 % 
Polycrystalline and monocrystalline silicon PV are assessed together and denoted further 
as crystalline silicon (c-Si). 
The same market shares for the EU are also assumed for 2030, based mainly on the 
assumption that a significant growth is not expected in the thin-film PV technology 
market share within this time frame (JRC experts' opinion). In fact, it is considered easier 
and less capital intensive to invest in different steps of the c-Si production supply chain, 
which is the dominant PV technology today, while the investments for thin-film are very 
intensive. Furthermore, such investments have to be implemented throughout the 
complete supply chain – from raw materials to final thin-film module production. 
Demand for c-Si PV materials 
Two materials were assessed for c-Si PV technology: silicon (Si) and silver (Ag). To 
estimate the Si demand in 2015 an average amount of 5 gr/Wp is anticipated [ITRPV, 
2016; JRC, 2016b]. An increase in material efficiency is considered for the future Si 
demand estimations as a consequence of the expected improvement in PV efficiency up 
to 2030. The amount of Si required per 1Wp is gradually reduced from 5 gr/Wp to 3.4 
gr/Wp in 2030. 
The demand for Ag is estimated based on the annual Ag consumption in 2014 and the 
amount of Ag required for photovoltaics in 2014 [WSS, 2015]. The amount of Ag 
required per 1Wp is gradually reduced from 0.04 g/Wp (2015) to 0.03 gr/Wp in 2030, 
due once again to the expected improvement in PV efficiency. 
Demand for thin-film CIGS and CdTe materials (kg/MWp) 
The amount of materials used in thin-film modules (per unit power) vary significantly in 
different studies. Therefore, the following procedure is applied in this analysis to assess 
the amount of materials required for a 1 MW power output: 
The surface of a thin-film PV required to produce 1 MW of power output, referred to here 
as 'power specific surface' in MW/m2 is calculated as follows:  
𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑒 =
𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 ∗ 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑦
𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑟 𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒
  
 131 
 
where the average 'solar irradiance' for the EU is considered to be 1000 W/m2. 
The 'power specific surface' for CIGS and CdTe PV modules was calculated to be 8333 
MW/m2 assuming average module efficiency of 12 %. The material mass (kg) required to 
produce 1 MW of power output, referred to here as 'material power specific mass', is 
calculated using the following formula: 
𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐 𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠
=  𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑒 ∗ 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 ∗ 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒  
The 'specific material volume' in m3/m2 is the volume corresponding to 1 square meter of 
PV thin-film module surface. For the specific volume calculations, a thin-film thickness of 
2.5 m is considered for both CIGS and CdTe modules. 
The calculated material needs per unit power, according to the present thin-film 
efficiency (2015), are given in Table 46. An increase in the material efficiency (less 
material required for 1 MWp) is considered as a consequence of the foreseen 
improvement in PV thin-film efficiency until 2030. It is assumed that the thin-film 
efficiency will gradually reach 20 % by 2030. In this case, the power specific surface for 
CIGS and CdTe PV modules will be reduced to 5000 MW/m2. 
Therefore, the amount of the different materials required for manufacturing CIGS/CdTe 
thin-film modules needed to generate 1MWp power by 2030 will decrease, as 
summarised in Table 46. 
 
Table 46: Materials required for 1 MWp power generated by CIGS and CdTe thin-film PV 
Materials Material 
density 
(kg/m3) 
Material power 
specific mass 
(kg/m2) 
Material 
fraction in 
cell (%) 
Material requirement 
(kg/MWp) 
2015 2020 2025 2030 
Cu 8940 0.022 16.26 24 20 17 15 
In 7310 0.018 28.08 34 29 24 21 
Ga 5100 0.013 5.85 5 4 4 3 
Se 4790 0.012 49.81 40 34 28 24 
Cd 8650 0.022 47 46 39 32 27 
Te 6240 0.016 53 52 44 37 31 
The average fraction of the different elements in a thin-film cell, used to calculate the 
materials required for 1 MWp, has been taken from several scientific publications 
[Kavlak, 2014; Bruker, 2015]. The resulting materials efficiency values used in the 
present analysis are comparable to those presented in different publications [Woodhouse, 
2013; Stamp, 2014; MIT, 2015]. 
 
B.2.3 Indicator D1.1 Material demand 
Table 47: Data for calculating D1.1 material demand for indium 
Indium 2015 2020 2025 2030 
EU demand for CIGS (SolarPower Europe 2030: low scenario) 3.6 3.6 11.7 16 
EU demand for CIGS (SolarPower Europe 2030: high scenario) 7.1 8.8 26.3 44.6 
EU demand for CIGS (IEA PV Technology Roadmap: hi-ren 
scenario) 
4.5 4.9 5.3 5.7 
EU demand for CIGS (EU reference scenario) 7.8 4.3 2.9 3.2 
EU demand, all sectors (SolarPower Europe 2030: low 
scenario) 
138 184 253 339 
EU demand, all sectors (SolarPower Europe 2030: high 
scenario) 
142 189 268 368 
EU demand, all sectors (IEA PV Technology Roadmap: hi-ren 
scenario) 
139 185 247 329 
EU demand, all sectors (EU reference scenario) 143 185 244 326 
Global demand, all sectors 800 1071 1433 1918 
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Indium 2015 2020 2025 2030 
D1.1.1 SolarPower Europe 2030: low scenario 0.005 0.004 0.01 0.01 
D1.1.1 SolarPower Europe 2030: high scenario 0.009 0.009 0.02 0.03 
D1.1.1 IEA PV Technology Roadmap: hi-ren scenario 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.003 
D1.1.1 EU reference scenario 0.01 0.004 0.002 0.002 
D1.1.2 SolarPower Europe 2030: low scenario 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.05 
D1.1.2 SolarPower Europe 2030: high scenario 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.12 
D1.1.2 IEA PV Technology Roadmap: hi-ren scenario 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 
D1.1.2 EU reference scenario 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.01 
D1.1.3 SolarPower Europe 2030: low scenario 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.19 
D1.1.3 SolarPower Europe 2030: high scenario 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.20 
D1.1.3 IEA PV Technology Roadmap: hi-ren scenario 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 
D1.1.3 EU reference scenario 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.18 
Note: Demand figures are given in tonnes. 
The global demand for indium in 2014 is assumed to be 755 tonnes [USGS, 2016]. An 
annual growth rate of 6 % is assumed until 2030 based on historical data and 
information from [Eurostat, 2015]. The EU demand for In in 2014 is estimated using 
information from [MSA, 2015]. 
 
Table 48: Data for calculating D1.1 material demand for silver 
Silver 2015 2020 2025 2030 
EU demand for c-Si (SolarPower Europe 2030: low scenario) 141 158 554 823 
EU demand for c-Si (SolarPower Europe 2030: high scenario) 281 381 1245 2309 
EU demand for c-Si (IEA PV Technology Roadmap: hi-ren 
scenario) 
179 212 251 297 
EU demand for c-Si (EU reference scenario) 307 187 138 166 
EU demand, all sectors (SolarPower Europe 2030: low 
scenario) 
1947 2177 2810 3345 
EU demand, all sectors (SolarPower Europe 2030: high 
scenario) 
2088 2400 3501 4831 
EU demand, all sectors (IEA PV Technology Roadmap: hi-ren 
scenario) 
1986 2231 2507 2819 
EU demand, all sectors (EU reference scenario) 2113 2206 2394 2687 
Global demand, all sectors 27300 32424 38509 45737 
D1.1.1 SolarPower Europe 2030: low scenario 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 
D1.1.1 SolarPower Europe 2030: high scenario 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.05 
D1.1.1 IEA PV Technology Roadmap: hi-ren scenario 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
D1.1.1 EU reference scenario 0.01 0.01 0.004 0.004 
D1.1.2 SolarPower Europe 2030: low scenario 0.07 0.07 0.20 0.25 
D1.1.2 SolarPower Europe 2030: high scenario 0.13 0.16 0.36 0.48 
D1.1.2 IEA PV Technology Roadmap: hi-ren scenario 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.11 
D1.1.2 EU reference scenario 0.15 0.09 0.06 0.06 
D1.1.3 SolarPower Europe 2030: low scenario 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
D1.1.3 SolarPower Europe 2030: high scenario 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.11 
D1.1.3 IEA PV Technology Roadmap: hi-ren scenario 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 
D1.1.3 EU reference scenario 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.06 
Note: Demand figures are given in tonnes. 
The global demand for silver and its annual growth rate (2.25 %) until 2030 is estimated 
combining information from multiple sources: [Cross, 2009; Bullionvault, 2013; 
EUROSTAT, 2015]. 
The EU demand for silver in 2014 is calculated based on information from [MSA, 2015]. 
The EU demand for silver varies for 2015 according to the different deployment scenarios 
since 2014 has been used as a starting year for the analysis. 
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Table 49: Data for calculating D1.1 material demand for silicon 
Silicon 2015 2020 2025 2030 
EU demand for c-Si (SolarPower Europe 2030: low scenario) 16622 17742 59252 83718 
EU demand for c-Si (SolarPower Europe 2030: high scenario) 33244 42854 133155 234962 
EU demand for c-Si (IEA PV Technology Roadmap: hi-ren 
scenario) 
21210 23867 26856 30220 
EU demand for c-Si (EU reference scenario) 36288 21055 14778 16854 
EU demand, all sectors (SolarPower Europe 2030: low 
scenario)(1) 
599 723 913 1117 
EU demand, all sectors (SolarPower Europe 2030: high 
scenario)(1) 
615 748 987 1268 
EU demand, all sectors (IEA PV Technology Roadmap: hi-ren 
scenario)(1) 
603 729 880 1064 
EU demand, all sectors (EU reference scenario)(1) 619 726 868 1050 
Global demand, all sectors(1) 8019 9993 12453 15519 
D1.1.1 Solar power Europe 2030: low scenario 0.002 0.002 0.01 0.01 
D1.1.1 Solar power Europe 2030: high scenario 0.004 0.004 0.01 0.02 
D1.1.1 IEA PV Technology Roadmap: hi-ren scenario 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 
D1.1.1 EU reference scenario 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 
D1.1.2 SolarPower Europe 2030: low scenario 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.07 
D1.1.2 SolarPower Europe 2030: high scenario 0.05 0.06 0.13 0.19 
D1.1.2 IEA PV Technology Roadmap: hi-ren scenario 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 
D1.1.2 EU reference scenario 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.02 
D1.1.3 SolarPower Europe 2030: low scenario 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
D1.1.3 SolarPower Europe 2030: high scenario 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.08 
D1.1.3 IEA PV Technology Roadmap: hi-ren scenario 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 
D1.1.3 EU reference scenario 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 
Note: Demand figures are given in tonnes or (1) thousand tonnes for all sectors. 
The global demand for silicon and its annual growth rate (3.9 %) until 2030 is estimated 
combining information from multiple sources: [Shah, 2011; ATKearney, 2012; Murthy, 
2015; BP, 2016; Statista, 2016d; Statista, 2016e; ISE, 2016]. The EU demand for silicon 
in 2014 is calculated based on information from [BGS, 2016b]. The EU demand for silicon 
varies for 2015 according to the different deployment scenarios since 2014 has been 
used as a starting year for the analysis. 
 
B.2.4 Indicator D1.2 Investment potential 
Data for D1.2 calculation are given in Table 18 and Table 19. 
 
B.2.5 Indicator D1.3 Stability of supply  
Table 50: Country production share, HHI and WGI for mining indium from zinc ores 
Country 2015 2020 2025 2030 WGI 
scaled share HHI share HHI share HHI share HHI 
Albania 0.00  0.00  0.06  0.21  0.54 
Argentina 0.30  0.25  0.30  0.20  0.45 
Armenia 0.09  0.23  0.20  0.04  0.48 
Australia 11.35  10.99  12.19  13.58  0.94 
Bolivia 3.04  2.48  0.93  0.61  0.40 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
0.05  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.49 
Botswana 0.00  0.00  0.04  0.15  0.70 
Brazil 1.14  0.96  1.06  1.36  0.53 
Bulgaria 0.09  0.08  0.08  0.08  0.57 
Burkina Faso 0.24  0.25  0.25  0.18  0.41 
Burma 0.07  0.06  0.06  0.06  0.25 
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Country 2015 2020 2025 2030 WGI 
scaled share HHI share HHI share HHI share HHI 
Canada 3.18  4.40  9.48  11.63  0.95 
Chile 0.22  0.27  0.33  0.09  0.83 
China 37.27  28.54  26.79  27.42  0.44 
Colombia 0.00  0.01  0.05  0.03  0.48 
Dem. Rep. 
Congo 
0.09  0.08  0.60  1.87  0.17 
Dominican 
Republic 
0.00  0.07  0.02  0.07  0.49 
Ecuador 0.00  0.00  0.04  0.13  0.39 
Egypt 0.00  0.00  0.01  0.02  0.32 
Eritrea 0.00  0.73  0.95  0.52  0.18 
Ethiopia 0.00  0.00  0.01  0.05  0.35 
Fiji 0.00  0.00  0.02  0.07  0.50 
Finland 0.29  0.34  0.28  0.25  1.00 
France 0.00  0.00  0.02  0.06  0.82 
Germany 0.00  0.00  0.02  0.08  0.93 
Greece 0.16  0.15  0.13  0.08  0.60 
Greenland 0.00  0.41  1.37  1.40  0.89 
Guatemala 0.01  0.14  0.14  0.04  0.40 
Honduras 0.19  0.16  0.16  0.01  0.39 
India 5.91  5.37  5.37  2.77  0.47 
Indonesia 0.00  1.15  1.24  0.51  0.49 
Iran 0.97  1.20  2.05  1.72  0.30 
Ireland 2.44  1.68  1.07  1.77  0.92 
Italy 0.00  0.03  0.21  0.51  0.66 
Kazakhstan 2.69  3.17  2.96  1.89  0.43 
Kenya 0.00  0.00  0.01  0.04  0.40 
Korea, North 0.27  0.23  0.22  0.23  0.14 
Korea, Republic 
of 
0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.73 
Kosovo 0.05  0.04  0.04  0.05  0.46 
Laos 0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.38 
Macedonia 0.22  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.58 
Malaysia 0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.67 
Mexico 4.79  5.24  5.11  4.70  0.49 
Mongolia 0.39  0.33  0.35  0.21  0.53 
Montenegro 0.00  0.04  0.12  0.12  0.58 
Morocco 0.34  0.22  0.18  0.03  0.48 
Myanmar 0.00  0.13  0.15  0.06  0.25 
Namibia 1.37  1.20  0.64  0.71  0.61 
Nigeria 0.07  0.06  0.06  0.06  0.25 
Oman 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.60 
Pakistan 0.07  0.24  0.00  0.00  0.29 
Papua New 
Guinea 
0.00  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.42 
Peru 10.07  8.65  9.46  9.34  0.49 
Philippines 0.12  0.11  0.10  0.11  0.50 
Poland 0.57  0.48  0.64  1.06  0.76 
Portugal 0.40  0.82  0.68  0.38  0.78 
Romania 0.00  0.02  0.01  0.03  0.59 
Russia 1.42  7.46  3.70  2.75  0.38 
Saudi Arabia 0.15  0.26  0.49  0.77  0.48 
Serbia 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.56 
South Africa 0.22  1.76  1.74  1.73  0.60 
Spain 0.22  0.51  0.63  0.46  0.74 
Sweden 1.31  1.38  1.53  1.95  0.97 
Tajikistan 0.15  0.13  0.12  0.13  0.31 
Thailand 0.22  0.19  0.20  0.25  0.47 
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Country 2015 2020 2025 2030 WGI 
scaled share HHI share HHI share HHI share HHI 
Turkey 1.49  1.28  1.40  1.45  0.52 
United Kingdom 0.00  0.00  0.02  0.08  0.90 
USA 5.84  5.24  2.80  2.69  0.84 
Uzbekistan 0.26  0.19  0.19  0.19  0.27 
Vietnam 0.15  0.13  0.12  0.13  0.43 
Yemen 0.00  0.26  0.25  0.26  0.18 
Zambia 0.00  0.13  0.42  0.44  0.48 
Total 100 1755 100 1203 100 1153 100 1234  
In data was derived assuming a fixed indium average content in zinc deposits; thus In 
data for the mine stage is proportional to zinc mine production, either current or 
forecasted. Production shares allocated to 2015 are based on 2013 zinc mine production 
as reported in [USGS, 2013]. The use of less updated data is intended to improve the 
level of disaggregation per country which in 2015 is rather poor. Production projections in 
2020, 2025 and 2030 were obtained according to the procedures in Annex C. 
 
Table 51: Country production share, HHI and WGI for refining indium 
Country 2015 2020/2025/2030 WGI 
scaled Share HHI Share HHI 
Belgium 3.3  4.7  0.9 
Brazil 0.0  1.1  0.5 
Canada 8.5  7.0  0.9 
China 48.6  52.8  0.4 
France 5.0  2.8  0.8 
Germany 1.3  0.0  0.9 
Japan 9.5  6.6  0.9 
Korea, Rep. of 19.7  17.9  0.7 
Peru 2.0  5.2  0.5 
Russia 1.3  1.9  0.4 
USA 0.7  0.0  0.8 
Total 100 2962 100 3263  
Indium refinery production in 2015 was retrieved from [USGS, 2016]. Projections in 
2020, 2025 and 2030 are based on existing refinery capacities in 2013 as identified in 
[By-Products, 2015]. 
 
Table 52: Country production share, HHI and WGI for mining silver 
Country 2015 2020 2025 2030 WGI 
scaled share HHI share HHI share HHI share HHI 
Argentina 3.91  3.95  4.76  6.47  0.45 
Armenia 0.42  0.58  0.32  0.17  0.48 
Australia 5.67  5.61  5.79  3.76  0.94 
Azerbaijan 0.00  0.08  0.00  0.00  0.38 
Bolivia 4.74  3.48  3.12  2.07  0.4 
Botswana 0.02  0.33  0.44  0.50  0.7 
Brazil 0.06  0.02  0.07  0.23  0.53 
Bulgaria 0.07  0.11  0.03  0.07  0.57 
Burkina Faso 0.05  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.41 
Canada 1.38  3.55  5.50  7.62  0.95 
Chile 5.46  7.58  8.01  7.67  0.83 
China 12.30  10.40  9.73  9.41  0.44 
Colombia 0.06  0.10  0.37  0.71  0.48 
Dem. Rep. 
Congo 
0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.3 
Dominican 
Republic 
0.46  0.32  0.30  0.30  0.49 
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Country 2015 2020 2025 2030 WGI 
scaled share HHI share HHI share HHI share HHI 
Ecuador 0.07  0.39  0.54  0.69  0.39 
Eritrea 0.26  0.30  0.42  0.25  0.18 
Ethiopia 0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.35 
Finland 0.01  0.19  0.17  0.00  1 
France 0.00  0.00  0.03  0.03  0.82 
Georgia 0.00  0.00  0.05  0.16  0.64 
Ghana 0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.54 
Greece 0.11  0.38  0.35  0.43  0.6 
Guatemala 3.12  2.47  2.33  1.17  0.4 
Haiti 0.00  0.00  0.03  0.03  0.26 
Honduras 0.12  0.12  0.00  0.00  0.39 
India 1.35  1.80  1.75  1.92  0.47 
Indonesia 1.11  1.42  1.32  1.60  0.49 
Iran 0.37  0.29  0.29  0.30  0.3 
Ireland 0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.92 
Italy 0.00  0.02  0.02  0.00  0.66 
Japan 0.06  0.04  0.04  0.05  0.89 
Kazakhstan 1.95  1.54  1.52  1.49  0.43 
Kyrgyzstan 0.05  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.35 
Laos 0.15  0.21  0.00  0.00  0.38 
Macedonia 0.05  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.58 
Mali 0.01  0.01  0.05  0.16  0.34 
Mexico 21.37  18.92  20.23  17.64  0.49 
Mongolia 0.29  0.28  0.33  0.34  0.53 
Morocco 1.07  0.85  0.75  0.28  0.48 
Myanmar 0.00  0.23  0.23  0.00  0.25 
Namibia 0.00  0.14  0.00  0.00  0.61 
New Zealand 0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03  1 
Nicaragua 0.07  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.41 
North Korea 0.09  0.07  0.07  0.07  0.14 
Pakistan 0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.29 
Panama 0.00  0.14  0.14  0.14  0.58 
Papua New 
Guinea 
0.26  0.34  0.59  0.74  0.42 
Peru 15.33  13.78  11.76  11.04  0.49 
Philippines 0.10  0.02  0.02  0.00  0.5 
Poland 4.68  3.70  3.91  4.58  0.76 
Portugal 0.27  0.33  0.15  0.08  0.78 
Romania 0.01  0.06  0.21  0.20  0.59 
Russia 5.70  5.25  3.81  3.73  0.38 
Saudi Arabia 0.08  0.06  0.06  0.06  0.48 
Serbia 0.00  0.15  0.00  0.00  0.56 
Slovakia 0.00  0.00  0.07  0.20  0.72 
South Africa 0.12  0.10  0.10  0.10  0.6 
Spain 0.15  0.43  0.22  0.07  0.74 
Sweden 1.79  1.65  1.79  2.15  0.97 
Tajikistan 0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.31 
Tanzania 0.05  0.13  0.00  0.00  0.43 
Thailand 0.09  0.19  0.18  0.00  0.47 
Turkey 0.73  0.65  0.67  0.82  0.52 
Ukraine 0.00  0.14  0.09  0.00  0.35 
USA 3.99  6.60  6.75  9.90  0.84 
Uzbekistan 0.17  0.13  0.17  0.27  0.27 
Venezuela 0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.21 
Zambia 0.06  0.04  0.04  0.05  0.48 
Zimbabwe 0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.22 
Total 100 1038 100 890 100 897 100   
 137 
 
Silver mine production shares in 2015 are calculated based on 2015 data available in 
[WSS, 2016]. Production projections in 2020, 2025 and 2030 were obtained according to 
the procedures in Annex C. 
 
Table 53: Country production share, HHI and WGI for refining silver 
Country 2015 2020/2025/2030 WGI 
scaled Share HHI Share HHI 
Asia 49.0  49.0  0.5 
Europe 26.5  26.5  1.0 
N. America 22.4  22.4  0.8 
Other 2.1  2.1  0.5 
Total 100 3611 100 3611  
Silver refinery production in 2015 was retrieved from [Manly, 2015]. The same shares 
are assumed in 2020, 2025 and 2030. 
 
Table 54: Country production share, HHI and WGI for mining silicon 
Country 2015 2020/2025/2030 WGI 
scaled Share HHI Share HHI 
Bhutan 0.9  0.9  0.6 
Brazil 1.9  1.9  0.5 
Canada 0.6  0.6  0.9 
China 68.6  68.6  0.4 
France 1.6  1.6  0.8 
Iceland 0.9  0.9  0.9 
India 1.1  1.1  0.5 
Norway 4.1  4.1  1 
Other countries 4.7  4.7  0.5 
Russia 8.5  8.5  0.4 
South Africa 1  1  0.6 
Ukraine 0.9  0.9  0.3 
USA 5.1  5.1  0.8 
Total 100 4853 100 4853  
Silicon mine production shares in 2015 are calculated based on data available at 
[Statista, 2016f]. The same shares are assumed in 2020, 2025 and 2030. 
 
B.2.6 Indicator D1.4 Reserves depletion 
Table 55: Data for calculating D1.4 reserves depletion for indium 
Indium 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Reserves (thousand tonnes) 12.4 7.89 1.85 -6.23 
Global demand (tonnes) 800 1071 1433 1918 
RDI (years) 15 7 1 -3 
Note: the negative value of the reserves is an artefact due to the conservative assumption of "reserves 
depletion" scenario (see methodology).  
Reserves of indium were retrieved from [Polinares, 2012].  
 
Table 56: Data for calculating D1.4 reserves depletion for silver 
Silver 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Reserves (thousand tonnes) 570 424 250 43.2 
Global demand (thousand tonnes) 27.3 32.4 38.5 45.7 
RDI (years) 21 13 6 1 
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Silver reserves were retrieved from [USGS, 2016]. See Table 48 for information on global 
demand data sources. 
 
Table 57: Data for calculating D1.4 reserves depletion for silicon 
Silicon 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Reserves (bn tonnes) 130.0 130.0 129.9 129.8 
Global demand (thousand tonnes) 8019 9993 12453 15519 
RDI (years) 16211 13005 10431 8366 
Silicon reserves were retrieved from [USGS, 2016]. See Table 49 for information on 
global demand data sources. 
 
B.2.7 Indicator D1.5 Import reliance 
Table 58: Import reliance on indium for various scenarios (%) 
Baseline 2015 2020 2025 2030 
SolarPower Europe 2030: low scenario 48 61 72 79 
SolarPower Europe 2030: high scenario 49 62 73 81 
IEA PV Technology Roadmap: hi-ren scenario 48 61 71 78 
EU reference scenario 50 61 70 78 
Scenario 1      
SolarPower Europe 2030: low scenario 48 57 69 77 
SolarPower Europe 2030: high scenario 49 58 71 79 
IEA PV Technology Roadmap: hi-ren scenario 48 57 68 76 
EU reference scenario 50 57 67 76 
Scenario 2      
SolarPower Europe 2030: low scenario 48 57 66 71 
SolarPower Europe 2030: high scenario 49 58 68 73 
IEA PV Technology Roadmap: hi-ren scenario 48 57 65 70 
EU reference scenario 50 57 64 70 
Scenario 3      
SolarPower Europe 2030: low scenario 48 55 58 49 
SolarPower Europe 2030: high scenario 49 57 60 55 
IEA PV Technology Roadmap: hi-ren scenario 48 56 57 56 
EU reference scenario 49 55 56 55 
Data used in the calculations of IR are given in Table 47 (EU demand) and Table 59 (EU 
production, recycling and substitution rates). See the table's notes for information on the 
data sources. 
 
Table 59: EU production, recycling and substitution of indium 
Indium 2015 2020 2025 2030 
EU production (tonnes) 73 80 80 80 
EU recycling rate (%) 0 0 3 6 
EU substitution rate (%) 0 0 8 15 
EU production in 2015 refers to refinery production as given in [USGS, 2016]. Projections 
in 2020, 2025 and 2030 are based on refinery capacities as identified in [By-Products, 
2015]. Recycling and substitution rates are based on the assumptions presented under 
Table 65 and Table 66. 
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Table 60: Import reliance on silver for various scenarios (%) 
Baseline 2015 2020 2025 2030 
SolarPower Europe 2030: low scenario 8 18 36 47 
SolarPower Europe 2030: high scenario 14 25 49 63 
IEA PV Technology Roadmap: hi-ren scenario 10 20 29 37 
EU reference scenario 15 19 25 33 
Scenario 1      
SolarPower Europe 2030: low scenario 8 0 21 26 
SolarPower Europe 2030: high scenario 14 9 36 49 
IEA PV Technology Roadmap: hi-ren scenario 10 2 11 13 
EU reference scenario 15 1 7 8 
Scenario 2      
SolarPower Europe 2030: low scenario 8 0 17 22 
SolarPower Europe 2030: high scenario 14 8 33 44 
IEA PV Technology Roadmap: hi-ren scenario 10 1 7 8 
EU reference scenario 15 0 3 4 
Scenario 3      
SolarPower Europe 2030: low scenario 8 0 0 0 
SolarPower Europe 2030: high scenario 14 6 8 0 
IEA PV Technology Roadmap: hi-ren scenario 10 0 0 0 
EU reference scenario 15 0 0 0 
Data used in the calculations of IR are given in Table 48 (EU demand) and Table 61 (EU 
production, recycling and substitution rates). See the table's notes for information on the 
data sources. 
 
Table 61: EU production, recycling and substitution of silver 
Silver 2015 2020 2025 2030 
EU production (tonnes) 1789 2194 2233 2460 
EU recycling rate (%) 0 <1 4 5 
EU substitution rate (%) 0 <1 25 50 
EU production in 2015 refers to mine production as given in [WSS, 2016]. Projections in 
2020, 2025 and 2030 refer to mine capacities, obtained according to the procedures and 
references in Annex C. Recycling and substitution rates are based on the assumptions 
presented under Table 65 and Table 66. 
 
Table 62: Import reliance on silicon for various scenarios (%) 
Baseline 2015 2020 2025 2030 
SolarPower Europe 2030: low scenario 78 82 86 88 
SolarPower Europe 2030: high scenario 79 83 87 90 
IEA PV Technology Roadmap: hi-ren scenario 78 82 85 88 
EU reference scenario 79 82 85 88 
Scenario 1      
SolarPower Europe 2030: low scenario 78 82 86 88 
SolarPower Europe 2030: high scenario 79 83 87 90 
IEA PV Technology Roadmap: hi-ren scenario 78 82 85 88 
EU reference scenario 79 82 85 88 
Scenario 2      
SolarPower Europe 2030: low scenario 78 82 86 88 
SolarPower Europe 2030: high scenario 79 83 87 90 
IEA PV Technology Roadmap: hi-ren scenario 78 82 85 88 
EU reference scenario  79 82 85 88 
Scenario 3      
SolarPower Europe 2030: low scenario 78 82 86 88 
SolarPower Europe 2030: high scenario 79 83 87 90 
IEA PV Technology Roadmap: hi-ren scenario 78 82 85 88 
EU reference scenario 79 82 85 88 
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Data used in the calculations of IR are given in Table 49 (EU demand) and Table 63 (EU 
production, recycling and substitution rates). See the table's notes for information on the 
data sources. 
 
Table 63: EU production, recycling and substitution of silicon 
Silicon 2015 2020 2025 2030 
EU production (thousand tonnes) 130 130 130 130 
EU recycling rate (%) 0 0 0 0 
EU substitution rate (%) 0 0 0 0 
EU production in 2015 refers to mine production as given in the [Statista, 2016f]. The 
same figures are assumed in 2020, 2025 and 2030. It is assumed that no recycling and 
substitution for Si will take place by 2030 as presented under Table 65 and Table 66. 
 
B.2.8 Indicator D1.6 Supply adequacy 
Table 64: In, Ag, Si global demand and mining capacity 
 2015 2020 2025 2030 
In: Global demand all sectors (tonnes) 800 1071 1433 1918 
In: Global mine capacities (tonnes) 907 1040 1060 1016 
In: Capacities utilisation (%) 88 103 135 189 
Ag: Global demand all sectors (tonnes) 27300 32424 38509 45737 
Ag: Global mine capacities (tonnes) 28796 31763 32098 31480 
Ag: Capacities utilisation (%) 95 102 120 145 
Si: Global demand all sectors (thousand tonnes) 8019 9993 12453 15519 
Si: Global mine capacities (tonnes) NA NA NA NA 
Si: Capacities utilisation (%) NA NA NA NA 
See Table 47, Table 48 and Table 49 for information on global demand data sources for 
In, Ag and Si, respectively. Mine capacities in 2015, 2020, 2025 and 2030 were obtained 
following the procedures described in Annex C. 
 
B.2.9 Indicator D1.7 Recycling 
Table 65: In, Ag, Si global recycling rates (%) 
Materials 2015 2020 2025 2030 
In 0 2 13 20 
Ag 0 1 4 5 
Si 0 0 0 0 
Indium 
The major demand (around 70 %) for indium comes from the production of flat-panel 
displays where indium is used as transparent electrodes (indium tin oxide - ITO). The 
high prices of indium and the increasing demand from several more applications, such as 
the semiconductor industry, solar cells, photo-catalysts and light-emitting diodes, have 
provoked further interest in recycling indium.  
In fact, the recycling of new scrap is currently the main source of indium globally: around 
58 % of the indium supply [Hong, 2010]. 
Only 30 % of the indium is actually used in the ITO layer; the remaining 70 % is wasted 
during the sputtering process [Matthews, 2009]. More efficient recovery of the wasted 
indium from the sputtering chambers is one feasible way of increasing the recycling rate 
of In. 
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As regards the recycling of indium from old scrap (end-of-life applications), there is an 
upcoming issue concerning recycling the indium-containing components in electronic 
devices: large flat screens (primarily used for TV appliances and computer monitors); 
digital displays, digital picture frames, tablet PCs, smartphones, e-book readers and 
numerous other devices. 
The current recycling rate of indium from flat-panel displays is < 1 %. Some large liquid-
crystal display (LCD) producers have put effort into developing techniques for recycling 
indium from LCD. However, there is no established system to recycle it from WEEE in 
Europe [Zhang, 2015]. 
A study carried out for Germany has revealed 0 recycling rate of indium from electronic 
devices [Öko-institut, 2012]. 
As regards the recovery of indium from thin-film panels – an emerging application for In 
globally – any visible contribution to the recycling flows is not expected by 2030. Here, 
indium is used in minor quantities, accounting for only 0.02 % of the module weight 
[BINE, 2010]. Moreover, most of the installed thin-film PV will be still in use globally in 
2030. 
Therefore, for these calculations only a 20 % increase in the recycling of indium is 
assumed globally due to new scrap recycling potential as well as some initiatives being 
undertaken globally for recycling end-of-life products (displays, mobile phones and other 
devices using ITO). 
For the EU, up to 6 % only is assumed as a reasonable recycling rate up to 2030. There 
is no production of flat-panel displays in Europe which could be the main source for 
recovering indium from production scrap. Therefore, in the near future, only the 
collection of electronic devices and recovery of indium from ITOs can be seen as potential 
sources of recycled indium in the EU. 
Silver 
Silver is already highly recycled globally. However, the methodology only takes into 
account the potential increase in material recycling rates from 2015 and beyond. 
Therefore, only new and emerging applications can make a tangible contribution to an 
eventual increase in the recycling rate. 
The emerging application which can introduce higher recycling rates for silver is PV solar 
modules. However, the amount of silver (silver paste) is <1 % of the weight of the 
module. In addition, around 85 % of the installed PV capacity globally has been 
connected to the grid in the last five years. 
Considering the lifetime of a PV module is 20 years or more, no tangible increase in 
recycling contribution should be expected before 2030. In addition, some of the old and 
less-efficient PV modules can be reused in spacious land areas where high efficiency is 
not required; the lifespan of such modules should be assumed as 30 years or more, 
according to various experts. 
In the light of the above, only a 5 % increase in the recycling rate for silver is assumed 
both globally and in the EU until 2030. 
 
B.2.10 Indicator D1.8 Substitution 
Table 66: In, Ag, Si global substitution rates (%) 
Materials 2015 2020 2025 2030 
In 0 1 8 15 
Ag 0 1 25 50 
Si 0 0 0 0 
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Indium 
As the result of the particular concern over the criticality of indium, significant efforts are 
being made by research and industry to find substitutes for indium in growing and 
emerging markets. 
Possible substitutes for the material’s main use – flat-panel displays – are aluminium-
doped zinc oxide (AZO) and fluorine-doped tin oxide (FTO), both of which are produced 
on an industrial scale and at a lower cost. However, both AZO and FTO have a lower 
performance than ITO and therefore are not applied extensively. Indium remains the 
material of reference for transparent conductive oxide (TCO) coatings. Substitutes for 
TCO currently under development are ultra-thin metal films and zinc oxide-metal-zinc 
oxide multilayers, carbon nanotubes and metal nanowire films, graphene films, organic 
transparent conductors (PEDOT:PSS) and printed metal grids [CRM InnoNet, 2016]. 
Since the estimated time-to-market for these substitution options is up to 10 years, they 
cannot be considered as a feasible way to reduce the demand for In until 2030. 
Another main use of indium is in optoelectronic windows. Substitution of indium is also 
possible here but only at the cost of reduced performance, specifically for heated 
windscreens and car lights. As for the current thin-film solar cell technologies, ITO 
alternatives already exist. It is expected that ITO substitution will be possible for the 
next-generation solar cells. The substitution of In in semiconductor applications is also 
possible, with the exception of optoelectronic devices (LEDs and laser diodes). 
As concluded in the CRM InnoNet project [CRM InnoNet, 2016], indium can be 
substituted in most applications albeit sometimes at a higher cost. However, in its main 
application – flat panel displays – which accounts for 70 % of indium demand, 
substitution is not possible without a performance loss. 
In our analysis, the potential for up to 15 % In substitution is considered by 2030. 
Silver 
Silver is used in solar panels and it is expected that demand for silver will continue to 
grow on a global scale. However, it is expensive and manufacturers are looking for 
alternative materials. In fact, silver can be easily substituted in solar panels – aluminium 
and copper are two materials that can replace silver in solar panels [Reddy, 2012]. 
Therefore, a substitution potential of around 50 % is assumed in the analysis. 
 
B.2.11 Indicator D2.1 Supply chain dependency 
Table 67: Country production share, HHI and WGI for relevant steps in the supply chain 
for CIGS PV (In) 
Country 2015 2020 2025 2030 WGI 
scaled share HHI share HHI share HHI share HHI 
 
Step 1: CIGS thin-film producers 
 
China 7  6  6  6  0.44 
USA 4  4  4  4  0.89 
Japan 79  81  81  81  0.89 
EU 4  4  4  4  1.00 
RoW 6  5  5  5  0.50 
Total 100 6322 100 6626 100 6626 100 6626  
The data are used to evaluate D2.1 for In. 
The CIGS thin-film manufacturing capacity used to calculate the shares comes from the 
JRC data compilation and analysis (private communication: courtesy of Arnulf Jaeger-
Waldau JRC C.2). 
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Table 68: Parameters for calculating D2.1 supply chain dependency for CIGS PV (In) 
Indium 2015 2020 2025 2030 
A step 1 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 
B step 1 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
D2.1 step 1 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 
D2.1 (In) 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 
 
Table 69: Country production share, HHI and WGI for relevant steps in the supply chain 
for c-Si PV (Si) 
Country 2015 2020 2025 2030 WGI 
scaled share HHI share HHI share HHI share HHI 
 
Step1: Solar-grade Si manufacturing 
 
China 50.9  50.9  50.9  50.9  0.44 
USA 8.4  8.4  8.4  8.4  0.89 
South Korea 18.3  18.3  18.3  18.3  0.84 
Japan 2.4  2.4  2.4  2.4  0.89 
Malaysia 1.9  1.9  1.9  1.9  0.50 
Norway 4  4  4  4  0.98 
EU 14  14  14  14  1 
Total 100 3218 100 3218 100 3218 100 3218  
 
Step 2: c-Si cell manufacturing 
 
Japan 5.8  5.8  5.8  5.8  0.89 
EU 2.0  2.0  2.0  2.0  1 
Taiwan 14.4  14.4  14.4  14.4  0.81 
China 66.1  66.1  66.1  66.1  0.44 
USA 1.4  1.4  1.4  1.4  0.89 
South Korea 2.7  2.7  2.7  2.7  0.73 
India 0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.47 
Malaysia 4.6  4.6  4.6  4.6  0.67 
Thailand 0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.47 
Vietnam 0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.43 
Other countries 2.3  2.3  2.3  2.3  0.5 
Total 100 4642 100 4642 100 4642 100 4642  
 
Step 3: c-Si module manufacturing 
 
EU 21.3  6.6  6.6  6.6  1 
Canada 2.3  8.7  8.7  8.7  0.95 
China 32.4  46.0  46.0  46.0  0.44 
Taiwan 13.6  1.6  1.6  1.6  0.81 
Japan 16.4  -  -  -  0.89 
Norway 1.3  -  -  -  0.98 
USA 5.3  13.8  13.8  13.8  0.89 
South Korea 1.0  4.1  4.1  4.1  0.73 
India 6.3  10.5  10.5  10.5  0.47 
Brazil -  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.53 
Thailand -  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.47 
Saudi Arabia -  1.9  1.9  1.9  0.48 
Vietnam -  2.0  2.0  2.0  0.43 
Malaysia -  3.3  3.3  3.3  0.67 
Ethiopia -  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.35 
Algeria -  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.33 
Total 100 2033 100 2570 100 2570 100 2570  
The data are used to evaluate D2.1 for Si. 
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The c-Si manufacturing capacities used to calculate the shares come from the JRC data 
compilation and analysis (private communication: courtesy of Arnulf Jaeger-Waldau JRC 
C.2). Data on new capacities for c-Si module manufacturing are taken from [PV-Tech, 
2016]. The new capacities have been added to the existing (present) capacities in order 
to calculate the concentration of supply for the period 2020 to 2030. 
 
 
Table 70: Parameters for calculating D2.1 supply chain dependency for c-Si PV (Si) 
Silicon 2015 2020 2025 2030 
A step 1 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 
B step 1 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 
D2.1 step 1 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 
A step 2 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 
B step 2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
D2.1 step 2 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 
A step 3 0.93 0.87 0.87 0.87 
B step 3 0.21 0.07 0.07 0.07 
D2.1 step 3 0.57 0.47 0.47 0.47 
D2.1 (Si) 0.48 0.45 0.45 0.45 
 
 
Table 71: Parameters for calculating D2.1 supply chain dependency for c-Si PV (Ag) 
Silver 2015 2020 2025 2030 
A step 1 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 
B step 1 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
D2.1 step 1 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 
A step 2 0.93 0.87 0.87 0.87 
B step 2 0.21 0.07 0.07 0.07 
D2.1 step 2 0.57 0.47 0.47 0.47 
D2.1 (Ag) 0.48 0.43 0.43 0.43 
 
 
Table 72: Country production share, HHI and WGI for relevant steps in the supply chain 
for c-Si PV (Ag) 
Country 
2015 2020 2025 2030 WGI 
scaled share HHI share HHI share HHI share HHI 
 
Step 1: c-Si cell manufacturing 
 
Japan 5.8  5.8  5.8  5.8  0.89 
EU 2.0  2.0  2.0  2.0  1 
Taiwan 14.4  14.4  14.4  14.4  0.81 
China 66.1  66.1  66.1  66.1  0.44 
USA 1.4  1.4  1.4  1.4  0.89 
South Korea 2.7  2.7  2.7  2.7  0.73 
India 0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.47 
Malaysia 4.6  4.6  4.6  4.6  0.67 
Thailand 0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.47 
Vietnam 0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.43 
Other countries 2.3  2.3  2.3  2.3  0.5 
Total 100 4642 100 4642 100 4642 100 4642  
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Country 
2015 2020 2025 2030 WGI 
scaled share HHI share HHI share HHI share HHI 
 
Step 2: c-Si module manufacturing 
 
EU 21.3  6.6  6.6  6.6  1 
Canada 2.3  8.7  8.7  8.7  0.95 
China 32.4  46.0  46.0  46.0  0.44 
Taiwan 13.6  1.6  1.6  1.6  0.81 
Japan 16.4        0.89 
Norway 1.3        0.98 
USA 5.3  13.8  13.8  13.8  0.89 
South Korea 1.0  4.1  4.1  4.1  0.73 
India 6.3  10.5  10.5  10.5  0.47 
Brazil -  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.53 
Thailand -  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.47 
Saudi Arabia -  1.9  1.9  1.9  0.48 
Vietnam -  2.0  2.0  2.0  0.43 
Malaysia -  3.3  3.3  3.3  0.67 
Ethiopia -  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.35 
Algeria -  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.33 
Total 100 2033 100 2570 100 2570 100 2570  
The data are used to evaluate D2.1 for Ag. 
 
B.2.12 Indicator D2.2 Purchasing potential 
The data needed for Indicator D2.2 are given in Table 18, Table 19, Table 39 and Table 
40. 
 
B.2.13 Indicator D2.3 Material cost impact 
Table 73: Parameters for calculating D2.3 material cost impact for CIGS PV (In) 
Indium 2015 2020 2025 2030 
E (USD/kg) 315 320 320 320 
F (g/W) 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 
G (USD/W) 1 0.7 0.6 0.4 
D2.3 (In) 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.98 
The data are used to calculate D2.3 for In. 
E (USD/kg) is indium ingot price of 99.99 % purity (known as 4N) used for PV 
[Metalprices, 2016]. 
F (kg/W) is the indium material intensity (data taken from indicator D1.1). 
The present and future technology/module specific costs for CIGS (USD/W) are taken 
from commercial sources [PVInsights, 2010; Greentech Media, 2015]. 
 
Table 74: Parameters for calculating D2.3 material cost impact for c-Si PV (Ag) 
Silver 2015 2020 2025 2030 
E (USD/kg) 564 564 564 564 
F (g/W) 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 
G (USD/W) 0.70 0.48 0.37 0.30 
D2.3 (Ag) 0.97 0.95 0.94 0.94 
The data are used to calculate D2.3 for Ag. 
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E (USD/kg) is the cost of Ag [WSS, 2016]. 
F (kg/W) is the Ag material intensity (data taken from indicator D1.1). 
G (USD/W) represents the module cost evolution until 2030 calculated as the average 
between utility, commercial and residential systems [BNEF, 2016c]. 
 
Table 75: Parameters for calculating D2.3 material cost impact for c-Si PV (Si) 
Silicon 2015 2020 2025 2030 
E (USD/kg) 11.9 11.9 11.9 11.9 
F (kg/W) 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.003 
G (USD/W) 0.70 0.48 0.37 0.30 
D2.3 (Si) 0.92 0.89 0.87 0.87 
The data are used to calculate D2.3 for Si. 
E (USD/kg) is the cost of Si metal [Statista, 2016d]; the cost is multiplied by a factor of 
4.4 as 4.4 kg of metallurgical-grade Si is required to produce 1 kg of solar-grade Si 
[Odden, 2008]. 
F (kg/W) is the Si material intensity (data taken from indicator D1.1). 
G (USD/W) represents the module cost evolution until 2030 calculated as the average 
between utility, commercial and residential systems [BNEF, 2016c]. 
 
B.3 Electric vehicles sector 
B.3.1 Deployment scenarios 
Three deployment scenarios have been considered to assess the demand for materials 
for EVs until 2030: 
1) European Roadmap Electrification of Road Transport 2nd edition [ERERT, 
2012]; 
2) Tech 2 scenario proposed in Fuelling Europe’s Future [CE, 2013]; 
3) Tech 3 scenario proposed in Fuelling Europe’s Future [CE, 2013]. 
The ERERT gives milestones for the penetration of BEVs and PHEVs in the EU by 2020 
and 2025, namely: 5 million EVs on EU roads by 2020 and 15 million EVs by 2025. Since 
HEVs were not considered in the ERERT, AVICENNE ENERGY projections giving sales 
forecasts for HEVs until 2025 were used to make the calculations [AVICENNE, 2014c]. 
These projections are also in line with the Pike Research forecast up to 2020 
[ElectricCarsReport, 2013], both giving around 27 % - 28 % CAGR for the HEVs 
European market until 2020. 
The Tech 2 scenario is derived from one of the scenarios used in the European 
Commission project ‘EU Transport GHG: Routes to 2050’. It assumes a strong market 
penetration by HEVs: 20 % of new vehicles sales in 2020 and 42 % penetration in 2030. 
The Tech 3 scenario – deriving similarly from the European Commission project ‘EU 
Transport GHG: Routes to 2050’ – assumes a more rapid introduction rate for advanced 
EVs. The uptake rates of BEVs and PHEVs are in line with the ‘EV breakthrough’ scenario 
from CE Delft [CE Delft, 2011], a report for the European Commission studying possible 
EV deployment rates. 
Detailed explanations on how the milestones and penetration rates envisaged in the 
three scenarios are used to calculate the demand for materials for EVs is given below. 
ERERT: The ERERT gives common milestones for BEVs and PHEVs together. In 2015, 
around 60 % of the EVs registered in the EU were PHEVs and 40 % were BEVs. It is 
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assumed that this proportion will be maintained for the future EV fleet until 2030. This is 
also consistent with the IEA's projections [IEA, 2011] for the OECD Europe: 70 % PHEV 
versus 30 % BEV is forecast for OECD Europe in 2030. The market shares for PHEVs and 
BEVs in 2050 are rather different: according to the IEA, the EV market will be dominated 
by BEVs; however, this time frame is out of the scope of this study. 
To reach the first milestone of 5 million EVs by 2020, with 148 740 EVs having already 
been registered in the EU in 2015, an annual growth of 70 % must be achieved. This is 
not a surprising growth rate bearing in mind the trend over the last few years – from 
2011 to 2013 – of doubling the number of the EVs each year [Mckinsey, 2014]. 
Furthermore, to reach the second milestone of 15 million vehicles on EU roads by 2025, 
no further increase in the annual production is actually required from 2020 onwards. The 
number of HEVs registered in the EU in 2015 [JATO, 2016] as well as the forecast for 
HEV sales until 2030 [AVICENNE, 2014c] is used in the ERERT deployment scenario. 
Tech 2: Projections for PHEV, BEV and HEV penetration rates proposed in the Tech 2 
scenario are given as a percentage of new car registrations (Figure 70). 
 
 
Figure 70: Tech 2 scenario [CE, 2013] 
To estimate the number of new cars to be registered in the EU in 2020, 2025 and 2030, 
ACEA data have been used which give an estimation of the new cars registered per capita 
on average in the EU [ACEA, 2016]: on average, 27 new cars were registered in 2015 
per 1000 inhabitants. The population statistics and forecast until 2030 is taken from the 
OECD database. This allows for an estimation of the total number of new cars to be 
registered in the EU in 2030, keeping the same ratio of 27 new cars per 1000 
inhabitants. 
The total number of new cars and the market shares given in Figure 70 for PHEVs, BEVs 
and HEVs are used to derive the number of PHEVs, BEVs and HEVs, respectively, until 
2030 (see Table 76). 
 
Table 76: Estimated numbers of PHEVs, BEVs and HEVs (Tech 2)  
Number of cars 2015 2020 2025 2030 
New cars (thousands) - 11973 11986 11962 
PHEV (% of new cars) - 2 8.6 2 
PHEVs (thousands) 90.0 239 1031 2392 
BEV (% of new cars) - 0.5 4 10 
BEVs (thousands) 59.0 60.0 479 1196 
HEV (% of new cars) - 20 30 42 
HEVs (thousands) 192 2395 3596 5024 
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Tech 3: The projections of PHEV, BEV and HEV penetration rates proposed in the Tech 3 
scenario are given as a percentage of the new cars (see Figure 71). 
 
 
Figure 71: Tech 3 scenario [CE, 2013] 
In a similar way to the Tech 2 scenario, population forecast and ACEA data are used to 
determine the number of new cars until 2030 [ACEA, 2016]. The total number of new 
cars and the market shares given in Figure 71 for PHEVs, BEVs and HEVs are used to 
derive the number of PHEVs, BEVs and HEVs, respectively (Table 77). 
 
Table 77: Estimated numbers of PHEVs, BEVs and HEVs (Tech 3)  
Number of cars 2015 2020 2025 2030 
New cars (thousands) - 11973 11986 11962 
PHEV (% of new cars) - 0.057 0.285 0.47 
PHEVs (thousands) 90.0 682 3416 5622 
BEV (% of new cars) - 0.036 0.1 0.2 
BEVs (thousands) 59 431 1199 2392 
HEV (% of new cars) - 0.2 0.18 0.15 
HEVs (thousands) 192 2397 2158 1794 
 
An overview of the three considered deployment scenarios is given in Table 78. 
 
Table 78: PHEVs, BEVs and HEVs penetration scenarios: overview 
Models ERERT Tech 2 Tech 3 
PHEVs 
5 million(1) EVs by 2020 
15 million(1) EVs by 2025 
2 %(2) in 2020 
8.6 %(2) in 2025 
20 %(2) in 2030 
6 %(2) in 2020 
29 %(2) in 2025 
47 %(2) in 2030 
BEVs 
0.5 %(2) in 2020 
4 %(2) in 2025 
10 %(2) in 2030 
4 %(2) in 2020 
10 %(2) in 2025 
20 %(2) in 2030 
HEVs 
CAGR (2015-2020) = 28 % 
CAGR (2020-2025) = 10 % 
20 %(2) in 2020 
30 %(2) in 2025 
42 %(2) in 2030 
20 %(2) in 2020 
18 %(2) in 2025 
15 %(2) in 2030 
Note: (1) Cumulative number of EVs (both PHEVs and BEVs) on EU roads. (2) Percentage of new vehicles sales. 
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Comparison with global scenarios 
The Paris Declaration on Electro-Mobility and Climate Change & Call to Action announced 
at COP21 (December, 2015) adopted a global target of 100 million electric cars by 2030 
[UNFCCC, 2015]. The IEA’s 2 Degree Scenario (2DS) establishes an even more 
challenging global deployment target for EVs: a stock of 140 million EVs (light duty) by 
2030 [ETP, 2016]. The 4 Degree Scenario (4DS) is a more conservative setting with a 
target of just 24 million EVs by 2030. The Electric Vehicles Initiative (EVI) target set a 
figure of 20 million EVs on the road [IEA, 2013]. 
The scenarios above are compared to the three scenarios selected here to evaluate the 
demand for materials (see Figure 72). 
 
 
 
Figure 72: Comparison between existing global scenarios and the three EU scenarios 
selected here for EV deployment until 2030 
The points on the graph correspond to EV stocks and not EV annual sales. It can be 
noted that the ERERT and Tech 2 selected in this study are aligned with the 4DS global 
scenario in terms of annual growth rates. However, the 4DS is a very conservative 
scenario which assumes less than 2.5 million EVs globally. The Tech 3 scenario is closer 
to the Paris Declaration in terms of growth rate. However, since it is too ambitious to 
expect that the EU might have half of the global EV stock, the Tech 3 scenario is 
considered as extreme for the EU. 
 
B.3.2 Assumptions 
Average lifetime of a battery 
The average lifetime of a Li-ion battery varies according to the different types of EVs. It 
can range from five to 20 years depending on many factors, such as EV type, 
manufacturer, external factors, driving/charging patterns, etc. In our calculations, an 
average EV battery lifetime is assumed to be 10 years for PHEVs and BEVs [Smith, 
2015]. This means that from 2025 onwards, the production of new batteries should also 
compensate for batteries reaching their end-of-life. Recycling will be feasible beyond 
2025; a CAGR of 12.5 % will only be required to compensate for batteries collected for 
recycling between 2025 and 2030. Calculations show that around 150 000 batteries will 
be collected for recycling in 2025 and the number will progressively increase to above 2 
million in 2030. If no recycling is done in the EU, around 5 million batteries will 
accumulate from PHEVs and BEVs alone.  
Since the Tech 2 and Tech 3 scenarios forecast the number of PHEVs, BEVs and HEVs as 
a percentage of the new cars in 2020, 2025 and 2030 and not the cumulative number of 
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cars in these years, the recycling of batteries should not be considered in the 
calculations. 
Material efficiency 
Lithium 
Several industry research companies claim that, theoretically, 1 kg of Li is needed to 
enable a 6 kWh battery [MERIDIAN, 2010] or  167 g per kWh. Other references [ANL, 
2009] indicate between 113 g and 246 g Li per kWh for various cathode types of 
batteries, all with a graphite anode, while a battery with a lithium titanate spinel anode 
has a high requirement of 423 g Li per kWh. The large scattering of these numbers 
illustrates the difficulty in quantifying how much Li should be considered per battery 
type/kWh/vehicle. Other factors to be considered when estimating realistic figures for Li 
content are: reduced battery capacity below the theoretical maximum, the discharge 
rate, cycle life capacity fade, electrochemical factors such as polarisation, internal 
resistance, electrolyte conductivity, separator conductivity, cation transport number, 
cation activity coefficient and order/disorder and particle size within the electrodes 
[MERIDIAN, 2010]. All these factors lead to a requirement for several times as much Li 
per kWh as the ‘theoretical’ quantity. Therefore, to be more realistic and conservative, 
according to this source it is advisable that around 3 kg of raw technical-grade lithium 
carbonate (or  564 g Li) per kWh battery capacity is considered. Assuming very high 
purity yields, optimistically the requirements can be reduced to 2 kg of lithium carbonate 
(or  376 g Li) per kWh. In this report, an average value of 286 g of Li per kWh battery 
capacity is considered when calculating the demand for Li. 
Plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) 
Table 79: Estimated Li demand for PHEVs registered in the EU in 2015  
PHEV models EU sales 
(cars) 
Battery 
capacity 
(kWh) 
Li per 
vehicle 
(kg) 
Li per 
model 
(kg) 
Mitsubishi Outlander 28250 12 3.43 96954 
VW Golf GTE 14834 8.8 2.52 37334 
Audi A3 e-Tron 9851 8.8 2.52 24793 
Volvo V60 PHEV 6328 11.2 3.20 20270 
Volvo XC90 2818 9.2 2.63 7415 
Mercedes C350e 5245 6.2 1.77 9300 
BMW X5 40e 1472 9 2.57 3789 
BMW i3Rex 4999 18.8 5.38 26879 
BMW 225xe Active Tourer 263 7.7 2.20 579 
VW Passat GTE 4730 9.9 2.83 13393 
Others 10717 - 2.59(1) 27710 
Total 89507   268415 
Note: (1) The average Li demand to be used in the category 'Others' has been derived from Table 80. 
PHEV sales per model were obtained from [EAFO, 2012; JRC, 2015b]. 
 
Table 80: Estimated Li demand for PHEVs, registered in the EU in 2014: 'Others' category 
PHEV models: 'Others' EU sales 
(cars) 
Battery 
capacity 
(kWh) 
Li per 
vehicle 
(kg) 
Li per 
model 
(kg) 
Porsche Cayenne S E-Hybrid 1486 11 3.15 4675 
BMW i8 1116 7.1 2.03 2266 
Toyota Prius PHEV 159 4.4 1.26 200 
Mercedes S500 Plug-in Hybrid 141 8.7 2.49 351 
Porsche Panamera S E-Hybrid 110 9.4 2.69 296 
Total 'Others' 3012   7788 
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Sales numbers in 2014 differ from the eventual 2015 sales. However, the purpose of 
Table 80 was simply to determine the average amount of Li used per vehicle for models 
included in the category 'Others'. To do this, it is important that the relative shares of 
each model are similar in 2014 and 2015 (due to different battery capacities), which is 
the assumption here. It can be seen that 7788 kg of Li is required to manufacture 3012 
PHEVs batteries (2014 data) [JRC, 2015b] leading to an average amount of Li of 2.59 kg 
per vehicle for the category ‘Others’. This number is then used in Table 79. 
The average content of Li required in a PHEV is calculated at 3 kg. This number is used 
to calculate the future demand for Li in PHEVs. 
Battery electric vehicles (BEVs) 
Table 81: Estimated Li demand for BEVs registered in the EU in 2015  
BEV models EU sales 
(cars) 
Battery 
capacity 
(kWh) 
Li per 
vehicle 
(kg) 
Li per 
model 
(kg) 
Nissan LEAF 11896 30 8.58 102068 
Tesla Model S(1) 10389 72.5 20.74 215416 
VW e-Golf 2076 26.5 7.58 15734 
Renault ZOE 16424 22 6.29 103340 
BMW i3 3481 33 9.44 32854 
VW e-UP 1397 18.7 5.35 7471 
Kia Soul EV 4916 27 7.72 37961 
Mercedes B-Class Electric 1288 28 8.01 10314 
Peugeot iOn 870 16 4.58 3981 
Citroën C-Zéro 1075 16 4.58 4919 
Others 5421  5.33(2) 28913 
Total 59233   562972 
Note: (1) The Tesla S model is offered on the market with two battery capacities: 60 kWh and 85 kWh. To 
account for this, an average value of 72.5 kWh was used for the calculations thereby assuming an equal 
proportion of both battery capacities. 
Note: (2) The average Li demand to be used in the category 'Others' has been derived from Table 82. 
BEV sales per model were obtained from [EAFO, 2012; JRC, 2015b]. 
 
Table 82: Estimated BEVs registered in the EU in 2014: 'Others' category 
BEV models: 'Others' Number 
of BEVs 
Battery 
capacity 
(kWh) 
Li per 
vehicle 
(kg) 
Li per 
model 
(kg) 
Nissan e-NV200 1614 24 6.86 11078 
Renault Kangoo ZE 1611 22 6.29 10136 
Smart Fortwo ED 1132 17 4.86 5504 
Renault Twizy 1138 6.1 1.74 1985 
Bolloré Bluecar 229 30 8.58 1965 
Mitsubishi i-MiEV 208 16.3 4.66 970 
Total 'Others' 5932   31639 
The 2014 sales [JRC, 2015b] were used to calculate the average content of Li required in 
BEV models pertinent to the category 'Others', namely 5.33 kg. 
The average content of Li required in a BEV is calculated at 9.5 kg. This number is used 
to estimate the future demand for Li in BEVs. 
To summarise: 
Average Li amount per PHEV = 3 kg 
Average Li amount per BEV = 9.5 kg 
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Hybrid electric vehicles (HEVs) 
A different approach was adopted to calculate the future demand for Li for the HEV 
market in the EU. Today, most of the HEV models are using the NiMH battery type; 
therefore these models should be excluded from the calculations.  
Among the models registered in 2015, only the Mercedes C class model is using LIB. 
However, due to the global trend of switching to Li-ion technology in future, assumptions 
until 2030 have been made based on available commercial information. Toyota has 
announced its intentions to launch the Prius model in 2016 with two battery choices: 
NiMH and Li-ion. For the calculations, it is assumed that in 2016 only 25 % of the Toyota 
Prius will be produced with Li-ion batteries, in 2017 – 50 %, in 2018 – 75 %, and in 2019 
– all Toyota Prius will have a Li-ion battery. The Lexus has announced that for the time 
being the NiMH will be the battery of choice. Therefore, it is assumed that only 35 % of 
Lexus cars might have a Li-ion battery in 2020, 90 % in 2025 and 100 % in 2030. Such 
Li-ion penetration rates are forecasted globally for the HEV sector. 
Peugeot, on the other hand, will explore another propulsion technology by 2020: 
compressed air. Therefore, Peugeot models were not considered in the calculations of 
future EU demand for Li. 
 
Table 83: Estimated Li demand for HEVs registered in the EU in 2015  
HEV models EU sales 
(cars) 
Battery 
type 
Battery 
capacity 
(kWh) 
Li per 
model 
(kg) 
Toyota Auris 72020 NiMH 1.43 0 
Toyota Yaris 65457 NiMH 0.9 0 
Lexus NX 14461 NiMH 1.3 0 
Lexus CT 9230 NiMH 1.3 0 
Lexus IS 6888 NiMH 1.6 0 
Toyota Prius+ 6522 NiMH 1.43 0 
Toyota Prius 6249 NiMH 1.43 0 
Mercedes C class 4358 Li-ion 0.8 997 
Peugeot 508 3700 NiMH 1.1 0 
Peugeot 3008 3051 NiMH 1.1 0 
Total 191936   997 
The HEVs sales per model for 2015 were obtained from [JATO, 2016]. 
 
Table 84: Projected sales of HEVs per model until 2030 (ERERT) 
HEV models 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Toyota Auris 72020 244866 403309 664274 
Toyota Yaris 65457 222553 366559 603744 
Lexus NX 14461 49167 80981 133381 
Lexus CT 9230 31383 51689 85135 
Lexus IS 6888 23421 38575 63536 
Toyota Prius+ 6522 22174 36522 60154 
Toyota Prius 6249 21247 34995 57639 
Mercedes C class 4358 14816 24403 40193 
Peugeot 508 3700 12581 20721 34129 
Peugeot 3008 3051 10375 17088 28145 
Total 191936 652583 1074842 1770328 
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Table 85: Estimated number of HEVs using LIB per model until 2030 (ERERT) 
HEV models 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Toyota Auris  85703 362978 664274 
Toyota Yaris  77894 329903 603744 
Lexus NX  17208 72883 133381 
Lexus CT  10984 46520 85135 
Lexus IS  8197 34718 63536 
Toyota Prius+  22174 36522 60154 
Toyota Prius  21247 34995 57639 
Mercedes C class 4358 14816 24403 40193 
Peugeot 508     
Peugeot 3008     
Total 4358 258223 942922 1708054 
 
Table 86: Estimated Li demand for HEVs until 2030 (ERERT) 
HEV models 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Toyota Auris  35051 148451 271675 
Toyota Yaris  20050 84917 155404 
Lexus NX  6398 27098 49591 
Lexus CT  4084 17296 31653 
Lexus IS  3751 15887 29074 
Toyota Prius+  9069 14937 24602 
Toyota Prius  8690 14312 23573 
Mercedes C class 997 3390 5583 9196 
Peugeot 508     
Peugeot 3008     
Li demand per year (kg) 997 90482 328481 594767 
 
Table 87: Projected sales of HEVs per model until 2030 (Tech 2) 
HEV models 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Toyota Auris 72020 898542 1349255 1885197 
Toyota Yaris 65457 816665 1226308 1713413 
Lexus NX 14461 180420 270919 378531 
Lexus CT 9230 115159 172924 241612 
Lexus IS 6888 85943 129052 180313 
Toyota Prius+ 6522 81368 122182 170715 
Toyota Prius 6249 77966 117074 163578 
Mercedes C class 4358 54368 81639 114067 
Peugeot 508 3700 46166 69323 96858 
Peugeot 3008 3051 38070 57167 79874 
Total 191936 2394666 3595843 5024158 
 
Table 88: Estimated number of HEVs per model using LIB until 2030 (Tech 2) 
HEV models 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Toyota Auris  314490 1214330 1885197 
Toyota Yaris  285833 1103677 1713413 
Lexus NX  63147 243827 378531 
Lexus CT  40306 155632 241612 
Lexus IS  30080 116147 180313 
Toyota Prius+  81368 122182 170715 
Toyota Prius  77966 117074 163578 
Mercedes C class 4358 54368 81639 114067 
Peugeot 508     
Peugeot 3008     
Total 4358 947556 3154508 4847425 
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Table 89: Estimated Li demand for HEVs until 2030 (Tech 2) 
HEV models 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Toyota Auris  128620 496637 771008 
Toyota Yaris  73573 284086 441033 
Lexus NX  23478 90655 140738 
Lexus CT  14986 57864 89831 
Lexus IS  13765 53149 82511 
Toyota Prius+  33278 49970 69819 
Toyota Prius  31887 47881 66900 
Mercedes C class 997 12439 18679 26098 
Peugeot 508     
Peugeot 3008     
Li demand per year (kg) 997 332025 1098921 1687938 
 
Table 90: Projected sales of HEVs per model until 2030 (Tech 3) 
HEV models 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Toyota Auris 72020 864001 778433 647403 
Toyota Yaris 65457 785271 707500 588410 
Lexus NX 14461 173484 156303 129993 
Lexus CT 9230 110733 99766 82973 
Lexus IS 6888 82639 74455 61922 
Toyota Prius+ 6522 78240 70491 58626 
Toyota Prius 6249 74969 67544 56175 
Mercedes C class 4358 52278 47100 39172 
Peugeot 508 3700 44391 39995 33263 
Peugeot 3008 3051 36607 32982 27430 
Total 191936 2302613 2074569 1725366 
 
Table 91: Estimated number of HEVs per model using LIB until 2030 (Tech 3) 
HEV models 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Toyota Auris  314490 728598 673285 
Toyota Yaris  285833 662206 611933 
Lexus NX  63147 146296 135190 
Lexus CT  40306 93379 86290 
Lexus IS  30080 69688 64398 
Toyota Prius+  81368 73309 60970 
Toyota Prius  77966 70245 58421 
Mercedes C class 4358 54368 48983 40738 
Peugeot 508     
Peugeot 3008     
Total 4358 947556 1892705 1731223 
 
Table 92: Estimated Li demand for HEVs until 2030 (Tech 3) 
HEV models 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Toyota Auris  128620 297982 275360 
Toyota Yaris  73573 170452 157512 
Lexus NX  23478 54393 50264 
Lexus CT  14986 34718 32083 
Lexus IS  13765 31889 29468 
Toyota Prius+  33278 29982 24935 
Toyota Prius  31887 28729 23893 
Mercedes C class 997 12439 11207 9321 
Peugeot 508     
Peugeot 3008     
Li demand per year (kg) 997 332025 659352 602835 
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Cobalt 
Once again, information on models registered in the EU in 2014/2015 has been used to 
estimate the demand for Co used in PHEVs, BEVs and HEVs until 2030. The different 
models use different LIB chemistries which means the Co content will differ – this should 
be taken into account when assessing the average amount of Co to be used for 
calculating future demand. 
Information on the battery type and the corresponding Co content for PHEVs, BEVs and 
HEVs is given in the tables below. 
 
Table 93: Estimated Co demand for PHEVs registered in the EU in 2015 
PHEV models EU 
sales 
(cars) 
Battery 
capacity 
(kWh) 
Battery 
type 
Co 
density 
(g/Wh) 
Co per 
vehicle 
(kg) 
Co per 
model 
(kg) 
Mitsubishi Outlander 28250 12 LMO 0 0 0 
VW Golf GTE 14834 8.8 NMC 0.36 3.17 46994 
Audi A3 e-Tron 9851 8.8 NMC 0.36 3.17 31208 
Volvo V60 PHEV 6328 11.2 LMO(NMC)
(1) 
0.252 2.82 17860 
Volvo XC90 2818 9.2 LMO(NMC)
(1) 
0.252 2.32 6533 
Mercedes C350e 5245 6.2 NMC 0.36 2.23 11707 
BMW X5 40e 1472 9 NMC 0.36 3.24 4769 
BMW i3Rex 4999 18.8 NMC 0.36 6.77 33833 
BMW 225xe Active Tourer 263 7.7 NMC 0.36 2.77 729 
VW Passat GTE 4730 9.9 NMC 0.36 3.56 16858 
Others 10717    1.14(2) 12268 
Total 89507     182760 
Note: (1) The LMO(NMC) type battery uses less Co. 
Note: (2) The average Co demand to be used in the category 'Others' has been derived from Table 94. 
Information on models registered in the EU in 2014 (Table 94) is used to calculate the 
average amount of Co per vehicle for the ‘Others’ category; consequently this is used in 
Table 93. 
 
Table 94: Estimated Co demand for PHEVs registered in the EU in 2014: ‘Others’ category  
PHEV models: 'Others' EU 
sales 
(cars) 
Battery 
capacity 
(kWh) 
Battery 
type 
Co 
density 
(g/Wh) 
Co per 
vehicle 
(kg) 
Co per 
model 
(kg) 
Porsche Cayenne S E-Hybrid 1486 11 LFP 0 0 0 
BMW i8 1116 7.1 NMC 0.36 2.56 2852 
Toyota Prius PHEV 159 4.4 NCA 0.22 0.97 154 
Mercedes S500 Plug-in 
Hybrid 
141 8.7 NMC 0.36 3.13 442 
Porsche Panamera S E-
Hybrid 
110 9.4 LFP 0 0 0 
Total 'Others' 3012     3448 
 
Similar approach is used to calculate the Co demand for BEVs (Table 95 and Table 96). 
 
 
 
 
 156 
 
Table 95: Estimated Co demand for BEVs registered in the EU in 2015 
BEV models EU 
sales 
(cars) 
Battery 
capacity 
(kWh) 
Battery 
type 
Co 
density 
(g/Wh) 
Co per 
vehicle 
(kg) 
Co per 
model 
(kg) 
Nissan Leaf 11896 30 LMO(NMC) 0.252 7.56 89934 
Tesla model S(1) 10389 72.5 NCA 0.22 15.95 165705 
VW e-Golf 2076 26.5 LMO(NMC) 0.252 6.68 13864 
Renault Zoe 16424 22 LMO 0 0.00 0 
BMW i3 3481 33 LMO(NMC) 0.252 8.32 28948 
VW e-UP 1397 18.7 LMO(NMC) 0.252 4.71 6583 
Kia Soul EV 4916 27 Li metal 
polymer 
0 0.00 0 
Mercedes B-Class Electric 1288 28 NMC 0.36 10.08 12983 
Peugeot iOn 870 16 LTO 0 0.00 0 
Citroen C-Zero 1075 16 LTO 0 0.00 0 
Others 5421    2.81(2) 15252 
Total 59233     333268 
Note: (1) The Tesla S model is offered on the market with two battery capacities: 60 kWh and 85 kWh. To 
account for this, an average value of 72.5 kWh was used for the calculations thereby assuming an equal 
proportion of both battery capacities. 
Note: (2) The average Co demand to be used in the category 'Others' has been derived from Table 96. 
 
Table 96: Estimated Co demand for BEVs registered in the EU in 2014: ‘Others’ category  
BEV models: 'Others' EU 
sales 
(cars) 
Battery 
capacity 
(kWh) 
Battery 
type 
Co 
density 
(g/Wh) 
Co per 
vehicle 
(kg) 
Co per 
model 
(kg) 
Nissan e-NV200 1614 24 LMO(NMC) 0.252 6.05 9761 
Renault Kangoo ZE 1611 22 LMO 0 0.00 0 
Smart Fortwo ED 1132 17 NMC 0.36 6.12 6928 
Renault Twizy 1138 6.1 LMO 0 0.00 0 
Bolloré Bluecar 229 30 Li metal 
polymer 
0 0.00 0 
Mitsubishi i-MiEV 208 16.3 LTO 0 0.00 0 
Total 'Others' 5932     16689 
 
The average amount of Co estimated from Table 93 to Table 96 for PHEVs and BEVs is as 
follows: 
Average Co amount per PHEV = 2.04 kg 
Average Co amount per BEV = 5.6 kg 
The obtained values were used to assess the Co demand until 2030 for these two types 
EVs. 
The demand for Co in HEVs has been calculated for the 3 different deployment scenarios 
similarly to the Li case. An average amount of 0.28 kg/kWh is used for the purpose. 
Information on the HEVs 2015 sales in the EU and sales projections until 2030 has 
already been given in Table 85. 
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Table 97: Estimated number of HEVs using LIB with Co per model until 2030 (ERERT) 
HEV models 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Toyota Auris  51422 217787 398564 
Toyota Yaris  46736 197942 362246 
Lexus NX  10325 43730 80028 
Lexus CT  6590 27912 51081 
Lexus IS  4918 20831 38121 
Toyota Prius+  13304 21913 36092 
Toyota Prius  12748 20997 34583 
Mercedes C class 2615 8890 14642 24116 
Peugeot 508     
Peugeot 3008     
Total 2615 154934 565753 1024833 
 
Table 98: Estimated Co demand for HEVs until 2030 (ERERT) 
HEV models 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Toyota Auris  14398 60980 111598 
Toyota Yaris  13086 55424 101429 
Lexus NX  2891 12244 22408 
Lexus CT  1845 7815 14303 
Lexus IS  1377 5833 10674 
Toyota Prius+  3725 6136 10106 
Toyota Prius  3569 5879 9683 
Mercedes C class 732 2489 4100 6752 
Peugeot 508     
Peugeot 3008     
Co demand per year (kg) 732 43382 158411 286953 
 
Table 99: Estimated number of HEVs using LIB with Co per model until 2030 (Tech 2) 
HEV models 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Toyota Auris  188694 728598 1131118 
Toyota Yaris  171500 662206 1028048 
Lexus NX  37888 146296 227119 
Lexus CT  24183 93379 144967 
Lexus IS  18048 69688 108188 
Toyota Prius+  48821 73309 102429 
Toyota Prius  46780 70245 98147 
Mercedes C class 2615 32621 48983 68440 
Peugeot 508     
Peugeot 3008     
Total 2615 568534 1892705 2908455 
 
Table 100: Estimated Co demand for HEVs until 2030 (Tech 2) 
HEV models 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Toyota Auris  52834 204007 316713 
Toyota Yaris  48020 185418 287853 
Lexus NX  10609 40963 63593 
Lexus CT  6771 26146 40591 
Lexus IS  5053 19513 30293 
Toyota Prius+  13670 20527 28680 
Toyota Prius  13098 19668 27481 
Mercedes C class 732 9134 13715 19163 
Peugeot 508     
Peugeot 3008     
Co demand per year (kg) 732 159189 529957 814367 
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Table 101: Estimated number of HEVs using LIB with Co per model until 2030 (Tech 3) 
HEV models 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Toyota Auris  188694 437159 403971 
Toyota Yaris  171500 397324 367160 
Lexus NX  37888 87778 81114 
Lexus CT  24183 56027 51774 
Lexus IS  18048 41813 38639 
Toyota Prius+  48821 43986 36582 
Toyota Prius  46780 42147 35052 
Mercedes C class 2615 32621 29390 24443 
Peugeot 508     
Peugeot 3008     
Total 2615 568534 1135623 1038734 
 
Table 102: Estimated Co demand for HEVs until 2030 (Tech 3) 
HEV models 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Toyota Auris  52834 122404 113112 
Toyota Yaris  48020 111251 102805 
Lexus NX  10609 24578 22712 
Lexus CT  6771 15688 14497 
Lexus IS  5053 11708 10819 
Toyota Prius+  13670 12316 10243 
Toyota Prius  13098 11801 9815 
Mercedes C class 732 9134 8229 6844 
Peugeot 508     
Peugeot 3008     
Co demand per year (kg) 732 159189 317974 290846 
 
Graphite 
To estimate the demand for graphite used in PHEVs, BEVs and HEVs until 2030, 
information on the models registered in the EU in 2014/2015 has been used. 
 
Table 103: Estimated graphite demand for PHEVs registered in the EU in 2015  
PHEV models EU sales 
(cars) 
Battery 
capacity 
(kWh) 
C per 
vehicle 
(kg) 
C per 
model 
(kg) 
Mitsubishi Outlander 28250 12 34.44 972930 
VW Golf GTE 14834 8.8 25.26 374648 
Audi A3 e-Tron 9851 8.8 25.26 248797 
Volvo V60 PHEV 6328 11.2 32.14 203407 
Volvo XC90 2818 9.2 26.40 74406 
Mercedes C350e 5245 6.2 17.79 93330 
BMW X5 40e 1472 9 25.83 38022 
BMW i3Rex 4999 18.8 53.96 269726 
BMW 225xe Active Tourer 263 7.7 22.10 5812 
VW Passat GTE 4730 9.9 28.41 134393 
Others 10717  25.95(1) 278065 
Total 89507   2693536 
Note: (1) The average graphite demand to be used in the category 'Others' has been derived from Table 104. 
The amount of natural graphite feedstock needed per kWh varies between 0.6 and 1.1 
kg/kWh in different sources [TMR, 2014; AVICENNE, 2014c]. The amount of processed 
graphite (battery grade) is around three times less: 
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𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒 𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡
= 3.3 
 
Since the demand and supply figures used in D1.1 indicator refer to natural graphite, the 
amount of natural graphite (denoted as C) has been taken for calculating the demand for 
graphite for EVs. An average amount of 2.87 kg/kWh and 2015 sales figures are used 
for calculating the demand for natural graphite in 2015. 
Information on models sold in the EU in 2014 (Table 104) has been used to calculate the 
average amount of graphite per vehicle for the ‘Others’ category; consequently this is 
used in Table 103. 
 
Table 104: Estimated graphite demand for PHEVs registered in the EU in 2014: ‘Others’ 
category  
PHEV models: 'Others' EU sales 
(cars) 
Battery 
capacity 
(kWh) 
C per 
vehicle 
(kg) 
C per 
model 
(kg) 
Porsche Cayenne S E-Hybrid 1486 11 31.57 46913 
BMW i8 1116 7.1 20.38 22741 
Toyota Prius PHEV 159 4.4 12.63 2008 
Mercedes S500 Plug-in Hybrid 141 8.7 24.97 3521 
Porsche Panamera S E-Hybrid 110 9.4 26.98 2968 
Total 'Others' 3012   78150 
 
Table 105: Estimated graphite demand for BEVs registered in the EU in 2015 
BEV models EU sales 
(cars) 
Battery 
capacity 
(kWh) 
C per 
vehicle 
(kg) 
C per 
model 
(kg) 
Nissan LEAF 11896 30 86.10 1024246 
Tesla Model S(1) 10389 72.5 208.08 2161691 
VW e-Golf 2076 26.5 76.06 157890 
Renault ZOE 16424 22 63.14 1037011 
BMW i3 3481 33 94.71 329686 
VW e-UP 1397 18.7 53.67 74976 
Kia Soul EV 4916 27 77.49 380941 
Mercedes B-Class Electric 1288 28 80.36 103504 
Peugeot iOn 870 16 45.92 39950 
Citroën C-Zéro 1075 16 45.92 49364 
Others 5421  53.52(2) 290142 
Total 59233   5649400 
Note: (1) The Tesla S model is offered on the market with two battery capacities: 60 kWh and 85 kWh. To 
account for this, an average value of 72.5 kWh was used for the calculations thereby assuming an equal 
proportion of both battery capacities. 
Note: (2) The average graphite demand to be used in the category 'Others' has been derived from Table 106. 
Information on models sold in the EU in 2014 (Table 106) has been used to calculate the 
average amount of graphite per vehicle (namely 53.52 kg) for the ‘Others’ category; 
consequently this is used in Table 105. 
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Table 106: Estimated graphite demand for BEVs registered in the EU in 2014: ‘Others’ 
category 
BEV models: 'Others' EU sales 
(cars) 
Battery 
capacity 
(kWh) 
C per 
vehicle 
(kg) 
C per 
model 
(kg) 
Nissan e-NV200 1614 24 68.88 111172 
Renault Kangoo ZE 1611 22 63.14 101719 
Smart Fortwo ED 1132 17 48.79 55230 
Renault Twizy 1138 6.1 17.51 19923 
Bolloré Bluecar 229 30 86.10 19717 
Mitsubishi i-MiEV 208 16.3 46.78 9730 
Total 'Others' 5932   317491 
The information in Table 103 to Table 106 has been used to derive an average amount of 
natural graphite required per vehicle (PHEV and BEV) in order to calculate future demand 
until 2030 for these two types of EVs. 
To estimate the demand for graphite for HEVs, a similar approach is taken as for lithium. 
The HEV models and number of cars per model using LIB has already been given in Table 
85. 
The demand for graphite according to the three deployment scenarios is presented in 
Table 107 to Table 109. 
 
Table 107: Estimated graphite demand for HEVs until 2030 (ERERT) 
HEV models 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Toyota Auris  351735 1489699 2726247 
Toyota Yaris  201199 852139 1559470 
Lexus NX  64205 271926 497643 
Lexus CT  40981 173567 317639 
Lexus IS  37642 159424 291756 
Toyota Prius+  91004 149889 246876 
Toyota Prius  87200 143623 236555 
Mercedes C class 10005 34018 56029 92283 
Peugeot 508     
Peugeot 3008     
C demand per year (kg) 10005 907983 3296296 5968469 
 
Table 108: Estimated graphite demand for HEVs until 2030 (Tech 2) 
HEV models 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Toyota Auris  1290697 4983731 7737037 
Toyota Yaris  738306 2850798 4425746 
Lexus NX  235601 909719 1412301 
Lexus CT  150381 580661 901453 
Lexus IS  138127 533347 827999 
Toyota Prius+  333941 501448 700630 
Toyota Prius  319981 480485 671339 
Mercedes C class 10005 124828 187443 261897 
Peugeot 508     
Peugeot 3008     
C demand per year (kg) 10005 3331862 11027631 16938402 
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Table 109: Estimated graphite demand for HEVs until 2030 (Tech 3) 
HEV models 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Toyota Auris  1290697 2990239 2763227 
Toyota Yaris  738306 1710479 1580623 
Lexus NX  235601 545831 504393 
Lexus CT  150381 348397 321947 
Lexus IS  138127 320008 295714 
Toyota Prius+  333941 300869 250225 
Toyota Prius  319981 288291 239764 
Mercedes C class 10005 124828 112466 93535 
Peugeot 508     
Peugeot 3008     
C demand per year (kg) 10005 3331862 6616579 6049429 
 
Rare earths 
To estimate the demand for Nd and Pr and Dy, respectively, in PHEVs, BEVs and HEVs 
until 2030, information on the models registered in the EU in 2014/2015 has been used. 
Not all EVs use a permanent magnet (PM) motor. Therefore, only those using PM have 
been taken into account when calculating the average demand for Nd, Pr and Dy per EV 
type. 
The demand and supply figures used in D1.1 relate to Nd oxide; for reasons of 
comparison, the Nd metal demand is transformed into Nd oxide demand assuming that 
for every 1 kg of Nd metal used, around 1.17kg of Nd oxide feedstock is required. The 
same assumption has been made for the demand for Dy and Pr metal. 
The Nd, Pr and Dy demand per vehicle is calculated as 22.65 %, 7.55 % and 7.5 % of 
the weight of the permanent magnet. 
The weight of the permanent magnet is assumed at 1.5 kg for PHEVs and BEVs, and 0.63 
kg for HEVs. 
Neodymium 
Table 110: Estimated Nd demand for PHEVs registered in the EU in 2015 
PHEV models EU sales 
(cars) 
Motor 
type 
Nd per 
model 
(kg) 
Nd oxide 
per 
model 
(kg) 
Mitsubishi Outlander 28250 PM 9598 11230 
VW Golf GTE 14834 PM 5040 5897 
Audi A3 e-Tron 9851 PM 3347 3916 
Volvo V60 PHEV 6328 PM 2150 2515 
Volvo XC90 2818 PM 957 1120 
Mercedes C350e 5245 PM 1782 2085 
BMW X5 40e 1472 PM 500 585 
BMW i3Rex 4999 PM 1698 1987 
BMW 225xe Active Tourer 263 PM 89 105 
VW Passat GTE 4730 PM 1607 1880 
Others 10717  3641(1) 4260 
Total 89507  30410 35580 
Note: (1) The average Nd demand to be used in the category 'Others' has been derived from Table 111. 
Information on models sold in the EU in 2014 (Table 111) is used to calculate the 
average amount of Nd per vehicle for the ‘Others’ category; consequently this is used in 
Table 110. 
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Table 111: Estimated Nd demand for PHEVs registered in the EU in 2014: ‘Others’ 
category 
PHEV models: 'Others' EU sales 
(cars) 
Motor 
type 
Nd per 
model 
(kg) 
Nd oxide 
per 
model 
(kg) 
Porsche Cayenne S E-Hybrid 1486 PM 505 591 
BMW i8 1116 PM 379 444 
Toyota Prius PHEV 159 PM 54 63 
Mercedes S500 Plug-in Hybrid 141 PM 48 56 
Porsche Panamera S E-Hybrid 110 PM 37 44 
Total 'Others' 3012  1023 1197 
 
A similar approach is used to calculate the Nd demand for BEVs. 
 
Table 112: Estimated Nd demand for BEVs registered in the EU in 2015 
BEV models EU sales 
(cars) 
Motor 
type 
Nd per 
model 
(kg) 
Nd oxide 
per 
model 
(kg) 
Nissan LEAF 11896 PM 4042 4729 
Tesla Model S(1) 10389 Non-PM 0 0 
VW e-Golf 2076 PM 705 825 
Renault ZOE 16424 Non-PM 0 0 
BMW i3(2) 3481 PM 355 415 
VW e-UP 1397 PM 475 555 
Kia Soul EV 4916 PM 1670 1954 
Mercedes B-Class Electric 1288 PM 438 512 
Peugeot iOn 870 PM 296 346 
Citroën C-Zéro 1075 PM 365 427 
Others 5421  745(3) 872 
Total 59233  9090 10635 
Note: (1) The Tesla S model is offered on the market with two battery capacities: 60 kWh and 85 kWh. To 
account for this, an average value of 72.5 kWh was used for the calculations thereby assuming an equal 
proportion of both battery capacities. 
Note: (2) BMW i3 uses 30 % less PM, e.g. a PM weight of 0.45 kg. 
Note: (3) The average Nd demand to be used in the category 'Others' has been derived from Table 113. 
 
Table 113: Estimated Nd demand for BEVs registered in the EU in 2014: ‘Others’ category  
BEV models: 'Others' EU sales 
(cars) 
Motor 
type 
Nd per 
model 
(kg) 
Nd oxide 
per 
model 
(kg) 
Nissan e-NV200 1614 PM 548 642 
Renault Kangoo ZE 1611 Non-PM 0 0 
Smart Fortwo ED 1132 Non-PM 0 0 
Renault Twizy 1138 Non-PM 0 0 
Bolloré Bluecar 229 PM 78 91 
Mitsubishi i-MiEV 208 PM 71 83 
Total 'Others' 5932  697 815 
 
Nd demand for HEVs in 2015 is presented in Table 114. 
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Table 114: Estimated Nd demand for HEVs registered in the EU in 2015  
HEV models EU sales 
(cars) 
Motor 
type 
Nd per 
model 
(kg) 
Nd oxide 
per 
model 
(kg) 
Toyota Auris 72020 PM 10277 12024 
Toyota Yaris 65457 PM 9340 10928 
Lexus NX 14461 PM 2063 2414 
Lexus CT 9230 PM 1317 1541 
Lexus IS 6888 PM 983 1150 
Toyota Prius+ 6522 PM 931 1089 
Toyota Prius 6249 PM 892 1043 
Mercedes C class 4358 PM 622 728 
Peugeot 508 3700 PM 528 618 
Peugeot 3008 3051 PM 435 509 
Total 191936  27388 32044 
 
Praseodymium 
Table 115: Estimated Pr demand for PHEVs registered in the EU in 2015 
PHEV models EU sales 
(cars) 
Motor 
type 
Pr per 
model 
(kg) 
Pr oxide 
per 
model 
(kg) 
Mitsubishi Outlander 28250 PM 3199 3743 
VW Golf GTE 14834 PM 1680 1966 
Audi A3 e-Tron 9851 PM 1116 1305 
Volvo V60 PHEV 6328 PM 717 838 
Volvo XC90 2818 PM 319 373 
Mercedes C350e 5245 PM 594 695 
BMW X5 40e 1472 PM 167 195 
BMW i3Rex 4999 PM 566 662 
BMW 225xe Active Tourer 263 PM 30 35 
VW Passat GTE 4730 PM 536 627 
Others 10717  1214(1) 1420 
Total 89507  10137 11860 
Note: (1) The average Pr demand to be used in the category 'Others' has been derived from Table 116. 
 
Table 116: Estimated Pr demand for PHEVs registered in the EU in 2014: ‘Others’ 
category  
PHEV models: 'Others' EU sales 
(cars) 
Motor 
type 
Pr per 
model 
(kg) 
Pr oxide 
per 
model 
(kg) 
Porsche Cayenne S E-Hybrid 1486 PM 168 197 
BMW i8 1116 PM 126 148 
Toyota Prius PHEV 159 PM 18 21 
Mercedes S500 Plug-in Hybrid 141 PM 16 19 
Porsche Panamera S E-Hybrid 110 PM 12 15 
Total 'Others' 3012  341 399 
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Table 117: Estimated Pr demand for BEVs registered in the EU in 2015 
BEV models EU sales 
(cars) 
Motor 
type 
Pr per 
model 
(kg) 
Pr oxide 
per 
model 
(kg) 
Nissan LEAF 11896 PM 1347 1576 
Tesla Model S(1) 10389 Non PM 0 0 
VW e-Golf 2076 PM 235 275 
Renault ZOE 16424 Non PM 0 0 
BMW i3(2) 3481 PM 118 138 
VW e-UP 1397 PM 158 185 
Kia Soul EV 4916 PM 557 651 
Mercedes B-Class Electric 1288 PM 146 171 
Peugeot iOn 870 PM 99 115 
Citroën C-Zéro 1075 PM 122 142 
Others 5421  248(3) 291 
Total 59233  3030 3545 
Note: (1) The Tesla S model is offered on the market with two battery capacities: 60 kWh and 85 kWh. To 
account for this, an average value of 72.5 kWh was used for the calculations thereby assuming an equal 
proportion of both battery capacities. 
Note: (2) BMW i3 uses 30 % less PM, e.g. a PM weight of 0.45 kg. 
Note: (3) The average Pr demand to be used in the category 'Others' has been derived from Table 118. 
 
Table 118: Estimated Pr demand for BEVs registered in the EU in 2014: ‘Others’ category  
BEV models: 'Others' EU sales 
(cars) 
Motor 
type 
Pr per 
model 
(kg) 
Pr oxide 
per 
model 
(kg) 
Nissan e-NV200 1614 PM 183 214 
Renault Kangoo ZE 1611 Non PM 0 0 
Smart Fortwo ED 1132 Non PM 0 0 
Renault Twizy 1138 Non PM 0 0 
Bolloré Bluecar 229 PM 26 30 
Mitsubishi i-MiEV 208 PM 24 28 
Total 'Others' 5932  232 272 
 
Table 119: Estimated Pr demand for HEVs registered in the EU in 2015 
HEV models EU sales 
(cars) 
Motor 
type 
Pr per 
model 
(kg) 
Pr oxide 
per  
model 
(kg) 
Toyota Auris 72020 PM 3426 4008 
Toyota Yaris 65457 PM 3113 3643 
Lexus NX 14461 PM 688 805 
Lexus CT 9230 PM 439 514 
Lexus IS 6888 PM 328 383 
Toyota Prius+ 6522 PM 310 363 
Toyota Prius 6249 PM 297 348 
Mercedes C class 4358 PM 207 243 
Peugeot 508 3700 PM 176 206 
Peugeot 3008 3051 PM 145 170 
Total 191936  9129 10681 
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Dysprosium 
Table 120: Estimated Dy demand for PHEVs registered in the EU in 2015 
PHEV models EU sales 
(cars) 
Motor 
type 
Dy per 
model 
(kg) 
Dy oxide 
per 
model 
(kg) 
Mitsubishi Outlander 28250 PM 3178 3718 
VW Golf GTE 14834 PM 1669 1953 
Audi A3 e-Tron 9851 PM 1108 1297 
Volvo V60 PHEV 6328 PM 712 833 
Volvo XC90 2818 PM 317 371 
Mercedes C350e 5245 PM 590 690 
BMW X5 40e 1472 PM 166 194 
BMW i3Rex 4999 PM 562 658 
BMW 225xe Active Tourer 263 PM 30 35 
VW Passat GTE 4730 PM 532 623 
Others 10717 PM 1206(1) 1411 
Total 89507  10070 11781 
Note: (1) The average Dy demand to be used in the category 'Others' has been derived from Table 121. 
 
Table 121: Estimated Dy demand for PHEVs registered in the EU in 2014: ‘Others’ 
category 
PHEV models: 'Others' EU sales 
(cars) 
Motor 
type 
Dy per 
model 
(kg) 
Dy oxide 
per 
model 
(kg) 
Porsche Cayenne S E-Hybrid 1486 PM 168 197 
BMW i8 1116 PM 126 148 
Toyota Prius PHEV 159 PM 18 21 
Mercedes S500 Plug-in Hybrid  141 PM 16 19 
Porsche Panamera S E-Hybrid 110 PM 12 15 
Total 'Others' 3012  341 399 
 
Table 122: Estimated Dy demand for BEVs registered in the EU in 2015 
BEV models EU sales 
(cars) 
Motor 
type 
Dy per 
model 
(kg) 
Dy oxide 
per 
model 
(kg) 
Nissan LEAF 11896 PM 1338 1566 
Tesla Model S(1) 10389 Non PM 0 0 
VW e-Golf 2076 PM 234 273 
Renault ZOE 16424 Non PM 0 0 
BMW i3(2) 3481 PM 117 137 
VW e-UP 1397 PM 157 184 
Kia Soul EV 4916 PM 553 647 
Mercedes B-Class Electric 1288 PM 145 170 
Peugeot iOn 870 PM 98 115 
Citroën C-Zéro 1075 PM 121 141 
Others 5421  247(3) 289 
Total 59233  3010 3522 
Note: (1) The Tesla S model is offered on the market with two battery capacities: 60 kWh and 85 kWh. To 
account for this, an average value of 72.5 kWh was used for the calculations thereby assuming an equal 
proportion of both battery capacities. 
Note: (2) BMW i3 uses 30 % less PM, e.g. a PM weight of 0.45 kg. 
Note: (3) The average Dy demand to be used in the category 'Others' has been derived from Table 123. 
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Table 123: Estimated Dy demand for BEVs registered in the EU in 2014: ‘Others’ category  
BEV models: 'Others' EU sales 
(cars) 
Motor 
type 
Dy per 
model 
(kg) 
Dy oxide 
per 
model 
(kg) 
Nissan e-NV200 1614 PM 182 212 
Renault Kangoo ZE 1611 Non PM 0 0 
Smart Fortwo ED 1132 Non PM 0 0 
Renault Twizy 1138 Non PM 0 0 
Bolloré Bluecar 229 PM 26 30 
Mitsubishi i-MiEV 208 PM 23 27 
Total 'Others' 5932  231 270 
 
Table 124: Estimated Dy demand for HEVs registered in the EU in 2015 
HEV models EU sales 
(cars) 
Motor 
type 
Dy per 
model 
(kg) 
Dy oxide 
per 
model 
(kg) 
Toyota Auris 72020 PM 3403 3981 
Toyota Yaris 65457 PM 3093 3619 
Lexus NX 14461 PM 683 799 
Lexus CT 9230 PM 436 510 
Lexus IS 6888 PM 325 381 
Toyota Prius+ 6522 PM 308 361 
Toyota Prius 6249 PM 295 345 
Mercedes C class 4358 PM 206 241 
Peugeot 508 3700 PM 175 205 
Peugeot 3008 3051 PM 144 169 
Total 191936  9069 10611 
The average amount of Nd, Pr and Dy calculated using the information in Table 110 to 
Table 124 is presented in Table 125. These values have been used for estimating the 
demand for these three materials until 2030. 
 
Table 125: Average amount of Nd, Dy and Pr per vehicle type used to calculate the 
Nd/Pr/Dy demand for PHEVs, BEVs and HEVs until 2030 
Materials PHEVs BEVs HEVs 
Nd 0.398 0.180 0.167 
Pr 0.133 0.060 0.056 
Dy 0.132 0.059 0.055 
Note: Average amount of materials per vehicle is in kilogrammes. 
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B.3.3 Indicator D1.1 Material demand 
Li-ion battery 
Table 126: Data for calculating D1.1 material demand for lithium 
Lithium 2015 2020 2025 2030 
EU demand for PHEV (ERERT) 0.27 3.81 3.71 6.92 
EU demand for BEV (ERERT) 0.56 7.99 7.79 14.5 
EU demand for HEV (ERERT) 0 0.09 0.33 0.7 
EU demand for PHEV (Tech 2) 0.27 0.72 3.09 7.18 
EU demand for BEV (Tech 2) 0.56 0.57 4.56 11.4 
EU demand for HEV (Tech 2) 0 0.33 1.10 1.69 
EU demand for PHEV (Tech 3) 0.27 2.05 10.2 16.7 
EU demand for BEV (Tech 3) 0.56 4.10 11.4 22.8 
EU demand for HEV (Tech 3) 0 0.33 0.66 0.60 
EU demand, all sectors (ERERT) 8.00 20.8 23.0 36.2 
EU demand, all sectors (Tech 2) 8.00 10.5 19.9 34.2 
EU demand, all sectors (Tech 3) 8.00 15.4 33. 5 54.2 
Global demand, all sectors 33.3 58.7 104 182 
D1.1.1 ERERT 0.02 0.20 0.11 0.12 
D1.1.1 Tech 2  0.02 0.03 0.08 0.11 
D1.1.1 Tech 3  0.02 0.11 0.22 0.22 
D1.1.2 ERERT 0.10 0.57 0.51 0.61 
D1.1.2 Tech 2  0.10 0.15 0.44 0.59 
D1.1.2 Tech 3  0.10 0.42 0.67 0.74 
D1.1.3 ERERT 0.24 0.35 0.22 0.20 
D1.1.3 Tech 2  0.24 0.18 0.19 0.19 
D1.1.3 Tech 3  0.24 0.26 0.32 0.30 
Note: Demand figures are given in thousand tonnes. 
The global demand for Li and its annual growth rate (12 %) until 2030 was estimated 
combining information from multiple sources: [OROCOBRE, 2012; Roskill, 2013; USGS, 
2016]. The EU demand for lithium was calculated based on information published by the 
European lithium company. 
 
Table 127: Data for calculating D1.1 material demand for cobalt 
Cobalt 2015 2020 2025 2030 
EU demand for PHEV (ERERT) 0.18 2.60 2.52 4.72 
EU demand for BEV (ERERT) 0.33 4.73 4.61 8.60 
EU demand for HEV (ERERT) 0 0.04 0.16 0.36 
EU demand for PHEV (Tech 2) 0.18 0.49 2.11 4.89 
EU demand for BEV (Tech 2) 0.33 0.34 2.70 6.73 
EU demand for HEV (Tech 2) 0 0.16 0.53 0.81 
EU demand for PHEV (Tech 3) 0.18 1.39 7.00 11.5 
EU demand for BEV (Tech 3) 0.33 2.43 6.74 13.5 
EU demand for HEV (Tech 3) 0 0.16 0.32 0.29 
EU demand, all sectors (ERERT) 19.8 32.7 40.7 57.7 
EU demand, all sectors (Tech 2) 19.8 26.4 38.8 56.7 
EU demand, all sectors (Tech 3) 19.8 29.4 47.5 69.5 
Global demand, all sectors 123 159 206 267 
D1.1.1 ERERT 0.004 0.05 0.04 0.05 
D1.1.1 Tech 2  0.004 0.01 0.03 0.05 
D1.1.1 Tech 3  0.004 0.03 0.07 0.09 
D1.1.2 ERERT 0.03 0.23 0.18 0.24 
D1.1.2 Tech 2  0.03 0.04 0.14 0.22 
D1.1.2 Tech 3  0.03 0.14 0.30 0.36 
D1.1.3 ERERT 0.16 0.21 0.20 0.22 
D1.1.3 Tech 2  0.16 0.17 0.19 0.21 
D1.1.3 Tech 3  0.16 0.18 0.23 0.26 
Note: Demand figures are given in thousand tonnes. 
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The global and EU demand for Co and its annual growth rate (5 %) until 2030 was 
estimated combining information from multiple sources: [Roskill, 2014; CRU, 2015; 
Darton, 2016; Statista, 2016g]  
 
Table 128: Data for calculating D1.1 material demand for graphite 
Graphite 2015 2020 2025 2030 
EU demand for PHEV (ERERT) 2.69 38.2 37.3 69.5 
EU demand for BEV (ERERT) 5.64 80.2 78.1 146 
EU demand for HEV (ERERT) 0.01 0.91 3.35 7.49 
EU demand for PHEV (Tech 2) 2.69 7.21 31.0 72.0 
EU demand for BEV (Tech 2) 5.65 5.71 45.7 114 
EU demand for HEV (Tech 2) 0.01 333 11.0 16.9 
EU demand for PHEV (Tech 3) 2.69 20.5 103 169 
EU demand for BEV (Tech 3) 5.64 41.1 114 228 
EU demand for HEV (Tech 3) 0.01 3.33 6.62 6.04 
EU demand, all sectors (ERERT) 150 313 384 586 
EU demand, all sectors (Tech 2) 150 210 353 566 
EU demand, all sectors (Tech 3) 150 259 489 767 
Global demand, all sectors 1157 1585 2172 2976 
D1.1.1 ERERT 0.01 0.08 0.05 0.07 
D1.1.1 Tech 2  0.01 0.01 0.04 0.07 
D1.1.1 Tech 3  0.01 0.04 0.10 0.14 
D1.1.2 ERERT 0.06 0.38 0.31 0.38 
D1.1.2 Tech 2  0.06 0.08 0.25 0.36 
D1.1.2 Tech 3  0.06 0.25 0.46 0.53 
D1.1.3 ERERT 0.13 0.20 0.18 0.20 
D1.1.3 Tech 2  0.13 0.13 0.16 0.19 
D1.1.3 Tech 3  0.13 0.16 0.23 0.26 
Note: Demand figures are given in thousand tonnes. 
The global and EU demand for graphite and its annual growth rate (6.5 %) until 2030 
was estimated combining information from multiple sources: [Roskill, 2014; ProGraphite, 
2015; CRU, 2015; TMR, 2014; Statista, 2016h]  
At present, around 55 % of batteries use natural graphite, 41 % synthetic graphite and 
around 4 % use amorphous graphite [ProGraphite, 2015]. Natural graphite has several 
advantages over synthetic graphite: lower price, higher energy density and higher power 
output – three important factors for the EV market. Therefore, it is expected that natural 
graphite will also prevail in the future. Since the future shares of natural and synthetic 
graphite cannot be forecast, a conservative assumption in the demand calculations is that 
all batteries will use natural graphite until 2030. 
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PM motors 
Table 129: Data for calculating D1.1 material demand for neodymium 
Neodymium 2015 2020 2025 2030 
EU demand for PHEV (ERERT) 36 505 457 413 
EU demand for BEV (ERERT) 11 151 136 123 
EU demand for HEV (ERERT) 33 113 187 307 
EU demand for PHEV (Tech 2) 36 95 410 951 
EU demand for BEV (Tech 2) 11 11 86 215 
EU demand for HEV (Tech 2) 33 416 624 872 
EU demand for PHEV (Tech 3) 36 271 1358 2235 
EU demand for BEV (Tech 3) 11 77 215 430 
EU demand for HEV (Tech 3) 33 416 375 312 
EU demand, all sectors (ERERT)(1) 3.50 10.8 14.0 21.4 
EU demand, all sectors (Tech 2)(1) 3.50 10.5 14.3 22.7 
EU demand, all sectors (Tech 3)(1) 3.50 10.8 15.2 23.6 
Global demand, all sectors(1) 20.3 33.0 53.7 87.2 
D1.1.1 ERERT 0.004 0.02 0.01 0.01 
D1.1.1 Tech 2  0.004 0.02 0.02 0.02 
D1.1.1 Tech 3  0.004 0.02 0.04 0.03 
D1.1.2 ERERT 0.02 0.07 0.06 0.04 
D1.1.2 Tech 2  0.02 0.05 0.08 0.09 
D1.1.2 Tech 3  0.02 0.07 0.13 0.13 
D1.1.3 ERERT 0.17 0.33 0.26 0.25 
D1.1.3 Tech 2  0.17 0.32 0.27 0.26 
D1.1.3 Tech 3  0.17 0.33 0.28 0.27 
Note: Demand figures are given in tonnes or (1) thousand tonnes for all sectors. 
Note: For Nd global demand in 2015 and until 2030 see notes in Table 15. The future EU demand – all sectors – 
differ for the two technologies: wind and EVs. The reason is that the wind demand has been considered when 
calculating the EU demand for the three EVs deployment scenarios, and vice versa. However, due to multiple 
scenarios considered for the wind technology, an average value has been taken into account as a wind demand 
in 2020, 2025 and 2030. The same point is valid also for the EVs. 
Table 130: Data for calculating D1.1 material demand for praseodymium 
Praseodymium 2015 2020 2025 2030 
EU demand for PHEV (ERERT) 12 168 152 138 
EU demand for BEV (ERERT) 4 50 45 41 
EU demand for HEV (ERERT) 11 38 62 102 
EU demand for PHEV (Tech 2) 12 32 137 317 
EU demand for BEV (Tech 2) 4 4 29 72 
EU demand for HEV (Tech 2) 11 139 208 291 
EU demand for PHEV (Tech 3) 12 90 453 745 
EU demand for BEV (Tech 3) 4 26 72 143 
EU demand for HEV (Tech 3) 11 139 125 104 
EU demand, all sectors (ERERT) 1095 3474 4449 6793 
EU demand, all sectors (Tech 2) 1095 3391 4562 7191 
EU demand, all sectors (Tech 3) 1095 3472 4838 7504 
Global demand, all sectors(1) 6.35 10.3 16.6 26.8 
D1.1.1 ERERT 0.004 0.02 0.02 0.01 
D1.1.1 Tech 2  0.004 0.02 0.02 0.03 
D1.1.1 Tech 3  0.004 0.02 0.04 0.04 
D1.1.2 ERERT 0.02 0.07 0.06 0.04 
D1.1.2 Tech 2  0.02 0.05 0.08 0.09 
D1.1.2 Tech 3  0.02 0.07 0.13 0.13 
D1.1.3 ERERT 0.17 0.34 0.27 0.25 
D1.1.3 Tech 2  0.17 0.33 0.27 0.27 
D1.1.3 Tech 3  0.17 0.34 0.29 0.28 
Note: Demand figures are given in tonnes or (1) thousand tonnes for all sectors. 
Note: For Pr global demand in 2015 and until 2030 see notes in Table 16. The future EU demand – all sectors – 
differ for the two technologies: wind and EVs (see explanation under Table 129). 
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Table 131: Data for calculating D1.1 material demand for dysprosium 
Dysprosium 2015 2020 2025 2030 
EU demand for PHEV (ERERT) 12 167 151 137 
EU demand for BEV (ERERT) 4 50 45 41 
EU demand for HEV (ERERT) 11 38 62 102 
EU demand for PHEV (Tech 2) 12 32 136 315 
EU demand for BEV (Tech 2) 4 4 29 71 
EU demand for HEV (Tech 2) 11 138 207 289 
EU demand for PHEV (Tech 3) 12 90 450 740 
EU demand for BEV (Tech 3) 4 26 71 142 
EU demand for HEV (Tech 3) 11 138 124 103 
EU demand, all sectors (ERERT) 225 1479 1643 2384 
EU demand, all sectors (Tech 2) 225 1396 1755 2780 
EU demand, all sectors (Tech 3) 225 1477 2029 3090 
Global demand, all sectors 1270 2140 3606 6076 
D1.1.1 ERERT 0.02 0.12 0.07 0.05 
D1.1.1 Tech 2  0.02 0.08 0.10 0.11 
D1.1.1 Tech 3  0.02 0.12 0.18 0.16 
D1.1.2 ERERT 0.12 0.17 0.16 0.12 
D1.1.2 Tech 2  0.12 0.12 0.21 0.24 
D1.1.2 Tech 3  0.12 0.17 0.32 0.32 
D1.1.3 ERERT 0.17 0.69 0.46 0.39 
D1.1.3 Tech 2  0.17 0.65 0.49 0.46 
D1.1.3 Tech 3  0.17 0.69 0.56 0.51 
Note: Demand figures are given in tonnes. 
Note: For Dy global demand in 2015 and until 2030 see notes in Table 17. The future EU demand – all sectors – 
differ for the two technologies: wind and EVs (see explanation under Table 129). 
 
B.3.4 Indicator D1.2 Investment potential 
Data for D1.2 calculations are given in Table 18 and Table 19. 
 
B.3.5 Indicator D1.3 Stability of supply 
Table 132: Country production share, HHI and WGI for mining lithium 
Country 2015 2020 2025 2030 WGI 
scaled share HHI share HHI share HHI share HHI 
Argentina 11.4  13.3  14.1  14.1  0.4 
Australia 40.2  30.8  30.1  24.9  0.9 
Austria 0.0  0.0  0.3  0.8  0.9 
Bolivia 0.0  5.4  4.3  3.5  0.4 
Brazil 0.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.5 
Canada 0.0  11.0  11.3  14.4  0.9 
Chile 35.1  22.7  18.1  15.6  0.8 
China 6.6  12.1  9.9  8.2  0.4 
Czech Republic 0.0  0.0  0.8  2.3  0.8 
Finland 0.0  0.0  0.4  1.1  1.0 
Mexico 0.0  1.9  5.0  4.1  0.5 
Peru 0.0  0.0  0.4  1.1  0.5 
Portugal 0.9  0.5  0.4  0.4  0.8 
Serbia 0.0  0.0  1.1  3.2  0.6 
Spain 0.0  0.0  0.3  0.9  0.7 
USA 2.6  1.4  2.9  5.0  0.8 
Zimbabwe 2.7  0.9  0.7  0.6  0.2 
Total 100 3037 100 1942 100 1709 100 1410  
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Mine production shares in 2015 are calculated based on 2015 data available from [USGS, 
2016]. Production projections in 2020, 2025 and 2030 were obtained according to the 
procedures in Annex C. 
 
Table 133: Country production share, HHI and WGI for mining cobalt 
Country 2015 2020 2025 2030 WGI 
scaled share HHI share HHI share HHI share HHI 
Australia 4.9  4.9  7.9  11.3  0.94 
Botswana 0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.70 
Brazil 2.1  1.1  0.9  0.9  0.53 
Canada 5.1  4.0  4.3  3.6  0.95 
China 5.9  5.2  4.6  0.5  0.44 
Côte d'Ivoire 0.0  0.0  0.1  0.2  0.38 
Cuba 3.4  5.0  4.4  4.2  0.43 
Dem. Rep. 
Congo 
51.3  55.2  49.9  46.5  0.30 
Finland 1.7  1.7  1.5  1.6  1.00 
Indonesia 0.3  0.9  2.8  2.6  0.49 
Madagascar 2.9  3.5  3.1  3.0  0.35 
Mexico 0.0  1.1  0.9  0.9  0.49 
Morocco 1.1  0.4  0.0  0.0  0.48 
New Caledonia 2.7  3.7  3.3  3.2  0.54 
Norway 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.98 
Papua New 
Guinea 
1.7  2.1  2.4  3.4  0.42 
Philippines 3.7  3.4  2.6  2.4  0.50 
Russia 5.1  0.0  0.5  1.6  0.38 
Serbia 0.0  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.56 
Solomon 
Islands 
0.0  0.0  0.1  0.3  0.45 
South Africa 2.3  0.7  0.6  0.6  0.60 
Tanzania 0.0  0.0  0.2  0.6  0.43 
Tonga 0.0  0.0  2.8  9.0  0.57 
Uganda 0.0  0.2  0.2  0.0  0.39 
USA 0.6  0.6  1.1  1.3  0.84 
Vietnam 0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.43 
Zambia 4.5  6.0  5.5  2.2  0.48 
Zimbabwe 0.3  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.22 
Total 100 2820 100 3228 100 2694 100 2454  
Mine production shares in 2015 are calculated based on 2015 data, available from 
[Statista, 2016g; Roskill, 2014]. Mine capacities projections in 2020, 2025 and 2030 
were obtained according to the procedures in Annex C. It should be noted that the 
dataset used to normalise the data on capacities refers to the mine production in 2014 as 
given in [BGS, 2016a]. 
 
Table 134: Country production share, HHI and WGI for refining cobalt 
Country 2015 2020/2025/2030 WGI 
scaled Share HHI Share HHI 
Australia 5.3  4.3  0.94 
Belgium 4.0  3.2  0.86 
Brazil 1.3  1.1  0.53 
Canada 4.0  4.6  0.95 
China 43.6  35.6  0.44 
Dem. Rep. 
Congo 
10.1  15.8  0.3 
Finland 9.9  8.1  1.0 
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Country 2015 2020/2025/2030 WGI 
scaled Share HHI Share HHI 
France 0.3  0.2  0.82 
India 0.7  0.5  0.47 
Japan 2.0  4.1  0.89 
Madagascar 3.7  3.0  0.35 
Mexico 0.0  0.9  0.49 
Morocco 1.3  1.1  0.48 
New Caledonia 0.0  2.7  0.54 
Norway 3.4  2.8  0.98 
Russia 2.0  3.2  0.38 
South Africa 1.2  0.9  0.6 
South Korea 0.3  0.3  0.73 
Uganda 0.7  0.5  0.39 
UK 6.2  5.0  0.9 
USA 0.0  0.8  0.94 
Zambia 0.0  1.1  0.48 
Total 100 2243 100 1717  
Cobalt refinery production in 2015 and refinery capacities in 2020 were retrieved from 
[Roskill, 2014]. The same shares are assumed in 2025 and 2030. 
 
Table 135: Country production share, HHI and WGI for production of graphite 
Country 2015 2020 2025 2030 WGI 
scaled share HHI share HHI share HHI share HHI 
Australia 0.0  0.6  3.1  4.6  0.94 
Austria 0.0  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.92 
Brazil 6.7  4.2  3.0  0.9  0.53 
Canada 2.5  5.0  7.3  8.8  0.95 
China 65.6  49.6  36.2  30.0  0.44 
Ethiopia 0.0  0.0  0.2  0.5  0.35 
Germany 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.93 
India 14.3  6.1  4.5  3.7  0.47 
Indonesia 0.0  0.0  0.3  0.8  0.49 
Madagascar 0.4  1.2  2.0  1.7  0.35 
Malawi 0.0  0.0  1.0  2.8  0.44 
Mexico 1.9  3.5  2.5  2.1  0.49 
Mozambique 0.0  16.6  19.6  18.3  0.41 
North Korea 2.5  1.2  0.9  0.7  0.14 
Norway 0.7  0.5  0.4  0.3  0.98 
Russia 1.3  0.8  0.6  0.5  0.38 
South Korea 0.0  0.0  0.2  0.5  0.73 
Sri Lanka 0.3  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.48 
Sweden 0.0  1.7  2.4  4.2  0.97 
Tanzania 0.0  3.4  10.7  13.8  0.43 
Turkey 2.7  1.5  1.1  0.9  0.52 
Ukraine 0.4  1.6  1.2  1.0  0.35 
USA 0.0  0.0  0.9  2.4  0.84 
Uzbekistan 0.0  1.6  1.2  1.0  0.27 
Vietnam 0.0  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.43 
Zimbabwe 0.6  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.22 
Total 100 4579 100 2850 100 1924 100 2295  
Mine production shares in 2015 are calculated based on data available from [USGS, 2016 
and WMD, 2016]. Mine capacities projections in 2020, 2025 and 2030 were obtained 
according to the procedures in Annex C. To be noted that the dataset used to normalise 
the data on capacities refers to the mine production in 2015 as given in [Statista 2016h]. 
Data for D1.3 indicator for Nd, Pr and Dy are given in Table 20, Table 21 and Table 22. 
 173 
 
B.3.6 Indicator D1.4 Reserves depletion 
Table 136: Data for calculating D1.4 reserves depletion for lithium 
Lithium 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Reserves (mio. tonnes) 14.0 13.8 13.4 12.8 
Global demand (thousand tonnes) 33.3 58.7 104 182 
RDI (years) 420 235 130 70 
Lithium reserves were retrieved from [USGS, 2016]. See Table 126 for information on 
global demand data sources. 
 
Table 137: Data for calculating D1.4 reserves depletion for cobalt 
Cobalt 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Reserves (mio. tonnes) 7.16 6.48 5.60 4.45 
Global demand (thousand tonnes) 123 159 206 267 
RDI (years) 58 41 27 17 
Cobalt reserves were retrieved from [USGS, 2016]. See Table 127 for information on 
global demand data sources. 
 
Table 138: Data for calculating D1.4 reserves depletion for graphite 
Graphite 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Reserves (mio. tonnes) 229 222 213 201 
Global demand (thousand tonnes) 1157 1585 2172 2976 
RDI (years) 198 140 98 68 
Graphite reserves were retrieved from [USGS, 2016]. See Table 128 for information on 
global demand data sources. 
 
Data for D1.4 indicator for Nd, Pr and Dy are given in Table 23, Table 24 and Table 25. 
 
B.3.7 Indicator D1.5 Import reliance 
Table 139: Import reliance on lithium for various scenarios (%) 
Baseline 2015 2020 2025 2030 
ERERT 96 99 99 99 
Tech 2  96 97 98 99 
Tech 3  96 98 99 99 
Scenario 1      
ERERT 96 97 87 76 
Tech 2  96 95 85 75 
Tech 3  96 96 91 84 
Scenario 2      
ERERT 96 96 82 61 
Tech 2  96 93 80 60 
Tech 3  96 95 86 69 
Scenario 3      
ERERT 96 96 82 61 
Tech 2  96 93 80 60 
Tech 3  96 95 86 69 
Data used in the calculations of IR are given in Table 126 (EU demand) and Table 140 
(EU production, recycling and substitution rates). See the table's notes for information on 
the data sources. 
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Table 140: EU production, recycling and substitution of lithium 
Lithium 2015 2020 2025 2030 
EU production (tonnes) 300 564 2974 8597 
EU recycling rate (%) 0 1 5 15 
EU substitution rate (%) 0 0 0 0 
EU production in 2015 is based on data available from [USGS, 2016]. Projections in 
2020, 2025 and 2030 refer to mine capacities, obtained according to the procedures and 
references in Annex C. Recycling and substitution rates are based on the assumptions 
presented under Table 152 and Table 153. 
 
Table 141: Import reliance on cobalt for various scenarios (%) 
Baseline 2015 2020 2025 2030 
ERERT 89 94 95 96 
Tech 2  89 92 95 96 
Tech 3  89 93 96 97 
Scenario 1      
ERERT 89 92 93 95 
Tech 2  89 90 93 94 
Tech 3  89 91 94 95 
Scenario 2      
ERERT 87 77 58 55 
Tech 2  87 75 57 55 
Tech 3  87 76 59 56 
Scenario 3      
ERERT 87 73 43 29 
Tech 2  87 71 42 28 
Tech 3  87 72 44 29 
Data used in the calculations of IR are given in Table 127 (EU demand) and Table 142 
(EU production, recycling and substitution rates). See the table's notes for information on 
the data sources. 
 
Table 142: EU production, recycling and substitution of cobalt 
Cobalt 2015 2020 2025 2030 
EU production (tonnes) 2104 2712 2772 2999 
EU recycling rate (%) 0 15 35 40 
EU substitution rate (%) 0 4 15 26 
EU production in 2015 is based on data available from [Statista, 2016g]. Projections in 
2020, 2025 and 2030 refer to mine capacities, obtained according to the procedures and 
references in Annex C. Recycling and substitution rates are based on the assumptions 
presented under Table 152 and Table 153. 
 
Table 143: Import reliance on graphite for various scenarios (%) 
Baseline 2015 2020 2025 2030 
ERERT 99 99 99 100 
Tech 2  99 99 99 100 
Tech 3  99 99 99 100 
Scenario 1      
ERERT 99 86 78 70 
Tech 2  99 79 76 69 
Tech 3  99 83 83 77 
Scenario 2      
ERERT 00 85 73 61 
Tech 2  00 79 72 60 
Tech 3  00 82 78 68 
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Scenario 3  2015 2020 2025 2030 
ERERT 100 71 45 23 
Tech 2  100 64 43 22 
Tech 3  100 68 50 30 
Data used in the calculations of IR are given in Table 128 (EU demand) and Table 144 
(EU production, recycling and substitution rates). See the table's notes for information on 
the data sources. 
 
Table 144: EU production, recycling and substitution of graphite 
Graphite 2015 2020 2025 2030 
EU production (tonnes) 517 43567 82875 174593 
EU recycling rate (%) 0 1 5 9 
EU substitution rate (%) 0 15 28 38 
EU production in 2015 is based on data available from [USGS, 2016 and WMD, 2016]. 
Projections in 2020, 2025 and 2030 refer to mine capacities, obtained according to the 
procedures and references in Annex C. Recycling and substitution rates are based on the 
assumptions presented under Table 152 and Table 153. 
 
Table 145: Import reliance on neodymium for various scenarios (%) 
Baseline 2015 2020 2025 2030 
ERERT 100 100 100 100 
Tech 2  100 100 100 100 
Tech 3  100 100 100 100 
Scenario 1      
ERERT 100 100 98 95 
Tech 2  100 100 98 96 
Tech 3  100 100 98 96 
Scenario 2      
ERERT 100 100 93 86 
Tech 2  100 100 93 86 
Tech 3  100 100 93 86 
Scenario 3      
ERERT 100 98 63 28 
Tech 2  100 98 63 28 
Tech 3  100 98 63 28 
Data used in the calculations of IR are given in Table 129 (EU demand) and Table 146 
(EU production, recycling and substitution rates). See the table's notes for information on 
the data sources. 
 
Table 146: EU production, recycling and substitution of neodymium 
Neodymium 2015 2020 2025 2030 
EU production (tonnes) 0 0 349 994 
EU recycling rate (%) 0 0 5 10 
EU substitution rate (%) 0 2 30 58 
Note: see Table 27. 
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Table 147: Import reliance on praseodymium for various scenarios (%) 
Baseline 2015 2020 2025 2030 
ERERT 100 100 100 100 
Tech 2  100 100 100 100 
Tech 3  100 100 100 100 
Scenario 1     
ERERT 100 100 98 96 
Tech 2  100 100 98 96 
Tech 3  100 100 98 97 
Scenario 2     
ERERT 100 100 93 87 
Tech 2  100 100 93 87 
Tech 3  100 100 93 87 
Scenario 3     
ERERT 100 98 63 28 
Tech 2  100 98 63 29 
Tech 3  100 98 63 29 
Data used in the calculations of IR are given in Table 130 (EU demand) and Table 148 
(EU production, recycling and substitution rates). See the table's notes for information on 
the data sources. 
 
Table 148: EU production, recycling and substitution of praseodymium 
Praseodymium 2015 2020 2025 2030 
EU production (tonnes) 0 0 96 261 
EU recycling rate (%) 0 0 5 10 
EU substitution rate (%) 0 2 30 58 
Note: see Table 29. 
 
Table 149: Import reliance on dysprosium for various scenarios (%) 
Baseline 2015 2020 2025 2030 
ERERT 100 100 100 100 
Tech 2  100 100 100 100 
Tech 3  100 100 100 100 
Scenario 1      
ERERT 100 100 94 87 
Tech 2  100 100 95 89 
Tech 3  100 100 95 90 
Scenario 2      
ERERT 100 100 89 78 
Tech 2  100 100 90 79 
Tech 3  100 100 90 80 
Scenario 3      
ERERT 100 98 59 19 
Tech 2  100 98 60 21 
Tech 3  100 98 60 22 
Data used in the calculations of IR are given in Table 131 (EU demand) and Table 150 
(EU production, recycling and substitution rates). See the table's notes for information on 
the data sources. 
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Table 150: EU production, recycling and substitution of dysprosium 
Dysprosium 2015 2020 2025 2030 
EU production (tonnes) 0 0 95 312 
EU recycling rate (%) 0 0 5 10 
EU substitution rate (%) 0 2 30 58 
Note: see Table 31. 
 
B.3.8 Indicator D1.6 Supply adequacy 
Table 151: Li, Co and graphite global demand and mining capacity 
 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Li: Global demand all sectors (thousand tonnes) 33.3 58.7 104 182 
Li: Global mine capacities (thousand tonnes) 81.3 103 133 160 
Li: Capacities utilisation (%) 41 57 78 114 
Co: Global demand all sectors (thousand tonnes) 123 159 206 267 
Co: Global mine capacities (thousand tonnes) 241 160 180 189 
Co: Capacities utilisation (%) 51 99 114 141 
Graphite: Global demand all sectors (thousand tonnes) 1157 1585 2172 2976 
Graphite: Global mine capacities (thousand tonnes) 1843 2446 3352 4039 
Graphite: Capacities utilisation (%) 63 65 65 74 
See Table 126, Table 127 and Table 128 for information on demand data sources for Li, 
Co and graphite, respectively. Mine capacities in 2015, 2020, 2025 and 2030 were 
obtained following the procedures described in Annex C.  
See Table 32 for information on data sources for the rare earths (Nd, Pr and Dy). 
 
B.3.9 Indicator D1.7 Recycling 
Table 152: Li, Co, graphite global recycling rates (%) 
Materials 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Li 0 1 5 15 
Co  0 15 35 40 
Graphite 0 1 5 9 
 
Data for D1.7 calculation for Nd, Pr and Dy are given in Table 33. 
Lithium 
Globally, the recycling rates of Li are close to zero due to its abundancy and low cost. 
The lithium–ion battery is the application which will drive future demand for lithium 
worldwide. However, lithium is only a small fraction of the battery weight and accounts 
for less than 3 % of the production cost. The recycling of Li-ion batteries is more valuable 
for recovering metals such as cobalt and nickel which have a higher price than lithium. 
Consequently, almost none of the lithium used in batteries for the consumer market is 
recycled.  
Although lithium is 100 % recyclable, there is currently no economic driver for this. 
Recycled lithium costs five times the lithium extracted from brine. Specifically in the case 
of Li, LIB batteries will become the dominating application in the near future if no better 
substitute technology is found. Hence, secondary material flows are expected to arise 
from this particular end-use. 
Currently, recycling companies do not have a business case to extract lithium from slag; 
likewise, equipment manufacturers could not remain competitive by buying higher-priced 
materials from recycling companies. With Li-ion technology is in its infancy, a lack of 
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standardisation in battery chemistry, and ongoing research into different battery 
chemistries, currently there is no recycling infrastructure to explicitly recycle Li-ion 
batteries for automotive applications due to the very uncertain prospects for recycling 
companies. A few pilot plants exist at the demonstration stage, one of which is located in 
Belgium – Umicore's Hoboken plant. 
For the time being, Li-ion is the dominant battery technology for the future EV market 
which will become a significant and steadily growing market. Therefore, in the longer 
term, it is expected that recycling will become the major source of Li supplies, assuring 
supply stability and preventing price fluctuations due to geopolitical or other factors, 
which will affect the car’s purchase price. Other advantages of recycling include 
ecological paybacks and compliance with environmental laws. However, a significant 
number of batteries will only come through the waste stream for recycling after 2025, 
since the lifetime of a battery ranges from eight to 10 years. In light of the above, a 
recycling rate of around 15 % has been assumed for Li by 2030 [expert opinion: private 
communication]. An S-shape curve, with an onset after 2025, has been used to estimate 
the recycling rates in 2020, 2025 and 2030. 
The same recycling rate has also been applied for the EU. 
Cobalt 
Sufficient data and information are available (courtesy of experts from UMICORE) 
regarding the recycling of Co, which enabled the use of the formula proposed in the 
methodology to estimate future recycling rates. In 2015, around 41 % of the cobalt used 
was for battery chemicals. This share is expected to increase by 2030: for the 
calculations, it has been assumed that 50 % of the Co will be used in batteries in 2030. 
No significant growth can be expected for the other applications of Co: super alloys, hard 
metals, ceramics/pigments, catalysis, magnets and a few other minor applications. 
Although the recovery rate of Co is rather high today – 95 % or more – the collection 
rate is only around 9 %. However, it is expected that the collection rate will increase in 
future, mainly due to the fact that the core use of Co will be in LIBs – automotive and 
energy storage. The spent batteries will be returned to the recycling premises as is the 
procedure today for lead-acid batteries. If we assume a 90 % collection rate by 2030 
(which is not exaggerated considering the current collection rate of lead-acid batteries is 
around 99 %) the recycling rate from batteries can be estimated as the product of the 
above rates: 50 % x 90 % x 95 % = 43 %. 
As regards non-battery applications, which will consume around half of the Co by 2030, a 
significant increase in collection rates is not expected (due mainly to the dispersive use of 
Co in these applications). If the collection rate rises to 15 % by 2030, the contribution 
expected from non-batteries applications will be: 50 % x 15 % x 95 % = 7 %. 
A final recycling rate for Co of 43 % + 7 % = 50 % can be estimated using the 
methodology approach. The more conservative figure of a 40 % increase in the recycling 
rate has been taken for the calculations by 2030. 
Graphite 
The main increase in demand for graphite is expected to come from LIBs. However, the 
recycling of battery-grade flake graphite from spent LIBs is a challenge; the graphite is 
damaged and cannot be reused in batteries unless it is subjected to a special surface 
modification [Ghadi, 2014]. Apparently, this has yet to become a commercial solution.  
Manufacturers can also use synthetic graphite – although this is more expensive it has 
better properties compared to natural graphite. These features do not provide so many 
opportunities for increasing the potential for recycling. Therefore, a graphite recycling 
rate of around 10 % is taken into account up to 2030 – both globally and in the EU. 
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B.3.10 Indicator D1.8 Substitution 
D1.8 for Nd, Pr and Dy are assumed the same as for the wind sector. 
 
Table 153: Li, Co, graphite global substitution rates (%) 
Materials 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Li 0 0 0 0 
Co 0 4 15 26 
Graphite 0 15 28 38 
 
Data and information for the calculation of D1.8 for Nd, Pr and Dy is given in Table 34. 
Lithium 
A number of alternatives to Li-ion batteries, such as metal-air, lithium-sulphur, sodium-
ion, magnesium-ion, and flow batteries are currently being explored for use in electric 
vehicles. Hydrogen fuel cells, aluminium-ion and graphene batteries are also recognised 
as potential future alternatives to Li-ion. All of these battery chemistries are at different 
development stages and, according to the experts, 15 to 20 years away. 
The large technology companies and electric vehicles producers are aware of the 
limitations of current lithium-ion batteries and are investing heavily in battery chemistry 
research. However, before switching to another technology, the best replacement is 
being sought, which apparently is currently unavailable. Moreover, changes in production 
lines and manufacturing techniques are cost intensive. In a way, since this factor and 
existing deals with materials suppliers are hard to break, this will have a 'stabilising' 
effect on the lithium-ion technology until a proven substitute technology can be 
demonstrated. 
In other end-use applications of lithium – glass and ceramics, lubricants, gas and air 
treatment, continuous casting, synthetic rubbers and plastics, and aluminium smelting – 
lithium can be substituted although the product’s performance will be reduced. The single 
application where Li cannot be substituted is pharmaceuticals, but this represents only 
about 2-3 % of Li use. Due to the limited performance resulting from Li substitution, it is 
logical to assume that no substitution will take place until there is abundant Li at a low 
price. The incentive for substitution will come with supply shortage and/or a substantial 
price increase.  
For the time horizon under consideration – 2030 – no efforts are anticipated to substitute 
Li in its main applications and thus a substitution rate of 0 % has been applied in the 
calculations. 
Cobalt 
The substitution possibilities for Co are limited in most of its applications. However, 
substantial substitution results can be achieved for battery chemicals. Co is a major 
material in many new rechargeable batteries (up to 60 %), not only in electric cars but 
also in mobile phones and laptop computers. The future availability of Co is a matter of 
increasing concern for OEMs, which is expected to push forward the development of non- 
or low-cobalt-intensity batteries [CRU, 2015]. 
It is difficult to foresee how many batteries will contain less or no Co at all by 2030. The 
chemical composition of cathode materials varies depending on battery function and 
manufacturer. Various combinations of Ni, Mn and Al can be used to replace some of the 
Co, which will also lower the cost of the battery, an important factor for the automotive 
sector [Gaines, 2014]. Other materials are also mentioned as potential substitutes for the 
Co used in batteries. To reflect this, a substitution rate of around 26 % is assumed for Co 
until 2030. 
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Graphite 
Today, more than 50 % of batteries use natural graphite. However, alternative 
substitutes for natural graphite do exist and can be applied in case of a supply shortage 
or price increase. Natural graphite can be substituted with synthetic graphite, amorphous 
carbon, or Si-Sn carbon composites [SGL Group, 2013]. Therefore, substitution can be a 
tangible mitigation measure to deal with graphite supply issues. Hence, a substitution 
rate of around 40 % has been considered for natural graphite up to 2030. 
 
B.3.11 Indicator D2.1 Supply chain dependency 
Two supply chains were analysed for EVs: one for LIBs and one for electric traction 
motors with permanent magnets. The results for the LIBs supply chain are used in the 
downstream dimension assessment of Li, Co and graphite materials, while the supply 
chain for electric motors is used in the assessment of Nd, Pr and Dy materials. 
 
LIBs supply chain dependency 
 
Table 154: Country production share, HHI and WGI for relevant steps in the supply chain 
Country 2015 2020 2025 2030 WGI 
scaled share HHI share HHI share HHI share HHI 
 
Step 1: LIB specific materials 
 
 
Step 1.1: Cathode material 
 
China 44  44  44  44  0.44 
Japan 19  19  19  19  0.89 
USA 0  0  0  0  0.84 
Korea 8  8  8  8  0.73 
EU 12  12  12  12  1.00 
RoW 17  17  17  17  0.50 
Total 100 2794 100 2794 100 2794 100 2794  
 
Step 1.2: Anode material 
 
China 71  71  71  71  0.44 
Japan 26  26  26  26  0.89 
USA 0  0  0  0  0.84 
Korea 2  2  2  2  0.73 
EU 0  0  0  0  1.00 
RoW 1  1  1  1  0.50 
Total 100 5644 100 5644 100 5644 100 5644  
 
Step 1.3: Electrolyte 
 
China 51  51  51  51  0.44 
Japan 23  23  23  23  0.89 
USA 5  5  5  5  0.84 
Korea 8  8  8  8  0.73 
EU 9  9  9  9  1.00 
RoW 4  4  4  4  0.50 
Total 100 3316 100 3316 100 3316 100 3316  
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Country 2015 2020 2025 2030 WGI 
scaled share HHI share HHI share HHI share HHI 
 
Step 1.4: Separator 
 
China 10  10  10  10  0.44 
Japan 58  58  58  58  0.89 
USA 14  14  14  14  0.84 
Korea 12  12  12  12  0.73 
EU 2  2  2  2  1.00 
RoW 4  4  4  4  0.50 
Total 100 3824 100 3824 100 3824 100 3824  
 
Step 2: Cell/module manufacturing 
 
China 26  23  33  33  0.44 
Japan 31  10  9  9  0.89 
USA 20  59  52  52  0.84 
Korea 15  5  4  4  0.73 
EU 0  0  0  0  1.00 
RoW 8  3  2  2  0.50 
Total 100 2329 100 4184 100 3855 100 3855  
The analysis is performed for two steps in the supply chain for which consistent 
information has been found: step 1 – LIB specific materials (processed materials); and 
step 2 – cell/module manufacturing. 
The LIB-specific materials, namely cathode and anode materials, electrolyte and 
separator, are used to manufacture the electrodes; they are the key components of the 
battery cell. Cells, including other components, are assembled into battery packs to be 
integrated in the vehicles. Battery pack and cell/module manufacturing are assessed 
together since no information is available for companies performing only battery 
assembling/packaging activities as their main business. Thus, it is assumed that, in 
general, the companies producing the modules are the same as those indicated in the 
literature [Berger, 2011]. 
Data on LIB-specific materials were obtained from several sources: [AVICENNE, 2014a; 
AVICENNE, 2014b; CEMAC, 2015; CEMAC, 2016a; SNE Research data, 2016; Evonik, 
2015]. 
In 2015, a high concentration of manufacturing capacity for LIB-specific materials was 
observed in Asia: China, Japan and Korea were hosting more than 90 % of the cathode 
and anode material, separator and electrolyte production [SNE Research data, 2016]. 
The concentration of supply until 2030 for the cell/module manufacturing step has been 
calculated using partially commissioned capacities, capacities under construction, and 
announced capacities [BNEF 2016c quoted in CEMAC, 2016b]. The capacities partially 
commissioned and under construction are taken into consideration for 2020 along with 
the announced one – from 2020 onwards. To calculate the shares for 2020, capacities 
existing in 2015 were added to the partially commissioned and under-construction 
capacities. The shares for 2025/2030 were calculated by adding the 'announced' 
capacities to the 2020 capacities. The Tesla gigafactory capacity of 35 GWh is included. 
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Table 155: Parameters for calculating D2.1 supply chain dependency for the electric 
vehicle sector (Li, Co, graphite) 
 2015 2020 2025 2030 
A step 1.1 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 
B step 1.1 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 
D2.1 step 1.1 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 
A step 1.2 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 
B step 1.2 0 0 0 0 
D2.1 step 1.2 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 
A step 1.3 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 
B step 1.3 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 
D2.1 step 1.3 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 
A step 1.4 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 
B step 1.4 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
D2.1 step 1.4 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 
A step 2 0.94 0.91 0.90 0.90 
B step 2 0 0 0 0 
D2.1 step 2 0.47 0.46 0.45 0.45 
D2.1 (Li, Co, C) 0.46 0.45 0.45 0.45 
Note: The average between the four sub-steps has been taken to calculate the D2.1 for step 1 in the supply 
chain. 
 
Electric motors supply chain dependency 
Table 156: Country production share, HHI and WGI for relevant steps in the supply chain 
Country 2015 2020 2025 2030 WGI 
scaled share HHI share HHI share HHI share HHI 
 
Step 1: Permanent magnet manufacturing 
 
China 83.3  83.3  83.3  83.3  0.44 
Japan 10.3  10.3  10.3  10.3  0.89 
USA 2.6  2.6  2.6  2.6  0.84 
EU 1.3  1.3  1.3  1.3  1 
Other countries 2.6  2.6  2.6  2.6  0.50 
Total 100 7064 100 7064 100 7064 100 7064  
 
Step 2: Electric motor manufacturing 
 
China 32.0  32.0  32.0  32.0  0.44 
USA 28.0  28.0  28.0  28.0  0.84 
UK 8.0  8.0  8.0  8.0  0.90 
Japan 7.0  7.0  7.0  7.0  0.89 
Taiwan 7.0  7.0  7.0  7.0  0.81 
Canada 1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  0.95 
South Korea 2.0  2.0  2.0  2.0  0.73 
Australia 0.8  0.8  0.8  0.8  0.94 
Brazil 0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.53 
EU 14.0  14.0  14.0  14.0  1 
Total 100 2172 100 2172 100 2172 100 2172  
Data used to calculate the concentration of supply for the permanent magnet 
manufacturing step were taken from [Benecki, 2011]. The concentration of supply for the 
second step was elaborated using data from [PR Newswire, 2011]. 
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Table 157: Parameters for calculating D2.1 supply chain dependency for the electric 
vehicle sector (Nd, Pr, Dy) 
 2015 2020 2025 2030 
A step 1 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 
B step 1 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
D2.1 step 1 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 
A step 2 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 
B step 2 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 
D2.1 step 2 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 
D2.1 (Nd, Pr, Dy) 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 
 
B.3.12 Indicator D2.2 Purchasing potential 
The data needed for D2.2 are given in Table 18, Table 19, Table 39 and Table 40. 
 
B.3.13 Indicator D2.3 Material cost impact 
Table 158: Parameters for calculating D2.3 material cost impact for EVs (Li) 
Lithium 2015 2020 2025 2030 
E (USD/kg) 8.50 9.54 10.70 12 
F (kg/kWh) 0.286 0.286 0.286 0.286 
G (USD/kWh) 369 246 185 123 
D2.3 (Li) 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.97 
E (USD/kg) is the price of lithium hydroxide. Both lithium carbonate and lithium 
hydroxide are used as a starting material in the production of batteries. Battery-grade 
lithium carbonate and lithium hydroxide are much more expensive than the technical-
grade lithium used in ceramics, glass and other industrial applications. Telsa and other 
EV leaders have selected lithium hydroxide as a starting material for their batteries since 
it can provide better power density. Other auto manufacturers are using designs which 
can be easily switched from lithium carbonate to lithium hydroxide in the future. Since 
lithium hydroxide apparently has more potential and might be the car manufacturers’ 
preferred option in the future, the price of lithium hydroxide is taken into consideration in 
the calculations of the D2.3 indicator. As to the future cost of lithium hydroxide, 
signumBOX forecasts the price will steadily increase, reaching 12 000 USD/t by 2031 
[SNE Research data, 2016]. 
The prices of battery-grade lithium hydroxide fall in the range of 8375 USD/ton to 8700 
USD/ton [SignumBOX, 2015]. In Korea and Japan, both known as high-quality battery 
producers, the price is even higher: battery-grade lithium hydroxide is sold between 
8800 and 10 500 USD/ton. An average price of 8500 USD/ton has been taken for the 
calculations in 2015. 
F (kg/kWh) is the Li material intensity in LIB (data taken from indicator D1.1). 
G (USD/kWh) is the cost of the Li-ion cell. The current average price per cell (369 
USD/kWh) was gathered from information from [CEMAC, 2016b]. There is a clear 
consensus between various research institutes and consultancies regarding the cost 
evolution of Li-ion packs: they all suggest a significant fall in the cost of batteries over 
the next 10 to 15 years [Muenzel, 2014]. The cost of Li-ion packs will drop from around 
600 (average cost) USD/kWh in 2015 to around 400 USD/kWh in 2020, 300 USD/kWh in 
2025 and 200 USD/kWh in 2030. It is logical to consider the same declining rate for Li-
ion cells, too, namely: 
2015 to 2020: CAGR = -7.8 % 
2020 to 2025: CAGR = -5.6 % 
2025 to 2030: CAGR = -7.8 % 
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When applying the same CAGR for the cost of the Li-ion cell, the cost is expected to fall 
to 123 USD/kWh, which has been taken for the calculations of D2.3 in 2030. Logically, 
the same G (USD/kWh) is also used in the analysis of Co and graphite. 
 
Table 159: Parameters for calculating D2.3 material cost impact for EVs (Co) 
Cobalt 2015 2020 2025 2030 
E (USD/kg) 28.0 40.6 40.6 40.6 
F (kg/kWh) 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 
G (USD/kWh) 369 246 185 123 
D2.3 (Co) 0.98 0.95 0.94 0.91 
E (USD/kg) is the price of high-grade Co [eCobalt Solutions, 2016]. 
F (kg/kWh) is the average material intensity (average Co used per kWh) calculated 
within indicator D1.1. 
G (USD/kWh) is the same as for Li, as described above. 
 
Table 160: Parameters for calculating D2.3 material cost impact for EVs (graphite) 
Graphite 2015 2020 2025 2030 
E (USD/kg) 1.00 1.17 1.17 1.17 
F (kg/W) 2.87 2.87 2.87 2.87 
G (USD/W) 369 246 185 123 
D2.3 (C) 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.97 
E (USD/kg) is the price of natural graphite; the increase in prices by 2020 is forecast in 
[Statista, 2016h]. 
F (kg/kWh) is the average material intensity (average C used per kWh) calculated within 
indicator D1.1. 
G (USD/kWh) is the same as for Li and Co, as described above. 
A different approach is used to calculate D2.3 material cost impact for rare earths (Nd, 
Pr, Dy) required in EVs. 
The three materials investigated – Nd, Pr and Dy – are always used in combination to 
manufacture permanent magnets. A different approach is used to estimate D2.3 for Nd, 
Pr and Dy: the impact of the cost of materials is estimated separately for the magnet and 
for the materials (Nd, Pr, Dy) contained in the magnets. The common D2.3 for Nd, Pr 
and Dy is then taken as the average between these two cost impact factors. 
Magnet: the permanent magnet is around 53 % of the cost of the motor [US DOE, 2014]. 
This leads to D2.3 scoring (magnet related) of 0.47. This scoring is obtained as follows: 
𝐷2.3 (𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑) =
𝑀𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑀𝑎𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑀𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡
 
Materials for magnet: the combination of Nd, Pr and Dy accounts for more than 70 % of 
the permanent magnet cost [Widmer, 2015; Rahman, 2014]. This would lead to D2.3 
scoring (material related) of 0.29. This scoring is obtained as: 
𝐷2.3(𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑) =
𝑀𝑎𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑀𝑎𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡
 
The average value of D2.3 = 0.38 is then used for the three materials – Nd, Pr and Dy. 
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Annex C. Methodology for data collection and aggregation on 
mine capacities 
The following document provides an overview of the methodology and principles used to 
project trends in mine production through to 2030. It describes the practicalities of data 
collection, from the preparation of source data and assumptions made to fill gaps, to 
producing final aggregated results, presented in Annex B. Although the data collection 
followed a recursive routine, each material covered – Nd, Pr, Dy, Li, Co, C, In and Ag – 
has its own methodological issues which are discussed separately. 
 
General methodological issues 
Mine production capacities are the underlying data used to develop projections of future 
mine supply, to be used as inputs for the calculation of indicators D1.3, D1.5 (EU 
production) and D1.6. 
The projections are based on current and announced annual production capacities (the 
nominal level of output based on plant design) of both operating mines and developing 
projects for which current information is available. For each mine/project (hereinafter 
also referred to as properties), idealised production profiles have been approximated 
using information published on resources and reserves. 
The evolution of supply sources and capacities over time up to 2030 has been estimated 
assuming that current development-stage projects will reach production, adding 
capacities and new actors to the current list of suppliers. Given the nature of the mining 
industry and lead time for exploration/mining projects (10-15 years from discovery to 
production), the list of potential new suppliers is deterministic in that only the suppliers 
listed may be in the market e.g. [Poulizac, 2011].  
While this assumption is legitimate, thereby allowing for a predictive analysis to be 
carried out supported by currently identified projects, market conditions are the primary 
driver of decisions to further develop exploration projects or move forward with 
committed and planned production centres. Projects must meet increasingly severe 
production-cost criteria in order to obtain financing for development. Therefore, 
estimates of potential future production are only reasonable under certain preconditions 
of growth in demand and rising prices.  
In view of this, the analysis process implemented is rather simplistic as it allows all 
projects (including those with challenging economics) to start operating without 
considering the variables that companies must consider in turning reserves into profitable 
production.   
Moreover, market conditions also make establishing the timing of the additional 
production capability extremely uncertain. Very often projects give an indication of 
planned production capacity without the start year. To make allowance for this and also 
delays in the delivery of mine projects, fixed development time frames have been applied 
to the projects at various stages of development. 
 
Data sources 
The SNL Metals & Mining database [SNL, 2016] (hereby referred to as SNL) was used as 
the main source of data on production capacities and resources. SNL integrates a large 
volume of data, comprising comprehensive and updated resource extraction and 
exploration data for mines and projects targeting several material categories. This data 
set gathers information from a variety of sources, most commonly from companies’ 
annual reports and other public documents. Access to the online database was allowed 
under a DG-GROW-JRC agreement.  
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SNL provides a list of all properties that include a specific commodity ranked by total 
contained reserves and resources. Data can be filtered by geography (country), 
development stage, activity status and property type. In addition to the above criteria, 
information on each project includes: owner, all commodities at the project, control risk 
ratings and total in-situ value. For each operation, a property profile is provided giving 
details on development studies, geology, significant drill results, a detailed breakdown of 
the project's resources and reserves, the year production started or is projected to start, 
estimated and projected annual production capacity including, in some cases, operating 
costs, recovery rates and mill-head grades. 
While resources and reserves for the list of properties, including breakdowns by target, 
activity status and stage of development, could be retrieved from the database in one 
single Excel file, capacities had to be compiled on a project-by-project basis from 
individual property profiles.  
As regards the development stage, SNL breaks down the mining development phases 
into three top-level stages, defined as follows:  
 Early-stage (includes grassroots, exploration, target outline): a project without a 
defined resource estimate; 
 Late-stage (split into reserves development and feasibility, started or completed): 
a project with a defined resource that has not yet reached a production decision;  
 Mine-stage (includes pre-production, further breakdown into construction planned 
and started, and production stage including the following phases: operating, 
satellite, expansion, limited production and residual production): a project that 
has made a decision to move forward with production or is actively producing.  
The following indicators are used for the activity status: active; temporarily on hold; on 
hold awaiting financing; on hold awaiting higher commodity prices; under litigation; 
inactive; or care and maintenance. 
Resources are presented as reported by profiled companies in a given year and include 
reserves. Resources and reserves are given as mineralisation in-place with no recovery 
factors applied to quantify total tonnes. 
The average annual capacity of an operation may refer to an initial capacity, an 
expanded capacity, or the operation's average life-of-mine capacity. It is estimated using 
optimal cut-off grades based on the characteristics of reserves and market conditions. 
SNL provides comprehensive coverage of most commodities targeted in this study. 
However, the data on rare earths is provided in aggregated form which implies the need 
to integrate a number of other data sets. The TMR Advanced Projects Index [TMR, 2016] 
was used as the source of ore grade statistics and relative distribution of in-situ rare 
earth oxides, to disaggregate the SNL resources and reserves information. Since these 
data do not cover all SNL listed projects, we have used additional sources such as 
company data to obtain rare earths distributions.  
Roskill reports covering cobalt and graphite [Roskill, 2014; Roskill, 2015b] were used to 
address gaps in the data on capacity provided by SNL. 
Moreover, in the case of indium, which is extracted during the refining of zinc 
concentrates, mine capacities are not available. Its assessment required a different 
strategy which involved the screening of the primary product and performing the 
assumptions described below. 
 
Data assembly 
Data collection took place over a three-month period between June and August 2016. 
The compilation process of resources and capacities from the source data followed 
specific steps and guidelines, described below.  
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 Projects reviewed fall into the above-described stages of: reserves development, 
prefeasibility/scoping, feasibility (either started or completed), pre-production, 
including construction planned and started and production, including operating, 
satellite, expansion and limited production categories. Early-stage projects were 
excluded from the analysis.  
 Only active operations and projects temporarily on hold that have been delayed 
due to poor market conditions or suspended for technical, labour, environmental 
or political reasons were included. Properties stated as under care and 
maintenance were also included. Inactive operations were excluded from the 
analysis.  
 Projects for which information on resources and reserves is not available (as a 
result, for instance, of the company involved not having or not releasing the data) 
were excluded from the analysis. 
 The most recent year’s resources and reserves calculated for the property were 
used to filter late-stage developing properties (feasibility and reserves 
development), as follows:  
o Cobalt, graphite and lithium: properties in which the most recent resources 
and reserves assessment/reporting was before 2012 were excluded; 
o Rare earths: no filter was applied based on resources and reserves 
reporting; 
o Silver: properties with resources and reserves assessment and reporting 
prior to 2013 were excluded; 
o Zinc: properties with resources and reserves assessment and reporting 
previous to 2011 were excluded; 
o This was intentional to suppress projects that have not undergone recent 
development work. No filter was applied to mine-stage projects.  
 Regarding data collection on production capacities, an effort was made to screen 
all properties meeting the criteria set out above. However, in the cases of silver 
and zinc, the very high number of properties in the final lists made data collection 
less feasible, thus the screening of production capacities was carried out on 
shortened property lists obtained by introducing thresholds based on the amount 
of metal in resources and reserves:  
o Zinc: only properties containing Zn above 1 000 000 t were screened; 
o Silver: properties with over 100 000 000 oz Ag and those with 
<100 000 000 oz Ag in resources and reserves but having Ag as the 
primary commodity were traced.  
o For the rest, capacities were estimated by applying a statistical correlation 
between annual known capacities (of screened projects) and total 
contained metal in resources and reserves, as described below. 
 For projects which, although screened, production capacity was not available, the 
following procedures applied: for graphite and cobalt, data was taken from the 
Roskill reports when available. Where these numbers were not available, 
production allocated to previous years, as provided in SNL, were considered 
instead. If no such data was available, capacities were derived statistically 
(described below). 
 For the rare earths, resources and reserves of each individual rare earth in the 
deposit were derived using rare earth oxides distribution profiles provided in 
[TMR, 2016]. In some cases, information available from SNL was used. In cases 
where the previous data were not available, rare earth contents were collected 
from [Roskill, 2015a] or approximated using average REO distributions 
attributable to the predominant REE-bearing mineral in the deposit. In the few 
cases where these numbers were not available, the properties concerned were 
excluded from the analysis. Production capacities for Nd, Pr and Dy were then 
derived using the SNL overall reported capacities adjusted to disaggregated 
resources and reserves. 
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Statistical correlations used to handle missing data 
As the result of data availability issues for all materials and the impracticalities of a 
comprehensive screening of the SNL database for zinc and silver, some data on 
production capacities was derived statistically. 
The approach described in [Cox, 1981] was used to fill gaps in the data. The invoked 
procedure is based on the assumption that the total metal contained in deposits and their 
annual production is log-normally distributed – large deposits produce relatively less 
metal per tonne of metal contained annually than medium and small deposits – and a 
high correlation between the two can be observed. This correlation was used by the 
authors for a rough prediction of the potential copper production from undeveloped 
deposits in the US.  
For the purposes of this analysis, annual production capacities of properties for which 
information are available were compared with resources and reserves. Both variables 
were first transformed by taking the natural logarithms; regression equations relating 
them were obtained and used in the prediction of missing capacities data. Different 
improvements in the correlation coefficients were tested by eliminating outliers in the 
data (Figure 73). 
 
 
Figure 73: Examples of linear regressions expressed as the logarithms of production 
capacities and resources and reserves, for cobalt, rare earths, lithium and silver. 
While for cobalt the correlation coefficient for the data sample is 0.8, for other materials 
regression equations relating log annual capacity to log resources and reserves are much 
less significant statistically, showing correlation coefficients between 0.3 and 0.6. In 
these cases, the statistical simulation has serious limitations, reflecting a high variability 
in ore grades and ore/waste ratios between properties.  
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Life-of-mine forecasts 
To develop projections of future mine supply, idealised production profiles to 2030 were 
approximated for each property. Life-of-mine forecast profiles were modelled using a 
declining resources method to estimate the number of years of production the reported 
resources and reserves could theoretically support at full capacity. A depletion date for 
each mine was determined dividing resources and reserves by annual capacity. For 
operating mines, supply is assumed to have occurred from the date resources and 
reserves were reported – these deductions were applied when calculating the remaining 
years of production.  
Moreover, as planned production capacities are rarely attained quickly after start-up, 
capacity profiles of mines expected to come online in the future were calculated 
assuming a production up trajectory over the first two years (30 % in the first year and 
70 % in the second year), each mine reaching full capacity in the third year. To account 
for a decline in production near end-of-life, a ramping down trajectory of the same 
magnitude and rate was applied whenever mine closure was anticipated before 2030.  
Since no distinction is made between reserves and resources, to calculate the remaining 
years of production, resources and reserves figures were adjusted by a factor of 75 %. 
This conversion rate is assumed to be reasonable between resources and reserves, and 
used for example by SNL to assess strategies for copper reserves replacement [SNL, 
2014].  
Moreover, to account for the losses occurring at nearly every stage of mining and 
processing, throughout the analysis, calculations of remaining years of production 
assumed average recovery rates of material held in the resources (Table 161). 
Despite the use of optimisation procedures, the analysis is constrained by several 
assumptions: 
 Production profiles were established under the assumption that capacity will 
remain the same as reported throughout the mine-life. However, a drop in ore 
grades, commodity price fluctuations, or seasonal slowdowns are likely causes of 
capacity oscillations; 
 Events such as strikes, plant failures and other factors can lead to unforeseeable 
production stoppages; 
 Expansions at the mine site aimed at increasing production and/or extending 
mine-life are likely to occur throughout the mine’s life, if market conditions are 
favourable. Other factors that can be expected to increase production are 
technical developments and improvements in mining configuration, processing 
and metallurgical performance; 
 To calculate the remaining years of production it was assumed that each year 
production equals capacity. However, since mines normally do not run at full 
capacity for cost-efficiency reasons, mine production rarely matches production 
capabilities and therefore a longer life time is foreseeable; 
 Although reports of mineral resources must satisfy the requirement that there are 
reasonable prospects for eventual economic extraction, it should not be assumed 
that such upgrading will always occur [JORC Code, 2012]; 
 Mine-processing recovery rates applied to downgrading resources and reserves 
figures are average values that do not reflect the variability of losses between 
properties and therefore do not allow for reliable estimates. In addition to aspects 
related to the intrinsic ore mineralogy and the complexity of metal recovery, 
increasing concentrate treatment and refining costs, extraction methods also 
introduce differential losses, which are higher for underground mining methods. 
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Table 161: Average mine-processing recovery rates and respective data sources. For 
cobalt, recoveries, refer to the downstream refinery process from nickel and copper 
concentrates 
Commodity Recovery rate Data source 
Cobalt 83 % 
[Oakdene Hollins & Fraunhofer ISI, 
2013] 
Note: 83 % is an average recovery 
value from nickel and copper 
operations 
Graphite 85 % 
[USGS, 2015] 
Lithium 
45 % (brines), 50 % (pegmatites, 
hectorites and jadarites)  
[Yaksic, 2009] 
Note: The type of deposit was 
allocated in accordance with the 
property's group of commodities 
Rare earths 50 % 
[USGS, 2013] 
Note: 50% are ceiling rates for ion 
adsorption clay deposits 
Silver 90 % [Infomine, 2008] 
Zinc 87 % [USGS, 2000] 
 
Establishing start-up dates for developing projects 
The stages in the life cycle of a mine have different development time frames which also 
depend on the project scale, commodity and geography. 
For the pre-production stage, typical development time frames will be around one year. 
For developments prior to the decision to build a mine, the best-case scenario will be four 
years (Figure 74). 
According to [SNL, 2015], a pre-feasibility study prepared with suitable resources 
identified (after around six years of initial and advanced exploration), can take two years 
to produce. When reflecting a positive outcome for the project, the pre-feasibility study 
will then be developed further into a feasibility study, which takes an average of two 
years to prepare. The permitting and financing stage should take about three years while 
construction of a mine is likely to take at least two years.  
To overcome the fact that projects very often do not have an indication of the start year, 
the previous criteria were used to fix the date when it may be anticipated that a new 
property in a given development stage can begin commercial production, as follows:  
 Mines currently under construction are expected to come on-line in 2018 (two 
years from the current date);  
 Projects at the feasibility stage are expected to come on-stream in 2020 (four 
years from now);  
 Supply from pre-feasibility and reserves development-stage projects should not 
be expected to be available at the project site until 2025 (nine years from now). 
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Figure 74: Development time frames over the life cycle of a mine project, adapted from 
[Sykes, 2012] 
These time frames can be further constrained by delays during the development period, 
which can be expected, especially in less favourable market conditions. Uncertainties and 
challenges in raising investment for mine development – due to generally increasing 
mining costs combined with uncertainties associated with market prices – are a major 
source of delays in setting up new operations. Developments are normally brought into 
line with materials prices picking up, while some delayed projects may be reactivated by 
the appropriate market signals.  
Other unexpected factors, such as geopolitical events, labour disruptions, permitting 
issues and various technical challenges (e.g. mining engineering and metallurgical 
problems) can also stall or put the development of planned and prospective mines on 
hold.  
On the other hand, depending on the project’s economics, it is reasonable to expect that 
at least some projects with less challenging economics will take fewer years than the 
fixed time frames to come into production. 
 
Indium calculations 
Indium is a by-product of zinc-metal-refining operations; about 99 % is produced from 
zinc ores [By-products, 2015].  
The degree to which both zinc mine production and indium refinery production are 
related was evaluated using USGS historical data (1999-2013). By applying a linear 
regression, a correlation coefficient of 0.96 was obtained. The resultant equation was 
used to calculate indium production capacities up to 2030, based on zinc data collected 
as described.  
This relation entails an average production of 60 g of indium per tonne of zinc produced 
and ultimately reflects an average indium content of 134 ppm in sphalerite ores, 
assuming they have a zinc content of 67 % [Schwarz-Schampera, 2002], and that a 
typical metallurgical recovery efficiency of 30 % is achieved [Oakdene Hollins & 
Fraunhofer, 2013]. 
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Final adjustments 
The data collected on capacities were aggregated per country to be used in D1.3, while 
totals in each year were estimated to produce results for D1.6. 
A final adjustment was made to the capacities data by comparing it with available 
production statistics for 2015, for which references are presented in the relevant tables in 
annex B. In cases where production in 2015 in a given country was estimated to be 
higher than the aggregated total capacity for all SNL-covered properties, data was 
normalised by summing the remaining difference with the assembled capacities data up 
to 2030. This is designed to account for projects that might not have been covered, for 
which information was not available or that were excluded during the compilation 
exercise, but are, in fact, producing operations. However, we are aware that this 
introduces additional volumes that can also result from mines that were recently 
divested, stockpiling, and artisanal or other kinds of informal mining. 
Furthermore, it was realised that in the case of graphite there was a large discrepancy 
between the SNL inventory and Roskill data sets. Many projects highlighted by Roskill 
were not covered by SNL. These operations were identified and the capacities allocated 
to them were added to the country's total up to 2030. 
 
Final remarks 
For the methodology, it is important to note that there is great uncertainty surrounding 
the further development of some projects, especially those in the reserves development 
and pre-feasibility stages. To date, these remain ‘works in progress’ without 
consideration of all the factors that determine the economics of an ore body. Therefore, 
there is no guarantee that they will prove to be feasible. It is also reasonable to expect 
that many of these projects will only go forward under strengthening market conditions 
while others may become unprofitable due to changes in material prices and production 
costs. New resources that are close to production with low estimated costs are more 
likely to be developed. For this and other reasons, there is no assurance that the 
indicated levels of production will be attained.  
On the other hand, it is also reasonable to expect additional capacities offered by some 
current early-stage projects (exploration stage), that have not been taken into account. 
Up to 2030, it is likely that at least some will be developed and enter into operation 
within less constrained timeframes. 
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